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NoorQureshiNoorQureshi/SploitAgent/skills/api/api-auth-attacks/SKILL.md

api-auth-attacks

Skill26 starsChanged 31 days agoMITView on GitHub

Break API authentication: token handling, key leakage, weak session/JWT, and no-auth endpoints. Load on REST/GraphQL APIs using API keys, Bearer tokens, HMAC signing, or basic auth. Signals: `Authorization` headers, api_key params, tokens in URLs, /v1 vs /v2 auth drift.

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    Test every version and verb — the fix may exist only on the newest route.

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SKILL.md

API authentication attacks

When it applies

An API authenticates requests via tokens/keys/sessions. Auth is the gate; weaknesses here open everything behind it.

Why it works

APIs sprawl (many endpoints, versions, clients) so authentication is applied inconsistently: some routes forgot it, tokens are long-lived or weakly signed, keys leak client-side, and error/timing differences enable enumeration and brute force.

Method

  1. No-auth endpoints: replay requests with the token removed; probe /v1 vs /v2, /internal, /debug, and undocumented routes (Swagger/OpenAPI) for missing auth.
  2. Token weaknesses: JWT issues (→ web-auth-jwt: alg confusion, weak secret, none); long/ non-expiring tokens; predictable session ids; token accepted in URL (logged/leaked).
  3. Key leakage: hunt keys in JS bundles, mobile apps, git (→ code-review-secrets-detection), and test their privilege/scope.
  4. Brute/enumeration: username enumeration via login/reset differences; weak rate limits on login/OTP (→ web-race-conditions for OTP windows).
  5. Auth logic: password reset token predictability/leak, 2FA bypass, "remember me" tokens.

Gotchas

  • Test every version and verb — the fix may exist only on the newest route.
  • A leaked key must be live and privileged to matter — validate scope, don't over-collect.
  • Rate-limit "bypass" via parallelism or header rotation is reportable on many programs.

Verify success

Authenticated access without valid credentials (no-auth route, forged/replayed token, or a live leaked key performing a privileged action).

References

OWASP API Security Top 10 (API2); PortSwigger auth labs.

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