pentest-api
Skill8 starsChanged 3 months agoMITView on GitHub
API security testing — REST/GraphQL/WebSocket, OWASP API Top 10, JWT/OAuth analysis, mass assignment, broken object-level authorization advisory. Triggers on API pentest, OWASP API, REST security, GraphQL test, WebSocket, JWT analysis, OAuth flow, BOLA, BFLA, mass assignment.
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The file
We split this skill into the rules it gives an agent
1 rule. About 0 are common, 0 are distinctive, and 1 is very specific to this project.
≈0
Common · estimate
Many files like this have a rule of this kind.
≈0
Distinctive · estimate
This author's own choices. Worth a look.
1
Very specific
Tied to their project's names, files or tools. Probably skip.
- Common
- Distinctive
- Very specific
- Very specific: line 109
If the response returns isAdmin: true, the vulnerability is present.
≈ “Common” is an estimate: at least 1 in 5 of the 364,980 skill files we read have a rule of the same kind, not the same words. “Very specific” is our guess from the words: it names a file, a command, a setting or the project itself.
Files
pentest-api
REST + GraphQL + WebSocket security testing methodology. Focused on OWASP API Security Top 10 (2023).
Triggers
- "API pentest"
- "OWASP API Top 10"
- "GraphQL introspection"
- "JWT swap attempt"
- "OAuth flow test"
- "BOLA / BFLA"
- "mass assignment"
- "WebSocket security"
OWASP API Top 10 (2023)
| # | Category | Test Approach |
| API1 | BOLA (Broken Object Level Auth) | /users/123 -> /users/124 enum, unauthorized data access |
| API2 | Broken Authentication | Token replay, JWT manipulation, brute force endpoint |
| API3 | Broken Object Property Level Auth | Mass assignment (admin: true), excessive exposure |
| API4 | Unrestricted Resource Consumption | Missing rate limit, pagination size, file upload size |
| API5 | BFLA (Broken Function Level Auth) | Is /admin/* reachable with a user role |
| API6 | Unrestricted Business Flows | Bizlogic exploit (delegate to pentest-bizlogic) |
| API7 | SSRF | URL parameter cloud metadata reach |
| API8 | Security Misconfig | Verbose error, CORS *, default endpoint |
| API9 | Improper Inventory | v1/v2 same endpoint, different auth, shadow API |
| API10 | Unsafe Consumption of 3rd Party API | API key exfil, response trust |
REST Test Methodology
1. Find the spec document: /swagger.json, /openapi.yaml, /api-docs
2. List endpoints + auth requirements
3. BOLA: numeric ID enum (user_id, doc_id, order_id)
4. BFLA: role change (cookie/header swap)
5. Rate limit: 100 requests/sec within 60s
6. CORS: Origin: evil.com -> reflect?
7. Verbose error: malformed body, sql-like inputGraphQL Test
# Introspection check (QUIET)
curl -X POST https://<target>/graphql -H 'Content-Type: application/json' -d '{"query":"{__schema{types{name fields{name}}}}"}'
# Common queries
- Field suggestion (typo) -> auto-suggest reveal
- Batching: 1000 queries in a single POST (DoS-readiness test)
- Alias overloading
- Deep nesting: { user { friend { friend { ... } } } } depth 10+JWT Analysis
| Test | Approach |
| alg: none | Set the header to {"alg":"none","typ":"JWT"}, remove the signature |
| alg confusion | RS256 -> HS256, use the public key as the secret |
| kid injection | kid: ../../../dev/null (SQLi if the kid is SQL-backed) |
| exp ignore | exp is in the past, does the server still accept it |
| Weak secret | Crack the JWT secret with hashcat (offline) |
# QUIET — decode only (no request to any target)
echo "<token>" | python3 -c "import sys,jwt; print(jwt.decode(sys.stdin.read().strip(), options={'verify_signature': False}))"OAuth Flow Test
- redirect_uri tampering: send the token to evil.com
- missing state parameter -> CSRF
- is response_type=token (implicit) still supported
- PKCE missing (mandatory for mobile/SPA)
- scope creep: request minimal scope, did max scope come back
- missing refresh token rotation
Mass Assignment Test
POST /api/users
Content-Type: application/json
{
"name": "test",
"email": "test@example.com",
"isAdmin": true, # mass assignment
"subscription": "premium" # mass assignment
}If the response returns isAdmin: true, the vulnerability is present.
WebSocket
- Is Origin header validation missing (CSRF-like)
- Is authentication a single handshake (mid-session re-auth?)
- Message size limit
- Binary message + WS Frame manipulation
Output Template
## API Analysis — <baseURL>
### Findings
- [HIGH] BOLA in GET /api/orders/{id} — user A can see user B's order
- [MEDIUM] GraphQL introspection is open in production
- [LOW] CORS Origin reflection (null origin only)
### Untested Areas
- BFLA admin endpoint (no admin token)
- WebSocket /ws — handshake not tested
- Rate limit threshold (outside the client's test window)Out-of-Scope
- Live brute force (pentest-credentials)
- DDoS via rate limit absent
- Automated tool that enables a token replay attack
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