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NoorQureshiNoorQureshi/SploitAgent/skills/cloud/cloud-docker-registry/SKILL.md

cloud-docker-registry

Skill26 starsChanged 31 days agoMITView on GitHub

Find and loot exposed container registries — image pull/push, secrets baked in layers, and registry misconfig. Load on exposed Docker registry (port 5000, /v2/), a registry URL, harbor/ECR/ GCR/ACR references, or "container registry". Signals: /v2/_catalog, registry:2, unauth pull/push.

  • Reads credentials

2 other projects use a version of this.

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Most recently taken up by

The file

We split this skill into the rules it gives an agent

3 rules. About 0 are common, 2 are distinctive, and 1 is very specific to this project.

  • ≈0

    Common · estimate

    Many files like this have a rule of this kind.

  • ≈2

    Distinctive · estimate

    This author's own choices. Worth a look.

  • 1

    Very specific

    Tied to their project's names, files or tools. Probably skip.

  • Common
  • Distinctive
  • Very specific
  1. Distinctive:

    Push (critical): if anonymous/weak push works, you can poison images (supply-chain) — prove with a harmless tag, don't tamper real images.

    line 37
  2. Very specific:

    Cloud registries: test misconfigured ECR/GCR/ACR policies.

    line 39
  3. Distinctive:

    Only pull what proves the issue.

    line 44

≈ “Common” is an estimate: at least 1 in 5 of the 350,495 skill files we read have a rule of the same kind, not the same words. “Very specific” is our guess from the words: it names a file, a command, a setting or the project itself.

Keep what fits and drop the rest. Your version, ready for your agents.
Files
SKILL.md

Exposed container registry

When it applies

A Docker/OCI registry is reachable — a self-hosted registry (:5000, /v2/), or a cloud one (ECR/GCR/ACR/Harbor) with weak auth. Images are goldmines: source, configs, and baked-in secrets.

Why it works

Registries are often deployed without auth ("internal only") or with over-broad pull access. Image layers preserve everything added at build time — .env files, cloud keys, private source, tokens — even if a later layer deletes them, earlier layers keep them.

Method

  1. Detect & enumerate: curl -s https://registry:5000/v2/_catalog (repo list) and .../v2/<repo>/tags/list. registry:2 banner / an unauth /v2/ = exposed.
  2. Pull images: docker pull registry:5000/<repo>:<tag> or crane pull (no docker daemon). Anonymous pull of private images is the finding.
  3. Mine layers for secrets: crane export/docker save then scan with trufflehog filesystem / grep for keys, .env, kubeconfig, cloud creds (→ validate with code-review-secrets-detection).
  4. Push (critical): if anonymous/weak push works, you can poison images (supply-chain) — prove with a harmless tag, don't tamper real images.
  5. Cloud registries: test misconfigured ECR/GCR/ACR policies; leaked registry creds → pull private images.

Gotchas

  • Scan all layers/history, not just the final image — secrets hide in intermediate layers.
  • Anonymous push is critical (supply-chain); anonymous pull of private images is high — rate accordingly.
  • Only pull what proves the issue; images can be large and contain real data — handle carefully.

Verify success

Anonymous/unauthorized pull of a private image, a live secret extracted from its layers, or a successful (harmless) push proving write access.

References

Docker registry API docs; crane/trufflehog; "hacking Docker registries" write-ups.

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