pentest-forensics
Skill8 starsChanged 3 months agoMITView on GitHub
Digital forensics — evidence acquisition, memory/disk imaging analysis, timeline reconstruction, IOC extraction advisory. Triggers on forensics, DFIR, Volatility, memory analysis, disk image, Autopsy, FTK, timeline, IOC extraction, evidence chain, log analysis.
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pentest-forensics
Digital forensics + incident response advisory. Engagement post-exploit analysis, breach investigation, IR support.
Triggers
- "memory dump analysis"
- "examine the disk image"
- "extract the timeline"
- "extract IOCs"
- "with Volatility"
- "Autopsy / FTK report"
- "log correlation"
- "evidence chain"
Evidence Acquisition (Order Matters)
1. Volatile memory (RAM) -> disappears fastest
2. Network state -> active connections, route table
3. Running process -> ps, lsof
4. Disk image -> bit-by-bit copy
5. Log/audit files -> /var/log, Event Viewer
6. Backup + cold storage -> non-volatileChain of custody documentation per acquisition: who, when, which tool, SHA256 hash.
Memory Acquisition
| OS | Tool | Command |
| Linux | AVML (Microsoft) | avml memory.lime |
| Linux | LiME (LKM) | insmod lime.ko "path=/mnt/dump.lime format=lime" |
| Windows | DumpIt / WinPmem | DumpIt.exe /OUTPUT memory.raw |
| Windows | Magnet RAM Capture | GUI |
| macOS | osxpmem | osxpmem -o memory.aff4 /dev/pmem |
Volatility 3 (Memory Forensics)
# Process list
vol -f memory.raw windows.pslist
# Network connections
vol -f memory.raw windows.netscan
# Malware detect: hidden process
vol -f memory.raw windows.psscan
vol -f memory.raw windows.psxview # cross-view
# Injected code
vol -f memory.raw windows.malfind
# Registry keys (from memory)
vol -f memory.raw windows.registry.printkey --key "Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run"
# Mimikatz-like credential extraction (handle with care!)
vol -f memory.raw windows.hashdump
vol -f memory.raw windows.lsadump
# Linux
vol -f linux.lime linux.bash # bash history from memory
vol -f linux.lime linux.pslist
vol -f linux.lime linux.malfindDisk Image
# Acquisition (bit-by-bit with dd)
dd if=/dev/sda of=/mnt/external/disk.dd bs=4M conv=noerror,sync status=progress
# Hash verification
sha256sum /dev/sda > pre.hash
sha256sum disk.dd > post.hash
diff pre.hash post.hash # should be identical
# E01 format (compressed + metadata)
ewfacquire /dev/sdaTimeline Reconstruction
# Plaso / log2timeline (super timeline)
log2timeline.py timeline.plaso /mnt/disk/
psort.py -o l2tcsv -w timeline.csv timeline.plaso
# Mactime (Sleuth Kit)
fls -r -m / disk.dd > body.txt
mactime -b body.txt -d > timeline.csv
# Filter: within a specific time window
mactime -b body.txt -d 2026-05-14..2026-05-15IOC Extraction
# Network IOC from packet capture
tshark -r capture.pcap -T fields -e ip.dst -e dns.qry.name | sort -u
# File IOC from disk image
fls -r -m / disk.dd | grep -E '\.(exe|dll|ps1|sh|bash)' | head
# Hash all files
find /mnt/disk -type f -exec sha256sum {} \; > hashes.txt
# Compare against threat intel
while read hash file; do
curl -s "https://www.virustotal.com/api/v3/files/$hash" -H "x-apikey: $VT_KEY" \
| jq '.data.attributes.last_analysis_stats'
done < hashes.txtLog Analysis
# Auth log (Linux)
grep -E "Failed password|Accepted publickey" /var/log/auth.log | head
# Web log (Apache/Nginx)
awk '$9 >= 400 && $9 < 500 {print $1, $7, $9}' access.log | sort | uniq -c | sort -rn | head
# Windows Event Log (exported EVTX)
EvtxECmd.exe -f Security.evtx --csv ./out
# SIEM-friendly format
log-aggregator: sigma rules + this evtx -> alertsAnti-Forensics Detection
| Technique | Detection |
| Timestomp | $STANDARD_INFO vs $FILE_NAME timestamp diff |
| Secure delete | journal entry but no file |
| Encrypted volume | VeraCrypt header signature |
| Memory wipe | physical RAM = zero blocks |
| Log clearing | gap in journalctl, Event Viewer event 1102 |
| Live response only | no persistent artifact (fileless) |
Output Template
## Forensics Report — Incident #2026-05-14
### Acquisition
- Memory: WinPmem v3.3, SHA256 abc123..., 2026-05-14 18:30 UTC
- Disk: dd v8.32, SHA256 def456..., 2026-05-14 19:15 UTC
- Chain of custody: <analyst> -> <case-locker>
### Timeline (Critical Events)
| Time (UTC) | Event | Source |
|------------|-------|--------|
| 14:23:01 | Phishing email delivered | Email log |
| 14:23:45 | User clicked link | Web proxy |
| 14:24:12 | Implant downloaded | EDR |
| 14:25:03 | Implant executed (powershell.exe) | Sysmon EID 1 |
| 14:25:30 | C2 connection | Suricata alert |
| 16:42:11 | Lateral SMB to FILESERVER | Event 4624 (Type 3) |
| 17:15:00 | Data archive created | File system MFT |
| 17:30:00 | Exfil detected (Suricata) | Network IDS |
### IOC
- Hashes: 5 (in the report appendix)
- IPs: 3 C2 IPs (in the report appendix)
- Domains: 2 attacker domains
- Implant filename: svchost_2.exe (TIE score 95)Out-of-Scope
- Restoring production systems (the client's IR team)
- Legal witness testimony (formal forensics firm)
- Real-time intrusion response
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