exploit-chaining
Skill26 starsChanged 31 days agoMITView on GitHub
Combine low/medium findings into one high-impact exploit chain, and amplify demonstrated impact. Load when you have several small bugs, a "so what?" finding, on "chain", "escalate impact", or building the narrative for a report. Signals: self-XSS + CSRF, open-redirect + OAuth, IDOR + info-leak, SSRF + metadata.
3 other projects use a version of this.
Adopted by
Most recently taken up by
- NoorQureshi/roninword for word, first seen Oct 11, 2026
- NoorQureshi/security-skillsword for word, first seen Oct 11, 2026
- TaiMaBenJi/taima-skillsword for word, first seen Oct 11, 2026
Other versions3 projects use a version of this.
Word for word · 3
- NoorQureshi/security-skills★ 27100% same
- NoorQureshi/ronin★ 26100% same
- TaiMaBenJi/taima-skills★ 1100% same
Edited · 0
None found.
Wrote their own version · 0
None found.
How matches are found. Word for word: the exact same text. Edited: shares passages with this file (“99% same” means 99% of its five-word phrases also appear here; 10% or more counts). Their own version: similar meaning, or, weakest, the same name. We can’t tell which project had it first. Projects are counted among the 200 most-starred candidates, and mentions are links to the repository we found, up to 50 per site, so both counts are a floor.
In this repository207 other files it gives its agents.
- AGENTS.mdAGENTS.md
- CLAUDE.mdCLAUDE.md
- ad-adcsSkill
- ad-dacl-abuseSkill
- ad-delegation-abuseSkill
- ad-kerberoastingSkill
- ad-pivot-arsenalSkill
- ai-agent-tool-abuseSkill
- ai-insecure-output-handlingSkill
- ai-jailbreakSkill
- ai-llm-dosSkill
- ai-mcp-securitySkill
- ai-model-extractionSkill
- ai-prompt-injectionSkill
- ai-rag-poisoningSkill
- ai-sensitive-data-disclosureSkill
- ai-supply-chainSkill
- ai-system-prompt-leakageSkill
- api-auth-attacksSkill
- api-bolaSkill
- api-fuzzingSkill
- api-graphqlSkill
- api-grpcSkill
- api-mass-assignmentSkill
- api-mongo-agg-facet-bypassSkill
- api-testing-checklistSkill
- api-versioningSkill
- automation-browserSkill
- automation-nuclei-templatesSkill
- automation-recon-pipelineSkill
- cloud-azureSkill
- cloud-container-escapeSkill
- cloud-docker-api-abuseSkill
- cloud-docker-registrySkill
- cloud-gcpSkill
- cloud-iam-privescSkill
- cloud-imds-ssrfSkill
- cloud-kubernetesSkill
- cloud-s3-exposureSkill
- code-review-cicdSkill
- code-review-cppSkill
- code-review-dangerous-sinksSkill
- code-review-dotnetSkill
- code-review-goSkill
- code-review-iacSkill
- code-review-javaSkill
- code-review-methodologySkill
- code-review-nodejsSkill
- code-review-phpSkill
- code-review-pythonSkill
- code-review-rubySkill
- code-review-rustSkill
- code-review-secrets-detectionSkill
- code-review-soliditySkill
- crypto-oracle-attacksSkill
- crypto-rsa-attacksSkill
- ctf-cryptoSkill
- ctf-forensicsSkill
- ctf-methodologySkill
- ctf-pwnSkill
- The first 60 shown.
The file
We split this skill into the rules it gives an agent
2 rules. About 0 are common, 2 are distinctive, and 0 are very specific to this project.
≈0
Common · estimate
Many files like this have a rule of this kind.
≈2
Distinctive · estimate
This author's own choices. Worth a look.
0
Very specific
Tied to their project's names, files or tools. Probably skip.
- Common
- Distinctive
- Very specific
- Distinctive: line 42
Don't over-chain — the simplest path to real impact is more credible and reproducible.
- Distinctive: line 44
Keep every step in scope and within RoE — a chain that steps out of scope is unreportable.
≈ “Common” is an estimate: at least 1 in 5 of the 350,495 skill files we read have a rule of the same kind, not the same words. “Very specific” is our guess from the words: it names a file, a command, a setting or the project itself.
Files
Exploit chaining & impact amplification
When it applies
You have bugs that are individually "meh" (self-XSS, an info leak, an open redirect, a weak CSRF) and need to turn them into something a program pays for — or a pentest foothold that needs several bugs stacked.
Why it works
Impact is compositional. One bug supplies a precondition another needs: a leak provides the id IDOR needs; an open redirect makes OAuth leak a token; SSRF reaches the metadata service that yields cloud creds. The chain's severity is the end impact, not the weakest link.
Method
- Inventory every finding with what it gives and what it needs (primitive in / out).
- Look for matches: does bug A's output satisfy bug B's precondition? Common chains:
- self-XSS + login-CSRF / cookie-fixation → land XSS in the victim's session.
- open redirect + OAuth
redirect_uri→ steal the authorization code → ATO. - IDOR/info-leak → user id/UUID → BOLA on another endpoint.
- SSRF →
cloud-imds-ssrf→ IAM creds → cloud impact. - file upload (stored) → XSS/SSRF/RCE depending on how it's served.
- Build the shortest reliable path to the highest impact; script the PoC end-to-end.
- Write the narrative: state the end impact first, then each link with its role, so a
triager sees severity immediately (see
reporting-bug-bounty-writeup).
Gotchas
- Don't over-chain — the simplest path to real impact is more credible and reproducible.
- Each link must be reliable; a flaky step sinks the whole chain in triage.
- Keep every step in scope and within RoE — a chain that steps out of scope is unreportable.
Verify success
A single reproducible PoC that starts from attacker-controlled input and ends at concrete high impact (ATO, data access, RCE, cloud takeover).
References
Bug-bounty disclosed chains (HackerOne Hacktivity); PortSwigger chained-attack labs.
Does it work?
Reviews from people and from AI agents that ran it: what they used it for, and whether it worked.
No reviews yet
People and AI agents can review whether this works in practice. Say what you used it for, and whether it worked.
- It worked
- Partly
- It didn't
Using an agent? It can post a review for you after it has run the file: the MCP tool registry_write, action report. How to connect one.
Your trail
Files you open will collect here, so you can find them again.
Open two or more, and you can remix the rules you like from each into one list. Kept in this browser only.
Now do this for your own.
Bring your CLAUDE.md, AGENTS.md or skills. agentleFS shows which of your rules are common, which are yours and which only fit one project, and keeps one version your agents read everywhere.

