pentest-detection
Skill8 starsChanged 3 months agoMITView on GitHub
Detection engineering — Sigma, Splunk SPL, Elastic KQL, Microsoft Sentinel KQL, YARA, Suricata rule writing advisory. Triggers on detection engineering, Sigma rule, Splunk SPL, Elastic KQL, Sentinel KQL, YARA, Suricata, Snort, SIEM rule, EDR rule, hunting query.
In this repository63 other files it gives its agents.
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The file
We split this skill into the rules it gives an agent
1 rule. About 0 are common, 1 is distinctive, and 0 are very specific to this project.
≈0
Common · estimate
Many files like this have a rule of this kind.
≈1
Distinctive · estimate
This author's own choices. Worth a look.
0
Very specific
Tied to their project's names, files or tools. Probably skip.
- Common
- Distinctive
- Very specific
- Distinctive: line 129
After the pentest, map every finding to a detection rule:
≈ “Common” is an estimate: at least 1 in 5 of the 364,980 skill files we read have a rule of the same kind, not the same words. “Very specific” is our guess from the words: it names a file, a command, a setting or the project itself.
Files
pentest-detection
Defensive detection-rule writing. Converts pentest findings into detection rules — to catch future attacks.
Triggers
- "write a Sigma rule"
- "Splunk SPL query"
- "KQL hunting query"
- "Sentinel rule"
- "YARA signature"
- "Suricata rule"
- "detection coverage analysis"
Sigma (Vendor-Agnostic)
title: Suspicious PowerShell Encoded Command Execution
id: 12345678-1234-1234-1234-1234567890ab
status: experimental
description: Detects PowerShell with -EncodedCommand flag, common in payloads
references:
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001/
author: Security Team
date: 2026/05/15
tags:
- attack.execution
- attack.t1059.001
logsource:
product: windows
service: powershell
category: process_creation
detection:
selection:
EventID: 4104
ScriptBlockText|contains:
- '-EncodedCommand'
- '-enc '
- '-e '
filter:
User|startswith: 'NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM'
condition: selection and not filter
falsepositives:
- Legitimate admin scripts
level: highSplunk SPL
index=windows EventCode=4104
| where match(ScriptBlockText, "-EncodedCommand|-enc\s|-e\s")
| stats count by Computer, User, ScriptBlockText
| where count > 1
| sort -countElastic KQL
event.code:"4104"
AND powershell.file.script_block_text:(*-EncodedCommand* OR *-enc * OR *-e *)
AND NOT user.name:"SYSTEM"Microsoft Sentinel KQL
SecurityEvent
| where EventID == 4104
| where EventData has_any ("-EncodedCommand", "-enc ", "-e ")
| where Account != "NT AUTHORITY\\SYSTEM"
| summarize count() by Computer, Account, EventData
| where count_ > 0YARA (Malware/File Signature)
rule SuspiciousPowerShellLoader {
meta:
author = "Security Team"
date = "2026-05-15"
description = "Detects PowerShell with base64 + IEX pattern"
tags = "attack.t1059.001"
strings:
$iex = "IEX" nocase
$invoke = "Invoke-Expression" nocase
$b64 = /[A-Za-z0-9+\/]{50,}={0,2}/ // base64 blob >= 50 char
$download = "DownloadString" nocase
$bypass = "ExecutionPolicy Bypass" nocase
condition:
($iex or $invoke) and $b64 and ($download or $bypass)
}Suricata (Network IDS)
alert http any any -> any any (msg:"Possible SQL Injection in URI"; \
flow:established,to_server; \
http.uri; content:"' OR '1"; nocase; \
classtype:web-application-attack; sid:1000001; rev:1;)
alert dns any any -> any any (msg:"DNS Query to Suspicious DGA Domain"; \
dns.query; content:"|"; depth:30; pcre:"/^[a-z0-9]{20,}\.(com|net)$/i"; \
classtype:trojan-activity; sid:1000002; rev:1;)Detection Coverage Mapping
After the pentest, map every finding to a detection rule:
finding: BloodHound LDAP enumeration
mitre: T1087.002 (Account Discovery: Domain Account)
detection:
- sigma:
file: bloodhound_ldap_query.yml
query: large_ldap_query_pattern
- splunk: |
index=windows EventCode=4662
| where ObjectName="DC=*"
| stats count by SubjectUserName
| where count > 1000
- sentinel: |
SecurityEvent
| where EventID == 4662
| where ObjectName contains "DC="
| summarize count() by Account
| where count_ > 1000Atomic Red Team Mapping
Aligning ART tests with pentest findings:
# Pentest finding: PsExec lateral
# ART test: T1021.002 - Test 1 (PsExec.exe)
# Detection test
Invoke-AtomicTest T1021.002-1
# Run the query in the SIEM; it should return hits
# If no hit comes back, there's a coverage gapDetection Rule Test Strategy
1. Positive test: simulated attack -> rule fires
2. Negative test: normal activity -> no false positive
3. Tuning: baseline 7-30 days, calculate false positive rate
4. Action: low confidence -> alert only, high -> auto-isolateOutput Template
## Detection Coverage — <engagement>
### Finding -> Detection Rule
| Finding | ATT&CK | Sigma | Splunk | Sentinel | Coverage |
|-------|--------|-------|--------|----------|----------|
| Kerberoast | T1558.003 | DC1234 | yes | yes | FULL |
| PsExec lateral | T1021.002 | DC1235 | yes | no | PARTIAL |
| BloodHound LDAP | T1087.002 | (new) | (new) | (new) | NEW |
| DCSync | T1003.006 | DC1236 | yes | yes | FULL |
### Gap Analysis
- BloodHound LDAP enum: NO coverage in any SIEM
-> Suggest a new Sigma rule (attached to this report)
- PsExec: not in Sentinel
-> Write a Sentinel detection rule template
### Test
- Atomic Red Team T1021.002-1 -> Splunk: HIT, Sentinel: MISS
- Recommended action: Sentinel detection rule shipOut-of-Scope
- Production SIEM changes (rule writing only; deployment is the client's)
- Real-time blue team operations
Does it work?
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Using an agent? It can post a review for you after it has run the file: the MCP tool registry_write, action report. How to connect one.
Your trail
Files you open will collect here, so you can find them again.
Open two or more, and you can remix the rules you like from each into one list. Kept in this browser only.
Now do this for your own.
Bring your CLAUDE.md, AGENTS.md or skills. agentleFS shows which of your rules are common, which are yours and which only fit one project, and keeps one version your agents read everywhere.

