authorized-security-router
Skill16 starsChanged 5 months agoMITView on GitHub
Route authorized defensive security and reverse-analysis tasks by scope, target type, user intent, and available toolchain before taking action. Use for APK review, static binary triage, frontend JavaScript security review, firmware inventory, malware/YARA analysis, API/LLM/supply-chain audit, security report planning, or security issues that need evidence-led classification without offensive exploitation.
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The file
We split this skill into the rules it gives an agent
7 rules. About 0 are common, 7 are distinctive, and 0 are very specific to this project.
≈0
Common · estimate
Many files like this have a rule of this kind.
≈7
Distinctive · estimate
This author's own choices. Worth a look.
0
Very specific
Tied to their project's names, files or tools. Probably skip.
- Common
- Distinctive
- Very specific
- Distinctive: line 16
Before selecting a route, establish:
- Distinctive: line 25
If scope is unclear or the request asks for offensive execution, stop and ask for a safer authorized framing.
- Distinctive: line 29
Use the smallest defensive route that fits the task:
- Distinctive: line 45
If analysis finds keys, tokens, passwords, cookies, private URLs, or hardcoded credentials:
- Distinctive: line 47
do not reproduce full values in comments, reports, logs, issue bodies, or PR reviews.
- Distinctive: line 49
use an approved private secret-handling channel only when the user explicitly provides one.
- Distinctive: line 54
Do not provide operational instructions for:
≈ “Common” is an estimate: at least 1 in 5 of the 350,495 skill files we read have a rule of the same kind, not the same words. “Very specific” is our guess from the words: it names a file, a command, a setting or the project itself.
Files
Authorized Security Router
Route security work before acting. This skill is for authorized defensive analysis, triage, and reporting. It is not an exploitation, evasion, credential, persistence, phishing, or C2 playbook.
Scope Gate
Before selecting a route, establish:
- authorization: own system, internal review, client-approved scope, CTF/lab, or inspect-only public repository/artifact review;
- target boundary: repository, app, package, binary, API, URL, firmware image, sample hash, or document set;
- action level: inspect-only, local static analysis, local sandbox analysis, browser verification, report-only, or remediation planning;
- prohibited actions: no unauthorized access, no destructive testing, no live exploitation, no credential extraction, no persistence, no evasion, no phishing, no C2, no scope expansion.
Public review means inspect-only review of public repositories or static artifacts. It does not authorize interacting with public URLs, third-party apps, production APIs, login flows, or browser-driven security testing. URL, app, API, and browser-facing security routes require own-system, client-approved, internal, or lab/CTF authorization.
If scope is unclear or the request asks for offensive execution, stop and ask for a safer authorized framing.
Allowed Routes
Use the smallest defensive route that fits the task:
| Target / intent | Route | Pair with |
| APK or mobile app review | Manifest, permissions, redacted secret indicators, network endpoints, package metadata, static call-chain notes | evidence-ledger-research |
| Static binary triage | File metadata, strings, imports, symbols, packer indicators, suspicious capability inventory | evidence-ledger-research |
| Frontend JS security review | Source maps, bundled endpoints, dangerous DOM sinks, token handling, request signing logic, redacted secret indicators | browser-verification, web-quality-audit |
| Firmware or IoT inventory | Filesystem layout, services, redacted credential indicators, exposed configs, SBOM hints, update mechanism notes | evidence-ledger-research |
| Malware or suspicious sample triage | Hashes, strings, YARA/Sigma candidate indicators, behavior hypotheses, sandbox-safe report plan | evidence-ledger-research |
| API or GraphQL audit | Auth boundaries, object-level access checks, token handling, schema exposure, unsafe defaults | web-quality-audit when browser-facing |
| LLM or agent security review | Prompt injection surface, tool permission boundaries, data exfil paths, memory poisoning risks | agents-best-practices |
| Supply chain audit | SBOM, dependency risk, redacted secret indicators, CI/CD exposure, package provenance, release integrity | delivery-preflight-gate |
| Security issue intake | Classify severity, affected surface, evidence needed, next actor, and remediation owner | repo-issue-triage |
Secret Handling
If analysis finds keys, tokens, passwords, cookies, private URLs, or hardcoded credentials:
- do not reproduce full values in comments, reports, logs, issue bodies, or PR reviews;
- report only the secret type, evidence location, and at most a short fingerprint or redacted prefix/suffix;
- use an approved private secret-handling channel only when the user explicitly provides one;
- recommend rotation or revocation when exposure is plausible.
Blocked Routes
Do not provide operational instructions for:
- exploit development or weaponization;
- EDR/AV bypass, stealth, anti-forensics, or evasion;
- credential extraction, password cracking against real targets, token theft, or session hijacking;
- persistence, lateral movement, C2, phishing, social engineering, or initial access;
- WAF bypass, live brute force, live vulnerability exploitation, or unauthorized scanning;
- modifying APKs/binaries to bypass protections or licensing;
- malware deployment, loader building, or payload delivery.
For blocked requests, offer a defensive alternative: detection logic, hardening checklist, secure code review, incident-response triage, or lab-only conceptual risk summary.
Routing Workflow
- Classify the request across four axes:
- authorization and scope;
- target type;
- user intent;
- available or acceptable toolchain.
- Select one allowed route or declare
ROUTE_BLOCKED/ROUTE_UNCLEAR. - Define the evidence ledger fields before analysis:
- artifact;
- observation;
- source/path/offset/URL;
- confidence;
- risk;
- next verification.
- Choose the least invasive analysis level.
- Produce findings as evidence-backed triage, not exploit steps.
- End with report shape and remediation or next verification.
Output Contract
Start with routing:
Route: <allowed route | ROUTE_BLOCKED | ROUTE_UNCLEAR>
Authorization: <missing | own system | internal | client-approved | lab/CTF | inspect-only public artifact>
Target boundary:
Action level:
Blocked actions:
Paired skills:Then provide either:
- a defensive analysis plan with evidence fields and verification steps; or
- a refusal of the unsafe route plus a safe alternative.
Report Shape
For each finding:
- severity;
- evidence location;
- secret handling: redacted unless an approved private channel exists;
- confidence;
- affected component;
- risk in defensive terms;
- remediation or containment;
- verification.
Attribution
Adapted from the routing architecture of zhaoxuya520/reverse-skill, reduced to an ABVX defensive security router with explicit authorization and blocked-action gates.
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