code-review-ruby
Skill26 starsChanged 31 days agoMITView on GitHub
Security review of Ruby code — dangerous sinks and Rails pitfalls. Load when reviewing a Ruby/Rails codebase/PR, on .rb source in scope, or "review this Rails app". Signals: Gemfile, config/routes.rb, ActiveRecord, ERB, YAML.load, send/constantize.
2 other projects use a version of this.
Adopted by
Most recently taken up by
- NoorQureshi/roninword for word, first seen Oct 11, 2026
- NoorQureshi/security-skillsword for word, first seen Oct 11, 2026
Other versions2 projects use a version of this.
Word for word · 2
- NoorQureshi/security-skills★ 27100% same
- NoorQureshi/ronin★ 26100% same
Edited · 0
None found.
Wrote their own version · 0
None found.
How matches are found. Word for word: the exact same text. Edited: shares passages with this file (“99% same” means 99% of its five-word phrases also appear here; 10% or more counts). Their own version: similar meaning, or, weakest, the same name. We can’t tell which project had it first. Projects are counted among the 200 most-starred candidates, and mentions are links to the repository we found, up to 50 per site, so both counts are a floor.
In this repository207 other files it gives its agents.
- AGENTS.mdAGENTS.md
- CLAUDE.mdCLAUDE.md
- ad-adcsSkill
- ad-dacl-abuseSkill
- ad-delegation-abuseSkill
- ad-kerberoastingSkill
- ad-pivot-arsenalSkill
- ai-agent-tool-abuseSkill
- ai-insecure-output-handlingSkill
- ai-jailbreakSkill
- ai-llm-dosSkill
- ai-mcp-securitySkill
- ai-model-extractionSkill
- ai-prompt-injectionSkill
- ai-rag-poisoningSkill
- ai-sensitive-data-disclosureSkill
- ai-supply-chainSkill
- ai-system-prompt-leakageSkill
- api-auth-attacksSkill
- api-bolaSkill
- api-fuzzingSkill
- api-graphqlSkill
- api-grpcSkill
- api-mass-assignmentSkill
- api-mongo-agg-facet-bypassSkill
- api-testing-checklistSkill
- api-versioningSkill
- automation-browserSkill
- automation-nuclei-templatesSkill
- automation-recon-pipelineSkill
- cloud-azureSkill
- cloud-container-escapeSkill
- cloud-docker-api-abuseSkill
- cloud-docker-registrySkill
- cloud-gcpSkill
- cloud-iam-privescSkill
- cloud-imds-ssrfSkill
- cloud-kubernetesSkill
- cloud-s3-exposureSkill
- code-review-cicdSkill
- code-review-cppSkill
- code-review-dangerous-sinksSkill
- code-review-dotnetSkill
- code-review-goSkill
- code-review-iacSkill
- code-review-javaSkill
- code-review-methodologySkill
- code-review-nodejsSkill
- code-review-phpSkill
- code-review-pythonSkill
- code-review-rustSkill
- code-review-secrets-detectionSkill
- code-review-soliditySkill
- crypto-oracle-attacksSkill
- crypto-rsa-attacksSkill
- ctf-cryptoSkill
- ctf-forensicsSkill
- ctf-methodologySkill
- ctf-pwnSkill
- ctf-revSkill
- The first 60 shown.
The file
We split this skill into the rules it gives an agent
2 rules. About 0 are common, 0 are distinctive, and 2 are very specific to this project.
≈0
Common · estimate
Many files like this have a rule of this kind.
≈0
Distinctive · estimate
This author's own choices. Worth a look.
2
Very specific
Tied to their project's names, files or tools. Probably skip.
- Common
- Distinctive
- Very specific
- Very specific: line 45
Run brakeman and bundler-audit.
- Very specific: line 47
Check every controller's strong-params and before_action auth coverage.
≈ “Common” is an estimate: at least 1 in 5 of the 350,495 skill files we read have a rule of the same kind, not the same words. “Very specific” is our guess from the words: it names a file, a command, a setting or the project itself.
Files
Ruby / Rails source review
When it applies
Reviewing Ruby source, usually Rails. Rails is safe by default in many places, so the bugs cluster in dynamic dispatch, mass assignment gaps, raw SQL, and unsafe deserialization/rendering.
Why it works
Ruby's metaprogramming (send, constantize, eval) turns strings into method/class/code
references, and Rails helpers have unsafe escape hatches (.html_safe, where("...#{x}..."),
render inline:). Tracing params to these is the whole game — and Brakeman automates the first pass.
Sinks & patterns (grep, then trace to user input)
- Code exec:
eval,instance_eval,class_eval, backticks/system/%x/exec/open("|…"). - Dynamic dispatch:
send/public_send/__send__with a param method name;constantize/safe_constantizeon input (arbitrary class instantiation). - SQLi: string interpolation in
where("name = '#{x}'"),find_by_sql,order(params[:sort]),pluck/groupwith input. - Mass assignment: missing/loose Strong Parameters (
params.permit!,permit(*keys)). - Deserialization:
YAML.load(vssafe_load),Marshal.load,Ojin compat mode on input. - XSS/SSRF/render:
.html_safe/rawon user data,render inline:/render text:with input,open/Net::HTTPon user URLs,send_file/params[:path]traversal.
Framework specifics
- Rails:
permit/requirecorrectness,skip_before_action :verify_authenticity_token(CSRF),redirect_to params[...](open redirect), route globbing exposing actions, secrets incredentials/ENV, defaultprotect_from_forgerydisabled on APIs.
Method
- Run
brakemanandbundler-audit; triage the warnings (Brakeman is high-signal for Rails). rg 'send\(|constantize|eval|where\(".*#\{|html_safe|YAML.load|render.*inline'→ trace to params.- Check every controller's strong-params and
before_actionauth coverage. - Confirm exploitable findings with
web-sqli,web-deserialization,web-ssrf,web-idor.
Gotchas
sendto a fixed symbol is fine; the bug issend(params[:action]).YAML.safe_loadis safe; plainYAML.loadon input is RCE-capable.- Brakeman false positives exist — always confirm the param actually reaches the sink.
References
Brakeman docs; Rails Security Guide; OWASP Ruby on Rails cheat sheet.
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