linux-security-hardening
Skill31 starsChanged 18 days agoMITView on GitHub
Use when hardening or auditing Debian and Ubuntu hosts for identity, sudo, PAM, MFA, permissions, AppArmor, auditd, kernel, patching, integrity, boot, encryption, and CIS controls.
- Installs packages
1 other project uses a version of this.
Adopted by
Most recently taken up by
- SpeakingColors/claude-skillstheir own version, first seen Nov 15, 2026
Other versions1 project uses a version of this.
Word for word · 0
None found.
Edited · 0
None found.
Wrote their own version · 1
- SpeakingColors/claude-skills★ 0same name
How matches are found. Word for word: the exact same text. Edited: shares passages with this file (“99% same” means 99% of its five-word phrases also appear here; 10% or more counts). Their own version: similar meaning, or, weakest, the same name. We can’t tell which project had it first. Projects are counted among the 200 most-starred candidates, and mentions are links to the repository we found, up to 50 per site, so both counts are a floor.
In this repository172 other files it gives its agents.
- AGENTS.mdAGENTS.md
- CLAUDE.mdCLAUDE.md
- .github/copilot-instructions.mdCopilot instructions
- 00-meta-initializationSkill
- chwezi-dev-engineSkill
- ai-agent-commercial-operationsSkill
- ai-agent-compliance-controlsSkill
- ai-agent-governance-and-limitsSkill
- ai-agent-multi-agent-coordinationSkill
- ai-agent-observability-evaluationSkill
- ai-agent-runtime-architectureSkill
- ai-agent-safety-and-red-teamSkill
- ai-agent-tooling-and-hitlSkill
- ai-analyticsSkill
- ai-app-architectureSkill
- ai-cost-and-meteringSkill
- ai-economic-value-engineSkill
- ai-evaluationSkill
- ai-feature-rollout-and-experimentationSkill
- ai-feature-specSkill
- ai-incident-responseSkill
- ai-llm-integrationSkill
- ai-model-gatewaySkill
- ai-observability-and-debuggingSkill
- ai-opportunity-canvasSkill
- ai-prompt-engineeringSkill
- ai-rag-patternsSkill
- ai-securitySkill
- ai-web-appsSkill
- coding-agent-optimizationSkill
- openai-agents-sdkSkill
- android-developmentSkill
- api-design-firstSkill
- distributed-systems-patternsSkill
- ecommerce-platform-audit-requirementsSkill
- graphql-patternsSkill
- microservices-architectureSkill
- system-architecture-designSkill
- validation-contractSkill
- database-design-engineeringSkill
- database-reliabilitySkill
- mysql-engineeringSkill
- postgresql-engineeringSkill
- cicd-pipelinesSkill
- cloud-architectureSkill
- deployment-release-engineeringSkill
- docker-developmentSkill
- infrastructure-as-codeSkill
- kubernetes-platformSkill
- observability-monitoringSkill
- reliability-engineeringSkill
- execution-plan-scriptsSkill
- accounting-engineSkill
- accounting-finance-controllerSkill
- electronic-fiscal-taxingSkill
- multicurrency-and-fxSkill
- avalonia-desktop-developmentSkill
- frontend-architectureSkill
- frontend-performanceSkill
- image-compressionSkill
- The first 60 shown.
The file
Show its rules and text
We split this skill into the rules it gives an agent
16 rules. About 0 are common, 9 are distinctive, and 7 are very specific to this project.
≈0
Common · estimate
Many files like this have a rule of this kind.
≈9
Distinctive · estimate
This author's own choices. Worth a look.
7
Very specific
Tied to their project's names, files or tools. Probably skip.
- Common
- Distinctive
- Very specific
- Very specific: line 27
Use the references/ directory for deep detail after reading the core workflow below.
- Distinctive: line 41
Before putting a fresh VPS into production
- Distinctive: line 43
After a CVE affecting a library on your server
- Distinctive: line 44
When onboarding a new server into the fleet
- Distinctive: line 45
When a compliance requirement (SOC 2, ISO 27001, PCI-DSS) demands baseline hardening
- Distinctive: line 46
After an incident — to verify baseline still holds
- Distinctive: line 47
When migrating from one cloud/VPS provider to another
- Distinctive: line 84
Run this against every fresh Debian 12 / Ubuntu 24.04 server before accepting production traffic.
- Very specific: line 194
Write /etc/sysctl.d/99-hardening.conf with the baseline from references/kernel-sysctl-hardening.md, then:
- Very specific: line 286
Run services as root when a system user and DynamicUser=true in systemd would suffice.
- Very specific: line 289
Use NOPASSWD: ALL in sudoers — the whole point of sudo is the audit trail.
- Distinctive: line 291
Treat AIDE / rkhunter as checkboxes — they must alert off-host, or they are paperweights.
- Very specific: line 293
Leave AppArmor profiles in complain mode forever — tune and enforce.
- Very specific: line 294
Leave umask 0022 in /etc/login.defs — use 027 so others can't read new files by default.
- Very specific: line 296
Leave kernel.dmesg_restrict=0 — kernel messages leak addresses useful for exploitation.
