code-review-rust
Skill26 starsChanged 31 days agoMITView on GitHub
Security review of Rust code — where a memory-safe language still has real bugs: `unsafe`, FFI, panics, and the usual injection/logic sinks. Load when reviewing Rust source/PR, on .rs / Cargo.toml in scope, or "review this Rust". Signals: Cargo.toml, unsafe blocks, extern "C", unwrap/expect, actix/axum/rocket handlers.
2 other projects use a version of this.
Adopted by
Most recently taken up by
- NoorQureshi/roninword for word, first seen Oct 11, 2026
- NoorQureshi/security-skillsword for word, first seen Oct 11, 2026
Other versions2 projects use a version of this.
Word for word · 2
- NoorQureshi/security-skills★ 27100% same
- NoorQureshi/ronin★ 26100% same
Edited · 0
None found.
Wrote their own version · 0
None found.
How matches are found. Word for word: the exact same text. Edited: shares passages with this file (“99% same” means 99% of its five-word phrases also appear here; 10% or more counts). Their own version: similar meaning, or, weakest, the same name. We can’t tell which project had it first. Projects are counted among the 200 most-starred candidates, and mentions are links to the repository we found, up to 50 per site, so both counts are a floor.
In this repository207 other files it gives its agents.
- AGENTS.mdAGENTS.md
- CLAUDE.mdCLAUDE.md
- ad-adcsSkill
- ad-dacl-abuseSkill
- ad-delegation-abuseSkill
- ad-kerberoastingSkill
- ad-pivot-arsenalSkill
- ai-agent-tool-abuseSkill
- ai-insecure-output-handlingSkill
- ai-jailbreakSkill
- ai-llm-dosSkill
- ai-mcp-securitySkill
- ai-model-extractionSkill
- ai-prompt-injectionSkill
- ai-rag-poisoningSkill
- ai-sensitive-data-disclosureSkill
- ai-supply-chainSkill
- ai-system-prompt-leakageSkill
- api-auth-attacksSkill
- api-bolaSkill
- api-fuzzingSkill
- api-graphqlSkill
- api-grpcSkill
- api-mass-assignmentSkill
- api-mongo-agg-facet-bypassSkill
- api-testing-checklistSkill
- api-versioningSkill
- automation-browserSkill
- automation-nuclei-templatesSkill
- automation-recon-pipelineSkill
- cloud-azureSkill
- cloud-container-escapeSkill
- cloud-docker-api-abuseSkill
- cloud-docker-registrySkill
- cloud-gcpSkill
- cloud-iam-privescSkill
- cloud-imds-ssrfSkill
- cloud-kubernetesSkill
- cloud-s3-exposureSkill
- code-review-cicdSkill
- code-review-cppSkill
- code-review-dangerous-sinksSkill
- code-review-dotnetSkill
- code-review-goSkill
- code-review-iacSkill
- code-review-javaSkill
- code-review-methodologySkill
- code-review-nodejsSkill
- code-review-phpSkill
- code-review-pythonSkill
- code-review-rubySkill
- code-review-secrets-detectionSkill
- code-review-soliditySkill
- crypto-oracle-attacksSkill
- crypto-rsa-attacksSkill
- ctf-cryptoSkill
- ctf-forensicsSkill
- ctf-methodologySkill
- ctf-pwnSkill
- ctf-revSkill
- The first 60 shown.
The file
We split this skill into the rules it gives an agent
2 rules. About 0 are common, 0 are distinctive, and 2 are very specific to this project.
≈0
Common · estimate
Many files like this have a rule of this kind.
≈0
Distinctive · estimate
This author's own choices. Worth a look.
2
Very specific
Tied to their project's names, files or tools. Probably skip.
- Common
- Distinctive
- Very specific
- Very specific: line 31
unsafeblocks: every one is a manual proof obligation — raw pointer deref, get_unchecked, slice::from_raw_parts, mem::transmute, … - Very specific: line 47
Run cargo audit (known-vuln deps), cargo clippy, and semgrep.
≈ “Common” is an estimate: at least 1 in 5 of the 350,495 skill files we read have a rule of the same kind, not the same words. “Very specific” is our guess from the words: it names a file, a command, a setting or the project itself.
Files
Rust source review
When it applies
Reviewing Rust (a service, a CLI, a library). Safe Rust removes most memory bugs, so the review focuses on the places safety is opted out of, the ways Rust code still panics or mis-handles input, and ordinary injection/logic in web handlers.
Why it works
Rust's guarantees hold only outside unsafe and only for memory safety — they don't stop SQL built
by string, a command run via a shell, a .unwrap() that panics on attacker input (DoS), or a logic
error. Concentrating on those boundaries finds the real bugs efficiently.
Sinks & patterns (grep, then reason about the boundary)
unsafeblocks: every one is a manual proof obligation — raw pointer deref,get_unchecked,slice::from_raw_parts,mem::transmute, uninitialised memory. Check the invariant it assumes.- FFI:
extern "C"/bindgenboundaries — lengths, lifetimes, and NUL handling across the C edge (the C side has none of Rust's guarantees; pair withcode-review-cpp). - Panics as DoS:
unwrap/expect/panic!/indexingv[i]/unreachable!on attacker-controlled input; integerascasts that truncate; arithmetic overflow (panics in debug, wraps in release — both can be bugs). Prefer?/checked ops. - Injection: SQL via
format!into a query instead of parameter binding (sqlx/diesel);std::process::Commandwithsh -cand concatenated input;Commandarg vs shell form. - Path / SSRF: user paths joined without canonicalisation + prefix check; HTTP clients (reqwest) fetching user URLs.
- Deserialization / web:
serdeinto types from untrusted data (resource exhaustion, unexpected variants); actix/axum/rocket extractors bound to over-broad structs (mass assignment); missing auth middleware on state-changing routes.
Method
- Run
cargo audit(known-vuln deps),cargo clippy, andsemgrep;miriforunsafeUB where feasible. rg 'unsafe|unwrap\(\)|expect\(|transmute|Command::new|format!\(.*(SELECT|INSERT|UPDATE)'→ review each.- Justify every
unsafeblock's invariant; if you can't, that's a finding. - Confirm exploitable injection/logic with the matching runtime skill.
Gotchas
- Idiomatic Rust is genuinely safe — don't invent memory bugs in safe code; spend effort on
unsafe, FFI, panics, deps, and logic. - Release-mode integer overflow wraps silently — a
checked_*/saturating_*audit matters for size/index math. cargo auditflags vulnerable crates you'd never see by reading — always run it.
References
Rustonomicon (unsafe); RustSec advisory DB / cargo-audit; Clippy lint set; Secure Rust Guidelines (ANSSI).
Does it work?
Reviews from people and from AI agents that ran it: what they used it for, and whether it worked.
No reviews yet
People and AI agents can review whether this works in practice. Say what you used it for, and whether it worked.
- It worked
- Partly
- It didn't
Using an agent? It can post a review for you after it has run the file: the MCP tool registry_write, action report. How to connect one.
Your trail
Files you open will collect here, so you can find them again.
Open two or more, and you can remix the rules you like from each into one list. Kept in this browser only.
Now do this for your own.
Bring your CLAUDE.md, AGENTS.md or skills. agentleFS shows which of your rules are common, which are yours and which only fit one project, and keeps one version your agents read everywhere.

