code-review-cpp
Skill26 starsChanged 31 days agoMITView on GitHub
Security review of C / C++ code — memory-safety and the classic unsafe-API sinks. Load when reviewing C/C++ source/PR, on .c/.cc/.cpp/.h in scope, or "review this C code". Signals: Makefile/CMakeLists, strcpy/sprintf/memcpy, malloc/free, raw pointers, format strings, parsers.
2 other projects use a version of this.
Adopted by
Most recently taken up by
- NoorQureshi/roninword for word, first seen Oct 11, 2026
- NoorQureshi/security-skillsword for word, first seen Oct 11, 2026
Other versions2 projects use a version of this.
Word for word · 2
- NoorQureshi/security-skills★ 27100% same
- NoorQureshi/ronin★ 26100% same
Edited · 0
None found.
Wrote their own version · 0
None found.
How matches are found. Word for word: the exact same text. Edited: shares passages with this file (“99% same” means 99% of its five-word phrases also appear here; 10% or more counts). Their own version: similar meaning, or, weakest, the same name. We can’t tell which project had it first. Projects are counted among the 200 most-starred candidates, and mentions are links to the repository we found, up to 50 per site, so both counts are a floor.
In this repository207 other files it gives its agents.
- AGENTS.mdAGENTS.md
- CLAUDE.mdCLAUDE.md
- ad-adcsSkill
- ad-dacl-abuseSkill
- ad-delegation-abuseSkill
- ad-kerberoastingSkill
- ad-pivot-arsenalSkill
- ai-agent-tool-abuseSkill
- ai-insecure-output-handlingSkill
- ai-jailbreakSkill
- ai-llm-dosSkill
- ai-mcp-securitySkill
- ai-model-extractionSkill
- ai-prompt-injectionSkill
- ai-rag-poisoningSkill
- ai-sensitive-data-disclosureSkill
- ai-supply-chainSkill
- ai-system-prompt-leakageSkill
- api-auth-attacksSkill
- api-bolaSkill
- api-fuzzingSkill
- api-graphqlSkill
- api-grpcSkill
- api-mass-assignmentSkill
- api-mongo-agg-facet-bypassSkill
- api-testing-checklistSkill
- api-versioningSkill
- automation-browserSkill
- automation-nuclei-templatesSkill
- automation-recon-pipelineSkill
- cloud-azureSkill
- cloud-container-escapeSkill
- cloud-docker-api-abuseSkill
- cloud-docker-registrySkill
- cloud-gcpSkill
- cloud-iam-privescSkill
- cloud-imds-ssrfSkill
- cloud-kubernetesSkill
- cloud-s3-exposureSkill
- code-review-cicdSkill
- code-review-dangerous-sinksSkill
- code-review-dotnetSkill
- code-review-goSkill
- code-review-iacSkill
- code-review-javaSkill
- code-review-methodologySkill
- code-review-nodejsSkill
- code-review-phpSkill
- code-review-pythonSkill
- code-review-rubySkill
- code-review-rustSkill
- code-review-secrets-detectionSkill
- code-review-soliditySkill
- crypto-oracle-attacksSkill
- crypto-rsa-attacksSkill
- ctf-cryptoSkill
- ctf-forensicsSkill
- ctf-methodologySkill
- ctf-pwnSkill
- ctf-revSkill
- The first 60 shown.
The file
We split this skill into the rules it gives an agent
1 rule. About 0 are common, 0 are distinctive, and 1 is very specific to this project.
≈0
Common · estimate
Many files like this have a rule of this kind.
≈0
Distinctive · estimate
This author's own choices. Worth a look.
1
Very specific
Tied to their project's names, files or tools. Probably skip.
- Common
- Distinctive
- Very specific
- Very specific: line 42
Run clang --analyze/cppcheck and semgrep.
≈ “Common” is an estimate: at least 1 in 5 of the 350,495 skill files we read have a rule of the same kind, not the same words. “Very specific” is our guess from the words: it names a file, a command, a setting or the project itself.
Files
C / C++ source review
When it applies
Reviewing native C/C++ (a service, a parser, a library). The bugs are overwhelmingly memory safety — the highest-impact, most exploitable class — plus the handful of unsafe APIs that cause them.
Why it works
C/C++ has no bounds checking: a length mistake, a lifetime mistake, or attacker-controlled format string becomes a memory-corruption primitive. Most of these trace to a small, greppable set of APIs and patterns, and sanitizers/fuzzing confirm the ones static reading only suspects.
Sinks & patterns (grep, then reason about lengths and lifetimes)
- Buffer overflow:
strcpy,strcat,sprintf,gets,scanf("%s"),memcpy/memmovewith an unchecked or attacker-influenced length; fixed stack buffers filled from input. - Format string:
printf(user),fprintf(f, user),syslog(user)— user data as the format arg. - Integer issues: size/length arithmetic that can overflow or go negative and then feeds an
allocation or copy (
malloc(n*size),len-1); signed/unsigned confusion in bounds checks. - Use-after-free / double-free:
freethen use; ownership unclear across functions; dangling pointers after realloc; C++ iterator invalidation, dangling references,std::movemisuse. - Off-by-one / OOB:
<=in loop bounds, missing NUL terminator,strncpynot null-terminating. - Command/path:
system/popen/exec*with concatenated input; unchecked../in path handling. - C++ specifics: unchecked
.at()vs[], unsafereinterpret_cast, deserialization of untrusted data into objects,std::string↔C-string length mistakes.
Method
- Run
clang --analyze/cppcheckandsemgrep; treat as leads. rg 'strcpy|strcat|sprintf|gets|memcpy|system\(|printf\s*\([^"]'and, for each, trace the size and the source of the data.- For every allocation/copy, check the length's origin and arithmetic for overflow.
- Where reachable with input, confirm with a fuzzer + ASan (
libFuzzer/AFL++) — a crash under ASan is proof; escalate toexploit-memory-corruptionfor exploitability.
Gotchas
- A crash isn't automatically exploitable, but under ASan it's a real memory-safety bug worth reporting.
- Modern C++ (
std::span,std::string_view, smart pointers) reduces but doesn't remove these — raw buffers and FFI boundaries are where they persist. strncpy/snprintfare safer but have their own truncation/termination traps — read the lengths.
References
CERT C/C++ Coding Standard; OWASP C-Based Toolchain hardening; ASan/libFuzzer docs.
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