- Distinctive: line 298
Run Lynis once, fix nothing, forget.
≈ “Common” is an estimate: at least 1 in 5 of the 364,980 skill files we read have a rule of the same kind, not the same words. “Very specific” is our guess from the words: it names a file, a command, a setting or the project itself.
Files
Linux Security Hardening
Acknowledgement: Shared by Peter Bamuhigire, techguypeter.com, +256 784 464178.
<!-- dual-compat-start -->Use When
- Use when hardening a Debian/Ubuntu server — user/group/sudo hardening, file permission audits, PAM password policy + MFA, AppArmor mandatory access control, auditd system call logging, kernel sysctl hardening, file integrity monitoring (AIDE), rootkit detection (rkhunter/chkrootkit), unattended security patching, GRUB + UEFI + LUKS boot security, and CIS benchmark compliance.
Evidence Produced
| Category | Artifact | Format | Example |
| Security | Server hardening checklist | Markdown doc covering user/sudo, file permissions, PAM/MFA, and auditd findings | docs/server/hardening-checklist.md |
References
- Use the
references/directory for deep detail after reading the core workflow below.
<!-- dual-compat-end -->Defensive hardening for Debian 12 / Ubuntu 24.04 servers running multi-tenant SaaS. Covers the OS layer — users, permissions, PAM, mandatory access control, kernel, integrity, patching, and compliance.
Core principle: A fresh Debian install is not production-ready. Every server that accepts traffic needs hardening. Do it once with automation, audit it forever.
Scope: Linux OS security on your own servers. For network-layer defence use network-security. For secrets/CI hardening use cicd-devsecops. For app-code vulnerabilities use web-app-security-audit.
Cross-references: network-security, cicd-devsecops, cicd-jenkins-debian, database-reliability, web-app-security-audit
See references/ for: users-groups-sudo.md, file-permissions-acls.md, pam-authentication.md, selinux-apparmor.md, auditd-logging.md, kernel-sysctl-hardening.md, file-integrity.md, rootkit-detection.md, patch-management.md, boot-security.md, cis-benchmark-checklist.md
When to Use
- Before putting a fresh VPS into production
- During quarterly security audit cadence
- After a CVE affecting a library on your server
- When onboarding a new server into the fleet
- When a compliance requirement (SOC 2, ISO 27001, PCI-DSS) demands baseline hardening
- After an incident — to verify baseline still holds
- When migrating from one cloud/VPS provider to another
Threat Model + Attack Surface
Attack surface on a typical Debian server:
| Layer | Attack vector | Primary defence |
| Boot | Single-user mode, evil maid, kernel tampering | GRUB password, Secure Boot, LUKS |
| Kernel | Privilege escalation via syscall, unsigned module | sysctl, lockdown mode, MAC, module signing |
| Filesystem | Path traversal, setuid abuse, world-writable | perms, ACLs, mount options (nosuid,noexec) |
| Users | Brute force, privilege abuse, shared accounts | PAM, sudo least-priv, MFA, password policy |
| Services | Unpatched CVE, default creds, exposed port | unattended-upgrades, service minimization |
| Process | Arbitrary code execution in an app | AppArmor, systemd sandboxing, capabilities |
| Monitoring | Attacker erases logs | auditd off-host, FIM, log integrity |
Assume breach. Layer defences so a single failure does not equal game over.
The 10 Hardening Domains
| # | Domain | Reference |
| 1 | Users, groups, sudo | references/users-groups-sudo.md |
| 2 | File permissions + ACLs | references/file-permissions-acls.md |
| 3 | PAM authentication | references/pam-authentication.md |
| 4 | Mandatory Access Control (AppArmor) | references/selinux-apparmor.md |
| 5 | auditd + system logging | references/auditd-logging.md |
| 6 | Kernel sysctl hardening | references/kernel-sysctl-hardening.md |
| 7 | File integrity monitoring | references/file-integrity.md |
| 8 | Rootkit detection | references/rootkit-detection.md |
| 9 | Patch management | references/patch-management.md |
| 10 | Boot security (GRUB, UEFI, LUKS) | references/boot-security.md |
Compliance: references/cis-benchmark-checklist.md (~60 items aligned to CIS Debian 12 benchmark).
Baseline Hardening Checklist
Run this against every fresh Debian 12 / Ubuntu 24.04 server before accepting production traffic.
1. System baseline
apt update && apt full-upgrade -y
apt install -y \
ufw nftables fail2ban \
auditd audispd-plugins \
unattended-upgrades needrestart apt-listchanges \
libpam-pwquality libpam-google-authenticator \
rkhunter chkrootkit aide aide-common \
apparmor apparmor-utils apparmor-profiles \
lynis debsecanEnable unattended security updates with auto-reboot at a quiet hour (see references/patch-management.md).
