pentest-credentials
Skill8 starsChanged 3 months agoMITView on GitHub
Credential testing methodology — hash crack selection, wordlist generation, password spray (advisory), default cred audit. Triggers on credential testing, hash crack, Hashcat, John the Ripper, password spray, wordlist generation, cupp, CeWL, Crunch, hashid, default password, credential stuffing.
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The file
We split this skill into the rules it gives an agent
1 rule. About 0 are common, 1 is distinctive, and 0 are very specific to this project.
≈0
Common · estimate
Many files like this have a rule of this kind.
≈1
Distinctive · estimate
This author's own choices. Worth a look.
0
Very specific
Tied to their project's names, files or tools. Probably skip.
- Common
- Distinctive
- Very specific
- Distinctive: line 140
Test result: how many employees log in with old breach creds
≈ “Common” is an estimate: at least 1 in 5 of the 364,980 skill files we read have a rule of the same kind, not the same words. “Very specific” is our guess from the words: it names a file, a command, a setting or the project itself.
Files
pentest-credentials
Credential testing methodology. Offline hash crack + targeted wordlist + default cred audit. Online brute requires a scope declaration and account-lockout-policy awareness.
Triggers
- "I found a hash, how do I crack it"
- "crack with hashcat / john"
- "generate a wordlist"
- "password spray"
- "default cred audit"
- "credential stuffing test"
Hash Identification
# hashid (offline)
hashid "$2y$12$abcd..." # bcrypt detect
hashid "5f4dcc3b5aa765d61d8327deb882cf99" # MD5
# haiti (modern alt)
haiti "$2y$12$abcd..."Common hash modes (hashcat):
| Hash | Mode | Command Example |
| MD5 | 0 | hashcat -m 0 hash.txt wordlist.txt |
| SHA1 | 100 | hashcat -m 100 ... |
| bcrypt | 3200 | hashcat -m 3200 ... (slow) |
| NTLM | 1000 | hashcat -m 1000 ... |
| NetNTLMv2 | 5600 | from Responder |
| Kerberos AS-REP | 18200 | from GetNPUsers.py |
| Kerberos TGS-REP | 13100 | from GetUserSPNs.py |
| WPA2 (hash22000) | 22000 | from hcxpcapngtool |
| MS-SQL 2012+ | 1731 | T-SQL hash |
| LSA secrets | 5500 (NetNTLMv1) | Responder |
Wordlist Strategy
Ready-Made Wordlists
rockyou.txt — 14M (classic baseline)
SecLists/Passwords/* — 1500+ specialized
Probable-Wordlists/ — statistically ordered
WeakPass dataset — large merged setTarget-Specific Generation
# CeWL — scrape words from the site (QUIET)
cewl https://example.com -m 5 -w cewl-target.txt
# cupp — passwords from a user profile (offline interactive)
cupp -i
# Answer: name, date, pet, company, etc. -> target.txt
# Mentalist (GUI / CLI) — rule-based combine
# Crunch — pattern-based
crunch 8 12 -t Spring@^^^^ > crunch.txt # Spring@2026, Spring@1990, ...
# hashcat rule sets
hashcat -m 1000 hash.txt rockyou.txt -r rules/best64.rule -r rules/d3ad0ne.rule
hashcat -m 0 hash.txt --increment -a 3 ?l?l?l?l?l?d?d?d # mask attackMutation Rules
# Common mutation: Title + year + special
cat words.txt | sed 's/$/2026!/' >> mutated.txt
cat words.txt | sed 's/$/123/' >> mutated.txt
cat words.txt | awk '{print toupper(substr($0,1,1)) substr($0,2)}' >> mutated.txt
# Automated with Hashcat rules
hashcat --stdout words.txt -r rules/leetspeak.rule | sort -u > leet.txtPassword Spray (Advisory, Scope-Required)
1. Learn the target system's lockout policy
(typical: 3-5 wrong -> 30-min lock)
2. One password across all users, rotate at 5-minute intervals
3. Outside working hours (logging is easier to miss during the day)
4. Common password list: Spring2026!, Welcome1, Company123# AD environment (NetExec)
nxc smb <dc> -u users.txt -p 'Spring2026!' --continue-on-success
# O365 / Azure AD
go365 -h o365.com -u users.txt -p password.txt --type spray --delay 300
# Goal: 1-2 hits without triggering lockoutDefault Cred Audit
# Nuclei default-creds template
nuclei -u <target> -t default-logins/ -severity high,critical
# Hydra single test
hydra -L users.txt -P passwords.txt <target> ssh -t 4 -fCommon defaults:
- admin/admin
- admin/password
- root/toor
- Cisco/cisco
- Tomcat Manager: admin/admin, manager/manager
- Jenkins anonymous read
Credential Stuffing Test (Authorized)
- Old breach data for the client's own domain (HIBP API + paid lookup)
- User cred reuse rate: 5-10% (industry average)
- Test result: how many employees log in with old breach creds
Offline Crack Strategy
1. Detect the hash type (hashid)
2. Fast wordlist: rockyou + rule (5 min)
3. Slow down: rockyou + leetspeak + special (30 min)
4. Targeted: CeWL + cupp + mask (1-2 hours)
5. Fail -> Hashcat mask: bruteforce 8-10 char
6. Still fail -> hash dehashing (DB leak)Output Template
## Credential Test — <engagement>
### Hash Crack Results
| User | Hash Type | Crack Time | Password |
|------|-----------|------------|----------|
| svc-backup | NetNTLMv2 | 4 hours | Backup2024 |
| svc-deploy | NetNTLMv2 | (timeout) | (could not crack) |
### Password Spray Results
- Tested: "Welcome1" against 50 users
- Hit: 2 users (4%)
- dev-test (confirmed after a lockout-avoidance test)
- finance-tmp
### Finding Impact
- Crackable password: weak policy (Backup2024 — known pattern)
- Default cred: 4% of users on Welcome1 — not changed during onboardingOut-of-Scope
- Locking out a production account (exceeding rate limits)
- Out-of-authorization credential exfil (engagement scope only)
- Mass credential stuffing (3rd party dataset)
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