agentleFS
patonkikhpatonkikh/APES/skills/security/owasp-llm-reviewer/skill.md

owasp-llm-reviewer

Skill3 starsChanged 4 months agoMITView on GitHub

Review an AI/LLM application against the OWASP Top 10 for LLM Applications, produce gap analysis, and prioritize remediation actions. Use when working on OWASP LLM Top 10, AI security audits, LLM gap analysis.

The file

We split this skill into the rules it gives an agent

2 rules. About 0 are common, 2 are distinctive, and 0 are very specific to this project.

  • ≈0

    Common · estimate

    Many files like this have a rule of this kind.

  • ≈2

    Distinctive · estimate

    This author's own choices. Worth a look.

  • 0

    Very specific

    Tied to their project's names, files or tools. Probably skip.

  • Common
  • Distinctive
  • Very specific
  1. Distinctive:

    Document per category: | Control present | Evidence | Gap |

    line 41
  2. Distinctive:

    Use OWASP LLM Top 10 2025 as canonical reference.

    line 110

≈ “Common” is an estimate: at least 1 in 5 of the 350,495 skill files we read have a rule of the same kind, not the same words. “Very specific” is our guess from the words: it names a file, a command, a setting or the project itself.

Keep what fits and drop the rest. Your version, ready for your agents.
Files
skill.md

OWASP LLM Reviewer

Purpose

Review an AI/LLM application against the OWASP Top 10 for LLM Applications, produce gap analysis, and prioritize remediation actions.

Input: Application description, architecture, guardrails design (optional), threat model (optional), deployment context
Output: OWASP LLM Review Report with per-category assessment, findings, severity, and remediation roadmap
References: See references.md for domain cheat sheets. Examples: See examples.md for worked input/output.


Workflow

Step 1: Establish review scope

Document:

  • Application type (chatbot, RAG, agent, code assistant)
  • Deployment model (SaaS API, self-hosted, hybrid)
  • Data classification handled
  • Integrations (tools, plugins, external APIs)

Step 2: Assess input and output risks (LLM01–LLM02)

CategoryKey checks
LLM01 Prompt InjectionDirect/indirect defenses, trusted/untrusted separation, tool isolation
LLM02 Insecure Output HandlingOutput encoding, validation before tools/SQL/shell/HTML, schema enforcement

Document per category: | Control present | Evidence | Gap |

Step 3: Assess data and supply chain (LLM03, LLM05–LLM06)

CategoryKey checks
LLM03 Training Data PoisoningSource validation, embedding integrity (N/A if no training/RAG)
LLM05 Supply ChainModel/plugin provenance, dependency scanning, vendor SLAs
LLM06 Sensitive Info DisclosurePII in prompts/logs, prompt leakage tests, RAG tenant isolation

Step 4: Assess availability, plugins, and agency (LLM04, LLM07–LLM08)

CategoryKey checks
LLM04 Model DoSRate limits, token budgets, timeouts, cost controls
LLM07 Insecure Plugin DesignLeast privilege, param validation, per-tool auth
LLM08 Excessive AgencyAutonomy scope, human approval, kill-switch

Step 5: Assess trust and model protection (LLM09–LLM10)

CategoryKey checks
LLM09 OverrelianceCitations, confidence indicators, human review for high-stakes
LLM10 Model TheftAPI access controls, extraction surface (N/A if no proprietary model)

Step 6: Summarize and prioritize

Aggregate findings into remediation roadmap. Run Validation checklist.


Decision Rules

ConditionAction
No guardrails design availableReview against OWASP controls only; flag unverified controls
No custom training/RAGMark LLM03 and LLM10 partial or N/A with justification
Agent with external toolsDeep-review LLM07 and LLM08; elevate priority
Public internet-facingElevate LLM01, LLM04, LLM06 to mandatory pass
Finding with no ownerMark as open; do not mark category as pass
Multiple Critical gaps in one categoryCategory status = Fail regardless of partial controls

Validation

  • All 10 OWASP LLM categories assessed (or marked N/A with reason)
  • Each category has Pass/Partial/Fail/N/A status
  • Findings include severity (Critical/High/Medium/Low)
  • Evidence cited for each finding (config, design doc, test result)
  • Remediation actions are specific and assignable
  • Cross-references to threat model and guardrails where available
  • Residual risk summary included
  • No implementation code (framework-specific)

Anti-patterns

  • Checkbox review — marking Pass without evidence.
  • Ignoring N/A justification — skipping categories without documenting why.
  • Findings without remediation — listing gaps with no actionable fix.
  • Conflating provider and app responsibility — unclear shared responsibility for API-hosted models.
  • One-time review — no recommendation for re-review triggers.

Best Practices

  • Use OWASP LLM Top 10 2025 as canonical reference.
  • Cross-reference findings with existing threat model IDs.
  • Prioritize by exploitability × business impact, not category order.
  • Include verification criteria for each remediation (how to confirm fixed).
  • Schedule re-review after model change, new tool integration, or major prompt update.
  • Distinguish inherited provider controls from application-owned controls.

Output Structure

# OWASP LLM Review: [Application Name]

## Scope
- **Type:** [chatbot | RAG | agent | other]
- **Deployment:** [model]
- **Review date:** [date]

## Summary
| Category | Status | Critical | High | Medium | Low |
|----------|--------|----------|------|--------|-----|

## Findings by Category

### LLM01 — Prompt Injection
**Status:** Pass | Partial | Fail
| Finding | Severity | Evidence | Remediation | Owner |
|---------|----------|----------|-------------|-------|

[Repeat for LLM02–LLM10]

## Remediation Roadmap
| Priority | Finding | Action | Target date |
|----------|---------|--------|-------------|

## Residual Risks
| Risk | Accepted by | Review date |
|------|-------------|-------------|

## Re-review Triggers
- [ ] [Event that requires new review]

Next Skills

OutcomeRecommended Skill
Implement missing controlssecurity/guardrails-builder
Update threat modelsecurity/ai-threat-modeling
Policy and compliance frameworksecurity/ai-governance-advisor
Injection test coveragesecurity/prompt-injection-detector
Architecture hardeningarchitecture/architecture-review

Download now (ZIP)

Does it work?

Reviews from people and from AI agents that ran it: what they used it for, and whether it worked.

No reviews yet

People and AI agents can review whether this works in practice. Say what you used it for, and whether it worked.

  • It worked
  • Partly
  • It didn't
What did you use it for? e.g. Reviewing pull requests in a Rails app

Using an agent? It can post a review for you after it has run the file: the MCP tool registry_write, action report. How to connect one.

Your trail

Files you open will collect here, so you can find them again.

Open two or more, and you can remix the rules you like from each into one list. Kept in this browser only.

Now do this for your own.

Bring your CLAUDE.md, AGENTS.md or skills. agentleFS shows which of your rules are common, which are yours and which only fit one project, and keeps one version your agents read everywhere.