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NoorQureshiNoorQureshi/SploitAgent/skills/code-review/code-review-go/SKILL.md

code-review-go

Skill26 starsChanged 31 days agoMITView on GitHub

Security review of Go code — dangerous sinks and web-framework pitfalls. Load when reviewing a Go codebase/PR, on .go source in scope, or "review this Go". Signals: go.mod, net/http, os/exec, text/template, database/sql, gin/echo/fiber.

2 other projects use a version of this.

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The file

We split this skill into the rules it gives an agent

2 rules. About 0 are common, 1 is distinctive, and 1 is very specific to this project.

  • ≈0

    Common · estimate

    Many files like this have a rule of this kind.

  • ≈1

    Distinctive · estimate

    This author's own choices. Worth a look.

  • 1

    Very specific

    Tied to their project's names, files or tools. Probably skip.

  • Common
  • Distinctive
  • Very specific
  1. Very specific:

    Run gosec and govulncheck for a first pass.

    line 46
  2. Distinctive:

    Check auth/authorization middleware coverage on each route group.

    line 48

≈ “Common” is an estimate: at least 1 in 5 of the 350,495 skill files we read have a rule of the same kind, not the same words. “Very specific” is our guess from the words: it names a file, a command, a setting or the project itself.

Keep what fits and drop the rest. Your version, ready for your agents.
Files
SKILL.md

Go source review

When it applies

Reviewing Go source (an API, a CLI, a microservice). Go is memory-safe, so the bugs are logic and injection: command exec, the wrong template package, string-built SQL, and path/SSRF handling.

Why it works

Go's stdlib gives a safe and an unsafe option side by side (html/template vs text/template; parameterised db.Query(?, x) vs fmt.Sprintf into a query). Reviews find code that reached for the unsafe one, or that shells out with sh -c.

Sinks & patterns (grep, then trace to user input)

  • Command exec: exec.Command("sh","-c", …) / exec.CommandContext with concatenated input (safe form passes args separately — flag the sh -c variant).
  • XSS: text/template used to render HTML (no auto-escaping); manual w.Write([]byte(userHTML)).
  • SQLi: fmt.Sprintf/string concat into db.Query/db.Exec instead of placeholders.
  • Path traversal: filepath.Join(base, userInput) without filepath.Clean + prefix check; http.ServeFile with user paths.
  • SSRF: http.Get/http.NewRequest on user-supplied URLs; missing host allowlist.
  • Other: text/template/html/template injection from user-controlled template strings, unvalidated Unmarshal into structs (mass assignment), unsafe pointer use, weak math/rand for tokens (use crypto/rand).

Framework specifics

  • gin/echo/fiber: c.Param/c.Query/c.Bind sources; check bound structs for mass assignment and missing auth middleware on state-changing routes.
  • Templates: confirm html/template (not text/template) for anything rendered to a browser.

Method

  1. Run gosec and govulncheck for a first pass; treat as leads, not verdicts.
  2. rg 'exec.Command|text/template|Sprintf.*Query|filepath.Join' and trace to request input.
  3. Check auth/authorization middleware coverage on each route group.
  4. Confirm exploitable classes with the matching runtime skill.

Gotchas

  • exec.Command(name, arg1, arg2) (no shell) is safe — only the sh -c "...user..." form injects.
  • html/template context-escapes; the bug is usually using text/template by mistake.
  • Errors ignored with _ can hide security-relevant failures (e.g. an auth check's error).

References

Go security best practices; gosec rule set; OWASP Go SCP; govulncheck (known-vuln deps).

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