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fatihkanfatihkan/badi/.claude/skills-vault/pentest-orchestrator/SKILL.md

pentest-orchestrator

Skill8 starsChanged 3 months agoMITView on GitHub

Authorized penetration testing engagement orchestrator — scope declaration, OPSEC tagging, evidence-handling discipline. Triggers on pentest, penetration test, red team, engagement, ROE, scope, security assessment, vulnerability assessment, ethical hacking. ADVISORY/DEFENSIVE: does not run live exploits; methodology, planning, analysis, reporting.

The file

We split this skill into the rules it gives an agent

1 rule. About 0 are common, 1 is distinctive, and 0 are very specific to this project.

  • ≈0

    Common · estimate

    Many files like this have a rule of this kind.

  • ≈1

    Distinctive · estimate

    This author's own choices. Worth a look.

  • 0

    Very specific

    Tied to their project's names, files or tools. Probably skip.

  • Common
  • Distinctive
  • Very specific
  1. Distinctive:

    Write all tool output to a timestamped file

    line 72

≈ “Common” is an estimate: at least 1 in 5 of the 372,429 skill files we read have a rule of the same kind, not the same words. “Very specific” is our guess from the words: it names a file, a command, a setting or the project itself.

Keep what fits and drop the rest. Your version, ready for your agents.
Files
SKILL.md

pentest-orchestrator

The main orchestrator for an authorized penetration testing engagement. When this skill is active, the whole pentest- family is held to the same discipline.

What It Does

  • At engagement start it asks for a scope declaration (IP ranges, domain names, URLs, cloud accounts, ROE)
  • Applies OPSEC tagging to every command: QUIET / MODERATE / LOUD
  • Evidence handling: timestamped log files + sanitized target names
  • Hard refusal list: DoS, mass scanning, worms, persistent backdoors, false-flag, safety-of-life systems
  • Coordinates the recon-to-report flow; routes to the appropriate pentest- sub-category

What It Does Not Do (Out of Scope)

  • Live exploit execution (running SQL injection payloads, msfvenom payload generation, starting a C2 beacon) — use a dedicated pentest tool for these
  • Commands without authorization — if scope has not been declared in advance, no command is composed for any target
  • Unauthorized mass scanning — anything like masscan 0.0.0.0/0 is always refused
  • Self-propagating implants or backdoors

Session Initialization Protocol

At the start of every engagement, the following questions to the user are mandatory:

  1. Authorized scope (in-scope assets):
    • IP ranges (CIDR)
    • Domains and subdomains
    • URL path restrictions
    • Cloud account IDs / subscriptions
  2. Engagement type: external / internal / web-app / cloud / wireless / red-team / bug-bounty
  3. ROE (Rules of Engagement): forbidden techniques, working hours, contact info
  4. Proof of authorization: written permission / engagement letter / bug bounty program URL

Keep the answers in session memory and cross-check while composing every command. Out-of-scope target -> do not compose the command + redact.

Command Composing Rules

RuleDescription
No action before explanationEvery command is explained first (what it does, what it connects to, what it returns)
Quietest firstTCP connect > SYN, passive DNS > zone transfer, banner > full-scan
Rate limit by defaulttimeout + parallel limit always on (to zero out DoS risk)
Evidence saveAll output to a file: {tool}_{target-sanitized}_{YYYYMMDD-HHMMSS}.{ext}
No blind pipe`bash, sh, eval`, and eval of target-controlled data are forbidden

OPSEC Tagging

Tag before every command:

  • QUIET — passive, does not trigger IDS/IPS (DNS lookup, WHOIS, cert transparency, OSINT)
  • MODERATE — active but common traffic (TCP connect scan, HTTP banner grab)
  • LOUD — triggers IDS/IPS/WAF/SOC (vuln scan, brute force, aggressive enum)

For compound commands, the highest level applies. If a quieter alternative exists, show it too.

Evidence Handling

  • Write all tool output to a timestamped file
  • Format: {tool}_{target}_{YYYYMMDD_HHMMSS}.{ext} (in target, / -> -, remove special characters)
  • Raw output + parsed analysis side by side
  • At engagement end, remind the user to transfer/secure

Hard Refusal List

The following techniques pass with no authorization whatsoever:

  1. Volumetric / protocol-level DoS (the client runs load tests with their own program, not this toolkit)
  2. Mass scanning of public internet (masscan 0.0.0.0/0, full-internet shodan-style)
  3. Unattended worms / self-propagating implants
  4. Persistent backdoors that survive engagement closure (without written client permission)
  5. False-flag (framing a genuine third party)
  6. Safety-of-life system exploitation (medical device, ICS life-support, autonomous vehicle safety)
  7. CSAM, bioweapon-synthesis content (demonstrate with a placeholder)
  8. Payment bypass for personal gain (show the vulnerability, do not transfer)

A request that matches one of these -> redact + offer a safer alternative.

Tier Logic

  • Tier 1 (Advisory): pentest-engagement, pentest-recon, pentest-threat-model, pentest-detection, pentest-forensics, pentest-report, pentest-stig, pentest-malware, pentest-osint, pentest-bugbounty
  • Tier 2 (Execution-Capable): live command composer; an absolute scope declaration is required; this skill set covers the advisory side — use an authorized tool to execute.

Suggested Workflow

1. pentest-orchestrator (this) — declares scope + ROE
2. pentest-engagement      — phased plan + MITRE map
3. pentest-recon / -osint  — surface analysis
4. pentest-<domain>        — domain-specific methodology (web/cloud/ad/...)
5. pentest-exploit-chain   — finding chain analysis
6. pentest-detection       — defensive rule generation
7. pentest-report          — final report + remediation
8. pentest-opsec-evidence  — closeout: evidence handover

Legal

This skill is designed for authorized penetration testing. Use without authorization is a crime under the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA) and equivalent national laws. The user is responsible for working with written permission and proper proof of authorization on every test.

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