cloud-kubernetes
Skill26 starsChanged 31 days agoMITView on GitHub
Attack exposed Kubernetes: API server, kubelet, etcd, dashboards, and RBAC. Load on k8s signals — ports 6443/10250/2379/8443, /api/v1, kube-dns, a pod foothold, or "kubernetes/k8s". Signals: kubectl, service-account tokens, exposed dashboard, container in a cluster.
2 other projects use a version of this.
Adopted by
Most recently taken up by
- NoorQureshi/roninword for word, first seen Oct 11, 2026
- NoorQureshi/security-skillsword for word, first seen Oct 11, 2026
Other versions2 projects use a version of this.
Word for word · 2
- NoorQureshi/security-skills★ 27100% same
- NoorQureshi/ronin★ 26100% same
Edited · 0
None found.
Wrote their own version · 0
None found.
How matches are found. Word for word: the exact same text. Edited: shares passages with this file (“99% same” means 99% of its five-word phrases also appear here; 10% or more counts). Their own version: similar meaning, or, weakest, the same name. We can’t tell which project had it first. Projects are counted among the 200 most-starred candidates, and mentions are links to the repository we found, up to 50 per site, so both counts are a floor.
In this repository207 other files it gives its agents.
- AGENTS.mdAGENTS.md
- CLAUDE.mdCLAUDE.md
- ad-adcsSkill
- ad-dacl-abuseSkill
- ad-delegation-abuseSkill
- ad-kerberoastingSkill
- ad-pivot-arsenalSkill
- ai-agent-tool-abuseSkill
- ai-insecure-output-handlingSkill
- ai-jailbreakSkill
- ai-llm-dosSkill
- ai-mcp-securitySkill
- ai-model-extractionSkill
- ai-prompt-injectionSkill
- ai-rag-poisoningSkill
- ai-sensitive-data-disclosureSkill
- ai-supply-chainSkill
- ai-system-prompt-leakageSkill
- api-auth-attacksSkill
- api-bolaSkill
- api-fuzzingSkill
- api-graphqlSkill
- api-grpcSkill
- api-mass-assignmentSkill
- api-mongo-agg-facet-bypassSkill
- api-testing-checklistSkill
- api-versioningSkill
- automation-browserSkill
- automation-nuclei-templatesSkill
- automation-recon-pipelineSkill
- cloud-azureSkill
- cloud-container-escapeSkill
- cloud-docker-api-abuseSkill
- cloud-docker-registrySkill
- cloud-gcpSkill
- cloud-iam-privescSkill
- cloud-imds-ssrfSkill
- cloud-s3-exposureSkill
- code-review-cicdSkill
- code-review-cppSkill
- code-review-dangerous-sinksSkill
- code-review-dotnetSkill
- code-review-goSkill
- code-review-iacSkill
- code-review-javaSkill
- code-review-methodologySkill
- code-review-nodejsSkill
- code-review-phpSkill
- code-review-pythonSkill
- code-review-rubySkill
- code-review-rustSkill
- code-review-secrets-detectionSkill
- code-review-soliditySkill
- crypto-oracle-attacksSkill
- crypto-rsa-attacksSkill
- ctf-cryptoSkill
- ctf-forensicsSkill
- ctf-methodologySkill
- ctf-pwnSkill
- ctf-revSkill
- The first 60 shown.
The file
We split this skill into the rules it gives an agent
1 rule. About 0 are common, 0 are distinctive, and 1 is very specific to this project.
≈0
Common · estimate
Many files like this have a rule of this kind.
≈0
Distinctive · estimate
This author's own choices. Worth a look.
1
Very specific
Tied to their project's names, files or tools. Probably skip.
- Common
- Distinctive
- Very specific
- Very specific: line 33
From a pod: read the mounted token /var/run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount/.
≈ “Common” is an estimate: at least 1 in 5 of the 350,495 skill files we read have a rule of the same kind, not the same words. “Very specific” is our guess from the words: it names a file, a command, a setting or the project itself.
Files
Kubernetes attacks
When it applies
A Kubernetes control-plane or node component is reachable (externally or from a pod foothold), or you landed in a container inside a cluster and want to escalate to cluster admin / other tenants.
Why it works
k8s exposes powerful HTTP APIs that are frequently unauthenticated or over-permissioned: anonymous API access, kubelet read/exec on 10250, unauth etcd (all secrets), and mounted service-account tokens with broad RBAC. One over-scoped token = cluster takeover.
Method
- From outside:
kube-hunter; probe API server 6443 (/api/v1anonymous), kubelet 10250 (/pods,/runexec), etcd 2379 (keys→secrets), and exposed dashboards (8443/anonymous). - From a pod: read the mounted token
/var/run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount/;kubectl auth can-i --listto see what it grants. - Escalate via RBAC: over-permissioned SA → create/exec pods, read secrets across namespaces,
or
create podswith a hostPath/privileged spec to mount the node (→ node/cluster takeover). - Container→node breakout: privileged pod, hostPID/hostNetwork, or a hostPath mount to the
host filesystem (→
cloud-container-escape). - Loot:
kubectl get secrets -A, cloud IAM via node metadata (→cloud-imds-ssrf).
Gotchas
kubectl auth can-i --listfirst — it tells you exactly what the token can do; don't guess.- Anonymous API/kubelet is common in labs and misconfigured clusters — always test unauth.
- On bug bounty, prove access read-only where possible; creating privileged pods is high-impact — mind RoE.
Verify success
Cluster-level access proven: reading secrets across namespaces, exec into others' pods, or node filesystem/cloud-creds access from an over-scoped token.
References
kube-hunter/peirates; NCC "Kubernetes security"; MITRE ATT&CK Containers.
Does it work?
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