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pentest-mobile

Skill8 starsChanged 3 months agoMITView on GitHub

Mobile application pentest — Android/iOS, MASTG/MASVS, Frida/Objection dynamic analysis, certificate-pinning bypass, IPC test advisory. Triggers on Android pentest, iOS pentest, Frida, Objection, MobSF, MASTG, MASVS, certificate pinning, root detection, jailbreak detection, IPC, deep link.

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SKILL.md

pentest-mobile

Mobile app pentest advisory. Note: the mobile skill is for react-native/flutter development; pentest-mobile is for engagement-level mobile security testing.

Triggers

  • "Android APK pentest"
  • "iOS app security test"
  • "Frida hook"
  • "cert pinning bypass"
  • "MobSF report analysis"
  • "MASTG/MASVS check"

OWASP MASVS (Mobile Application Security Verification Standard)

CategoryScope
MASVS-STORAGESensitive data local storage
MASVS-CRYPTOCryptographic protocol use
MASVS-AUTHAuthentication + session
MASVS-NETWORKTLS, cert pinning
MASVS-PLATFORMIPC, deep link, WebView
MASVS-CODECode quality, anti-tampering
MASVS-RESILIENCERoot/jailbreak detect, RASP
MASVS-PRIVACYPII handling, permissions

Android Methodology

1. APK extraction: apktool d <app>.apk
2. Static: jadx-gui <app>.apk, MobSF upload
3. Manifest: permission list, exported components
4. Dynamic: emulator + Frida + Burp proxy
5. Storage: /data/data/<pkg>/ dump (rooted device)
6. Network: cert pinning bypass + intercept
7. IPC: exported activity, service, broadcast receiver test
8. WebView: file:// scheme, JavaScriptInterface

Suggested Commands

# QUIET — static analysis
apktool d -o ./app-decompiled <app>.apk
jadx -d ./jadx-out <app>.apk

# MobSF (local, offline)
docker run -it --rm -p 8000:8000 opensecurity/mobile-security-framework-mobsf

# Dynamic: Frida (jailbroken/rooted device)
frida-ps -U                                  # USB device process list
frida -U -l hooks.js -f com.example.app     # spawn + hook

# Cert pinning bypass (common script)
# frida-codeshare: 'fdciabdul/Universal-Android-SSL-Pinning-Bypass'
frida --codeshare fdciabdul/universal-android-ssl-pinning-bypass-2 -U -f com.example.app

# Objection (Frida wrapper)
objection -g com.example.app explore
# > android sslpinning disable
# > android root disable

iOS Methodology

1. IPA extract: unzip -d ./ipa-out <app>.ipa
2. Static: class-dump + Hopper / Ghidra
3. Plist: Info.plist permissions, URL schemes
4. Dynamic: jailbroken iPhone + Frida + Burp
5. Storage: /var/mobile/Containers/Data/Application/<uuid>/
6. Network: cert pinning bypass (Frida script)
7. URL scheme: deep link injection test
8. Keychain: keychain dumper

Suggested Commands

# QUIET — static
unzip <app>.ipa -d ./ipa-out
otool -L ./ipa-out/Payload/<app>.app/<binary>

# Frida (jailbroken device)
frida-ps -U
frida --codeshare federicodotta/ios-ssl-cert-bypass -U -f com.example.app

# Objection
objection -g com.example.app explore
# > ios sslpinning disable
# > ios jailbreak disable
# > ios keychain dump

Certificate Pinning Bypass Approaches

  1. Frida script (universal) — runtime hook
  2. Objection — android sslpinning disable
  3. APK patching — modify network_security_config.xml + re-sign
  4. iOS — find the pin method with Frida + class-dump
  5. WebView pinning — TrustManager override

IPC / Deep Link Test

<!-- exported activity in the Manifest -->
<activity android:name=".LoginActivity" android:exported="true">
  <intent-filter>
    <action android:name="android.intent.action.VIEW" />
    <data android:scheme="myapp" android:host="auth" />
  </intent-filter>
</activity>
# Deep link probe (ADB shell)
adb shell am start -W -a android.intent.action.VIEW -d "myapp://auth?token=test"
adb shell am start -n com.example.app/.LoginActivity --es token "bypass"

Common Finding Categories

FindingClassSeverity (general)
No certificate pinningMASVS-NETWORKMEDIUM
Sensitive data SharedPref clear textMASVS-STORAGEHIGH
Hard-coded API key inside the APKMASVS-CRYPTOHIGH
WebView + addJavascriptInterfaceMASVS-PLATFORMHIGH (RCE)
Root detection easy to bypassMASVS-RESILIENCEMEDIUM
Deep link auth bypassMASVS-AUTHHIGH
Sensitive log to LogcatMASVS-PRIVACYMEDIUM

Out-of-Scope

  • Techniques that would cause an App Store / Play Store policy violation (device rooting service)
  • Physical device teardown (chip-off, JTAG)
  • Third-party SDK traffic analysis (ToS violation)

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