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NoorQureshiNoorQureshi/ronin/skills/code-review/code-review-cpp/SKILL.md

code-review-cpp

Skill26 starsChanged 31 days agoMITView on GitHub

Security review of C / C++ code — memory-safety and the classic unsafe-API sinks. Load when reviewing C/C++ source/PR, on .c/.cc/.cpp/.h in scope, or "review this C code". Signals: Makefile/CMakeLists, strcpy/sprintf/memcpy, malloc/free, raw pointers, format strings, parsers.

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  1. Very specific:

    Run clang --analyze/cppcheck and semgrep.

    line 42

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SKILL.md

C / C++ source review

When it applies

Reviewing native C/C++ (a service, a parser, a library). The bugs are overwhelmingly memory safety — the highest-impact, most exploitable class — plus the handful of unsafe APIs that cause them.

Why it works

C/C++ has no bounds checking: a length mistake, a lifetime mistake, or attacker-controlled format string becomes a memory-corruption primitive. Most of these trace to a small, greppable set of APIs and patterns, and sanitizers/fuzzing confirm the ones static reading only suspects.

Sinks & patterns (grep, then reason about lengths and lifetimes)

  • Buffer overflow: strcpy, strcat, sprintf, gets, scanf("%s"), memcpy/memmove with an unchecked or attacker-influenced length; fixed stack buffers filled from input.
  • Format string: printf(user), fprintf(f, user), syslog(user) — user data as the format arg.
  • Integer issues: size/length arithmetic that can overflow or go negative and then feeds an allocation or copy (malloc(n*size), len-1); signed/unsigned confusion in bounds checks.
  • Use-after-free / double-free: free then use; ownership unclear across functions; dangling pointers after realloc; C++ iterator invalidation, dangling references, std::move misuse.
  • Off-by-one / OOB: <= in loop bounds, missing NUL terminator, strncpy not null-terminating.
  • Command/path: system/popen/exec* with concatenated input; unchecked ../ in path handling.
  • C++ specifics: unchecked .at() vs [], unsafe reinterpret_cast, deserialization of untrusted data into objects, std::string↔C-string length mistakes.

Method

  1. Run clang --analyze/cppcheck and semgrep; treat as leads.
  2. rg 'strcpy|strcat|sprintf|gets|memcpy|system\(|printf\s*\([^"]' and, for each, trace the size and the source of the data.
  3. For every allocation/copy, check the length's origin and arithmetic for overflow.
  4. Where reachable with input, confirm with a fuzzer + ASan (libFuzzer/AFL++) — a crash under ASan is proof; escalate to exploit-memory-corruption for exploitability.

Gotchas

  • A crash isn't automatically exploitable, but under ASan it's a real memory-safety bug worth reporting.
  • Modern C++ (std::span, std::string_view, smart pointers) reduces but doesn't remove these — raw buffers and FFI boundaries are where they persist.
  • strncpy/snprintf are safer but have their own truncation/termination traps — read the lengths.

References

CERT C/C++ Coding Standard; OWASP C-Based Toolchain hardening; ASan/libFuzzer docs.

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