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NoorQureshiNoorQureshi/SploitAgent/skills/code-review/code-review-java/SKILL.md

code-review-java

Skill26 starsChanged 31 days agoMITView on GitHub

Security review of Java code — dangerous sinks and Spring pitfalls. Load when reviewing a Java/ Spring codebase/PR, on .java source in scope, or "review this Java". Signals: pom.xml/build.gradle, Spring/Spring Boot, ObjectInputStream, XML parsers, Runtime.exec, JNDI/lookups.

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1 rule. About 0 are common, 1 is distinctive, and 0 are very specific to this project.

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  • ≈1

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  1. Distinctive:

    Check XML parser factory configuration everywhere XML is read.

    line 49

≈ “Common” is an estimate: at least 1 in 5 of the 350,495 skill files we read have a rule of the same kind, not the same words. “Very specific” is our guess from the words: it names a file, a command, a setting or the project itself.

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Files
SKILL.md

Java / Spring source review

When it applies

Reviewing Java source, most often a Spring/Spring Boot service. Java's biggest hitters are deserialization, XXE-by-default, and expression-language injection — all high impact and all grep-able.

Why it works

Several Java APIs are unsafe by default (XML parsers resolve external entities; ObjectInputStream instantiates arbitrary classes) and frameworks expose powerful expression languages (SpEL/OGNL) that turn a string into code. Tracing the source to a request parameter or message body confirms reach.

Sinks & patterns (grep, then trace to user input)

  • Deserialization: ObjectInputStream.readObject, Jackson enableDefaultTyping/polymorphic types, XMLDecoder, SnakeYAML new Yaml().load, unsafe readValue with type info → RCE gadgets.
  • XXE: DocumentBuilderFactory, SAXParser, XMLInputFactory, TransformerFactory without setFeature(disallow-doctype)/secure-processing.
  • Command exec: Runtime.getRuntime().exec, ProcessBuilder with concatenated input.
  • Expression injection: SpEL (SpelExpressionParser, @Value("#{...}") on input), OGNL (Struts), MVEL; template engines with unescaped output.
  • SQL/HQL: Statement/string-built queries, createQuery with concatenation.
  • SSRF: URL.openConnection, RestTemplate, HttpClient, WebClient on user URLs.
  • JNDI: InitialContext.lookup, log4j-style ${jndi:...} (Log4Shell) reachable from input.

Framework specifics

  • Spring: mass assignment via @ModelAttribute/DataBinder (missing setAllowedFields), exposed/unsecured Actuator endpoints, @RequestMapping path traversal, permit-all misconfig in SecurityFilterChain, SpEL in @PreAuthorize.
  • Struts/older MVC: OGNL injection (S2-* CVEs).

Method

  1. rg for the sinks; trace to controller params, headers, or message consumers.
  2. Check XML parser factory configuration everywhere XML is read.
  3. Review the Spring Security config for accidental permitAll()/disabled CSRF on state-changing routes.
  4. Confirm with web-deserialization, web-xxe, web-ssrf, or web-command-injection.

Gotchas

  • Jackson is safe unless default/polymorphic typing is enabled — check for it specifically.
  • find-sec-bugs/CodeQL surface candidates; you still must prove input reaches the sink.
  • Log4Shell-style lookups can fire from headers (User-Agent, X-Forwarded-For), not just body.

References

OWASP Deserialization & XXE cheat sheets; SpEL/OGNL injection research; find-sec-bugs rules.

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