2. Disable unused services and kernel modules
# Disable services
for svc in avahi-daemon cups rpcbind nfs-server bluetooth; do
systemctl disable --now "$svc" 2>/dev/null || true
done
# Blacklist rare filesystem / network modules
cat > /etc/modprobe.d/blacklist-hardening.conf <<EOF
install cramfs /bin/true
install freevxfs /bin/true
install jffs2 /bin/true
install hfs /bin/true
install hfsplus /bin/true
install udf /bin/true
install dccp /bin/true
install sctp /bin/true
install rds /bin/true
install tipc /bin/true
EOF
update-initramfs -u3. User and sudo hardening
passwd -l root # disable root password login
# Add each admin to sudo group; no shared accounts.
usermod -aG sudo deploy
# Edit sudoers to require pty and log IO
visudo # add: Defaults use_pty, log_input, log_outputFull detail: references/users-groups-sudo.md
4. File permissions
chmod 640 /etc/shadow /etc/gshadow
chmod 644 /etc/passwd /etc/group
chmod 700 /root
# Find unexpected setuid binaries
find / -xdev -type f -perm -4000 2>/dev/null
# Find world-writable
find / -xdev -type f -perm -0002 2>/dev/nullSet umask 027 globally via /etc/login.defs. Mount /tmp, /var/tmp, /dev/shm with nodev,nosuid,noexec. Detail: references/file-permissions-acls.md.
5. PAM password policy + lockout
Edit /etc/security/pwquality.conf:
minlen = 12
dcredit = -1
ucredit = -1
lcredit = -1
ocredit = -1
retry = 3
enforce_for_rootEnable faillock in /etc/pam.d/common-auth and /etc/security/faillock.conf (deny=5, unlock_time=900). Full stack: references/pam-authentication.md.
6. AppArmor enforce
systemctl enable --now apparmor
aa-status # check active profiles
# Put any complain-mode profiles into enforce
for p in /etc/apparmor.d/*; do
aa-enforce "$p" 2>/dev/null
doneCustom profiles for your own apps: see references/selinux-apparmor.md.
7. auditd rules
systemctl enable --now auditd
# Load CIS-style rules (edit to /etc/audit/rules.d/audit.rules)
augenrules --load
auditctl -l # verify loadedReference ruleset covering identity changes, sudo, SSH config, kernel module loads, and mount operations: references/auditd-logging.md.
8. Kernel hardening
Write /etc/sysctl.d/99-hardening.conf with the baseline from references/kernel-sysctl-hardening.md, then:
sysctl --systemKey values:
kernel.randomize_va_space = 2
kernel.kptr_restrict = 2
kernel.dmesg_restrict = 1
kernel.yama.ptrace_scope = 2
kernel.unprivileged_bpf_disabled = 1
net.core.bpf_jit_harden = 2
fs.suid_dumpable = 0
fs.protected_hardlinks = 1
fs.protected_symlinks = 19. File integrity baseline
aideinit # build baseline DB
mv /var/lib/aide/aide.db.new /var/lib/aide/aide.db
# Schedule daily checks via systemd timerShip output off-host. Detail: references/file-integrity.md.
10. Rootkit baseline
rkhunter --propupd # build baseline
rkhunter --update # update signature DB
chkrootkit # initial clean scanSchedule daily + alert on INFECTED. Detail: references/rootkit-detection.md.
11. Patch automation
dpkg-reconfigure -plow unattended-upgrades
systemctl status unattended-upgradesConfigure security-only updates + auto-reboot at 02:00. Detail: references/patch-management.md.
12. Verify with Lynis
lynis audit system --profile /etc/lynis/default.prf
# Target: hardening index >= 80 at Level 1Compliance Mapping (Brief)
| Control family | CIS | ISO/IEC 27001:2022 Annex A | PCI DSS v4.0.1 | Primary reference |
| Access control | 5.x | A.5.15-A.5.18, A.8.2, A.8.5 | 7, 8 | users-groups-sudo.md, pam-authentication.md |
| Cryptography | - | A.8.24 | 3, 4 | boot-security.md, network-security/tls-pki.md |
| Operations security | 4.x | A.8.8, A.8.9, A.8.19 | 6 | patch-management.md, file-integrity.md |
| Communications security | 3.x | A.8.20-A.8.22 | 1 | network-security/* |
| Logging / monitoring | 4.x | A.8.15, A.8.16 | 10 | auditd-logging.md, rootkit-detection.md |
| Secure development | - | A.8.25-A.8.29 | 6 | cicd-devsecops |
Full CIS Debian 12 checklist: references/cis-benchmark-checklist.md.
Audit Runbook
Weekly or quarterly, run this sequence on each production host:
lynis audit system— quick hardening scoredebsecan --only-fixed— list unpatched CVEsrkhunter --check --skip-keypress— rootkit scanaide --check— file integrity deltaaureport --summary— audit log summaryfail2ban-client status— see active jails and banslast -a | head -20— recent loginssudo grep -i 'COMMAND' /var/log/auth.log | tail -50— recent privileged commandssystemctl --failed— failed servicesapt list --upgradable— pending updates
Log findings and track remediation in a ticket.
Anti-Patterns
Do not:
- Rely on DAC (
rwx) alone — add AppArmor for any internet-facing daemon. - Disable AppArmor "to make the app work" — write a profile instead.
- Run services as root when a system user and
DynamicUser=truein systemd would suffice. - Skip patching because "uptime is important" — schedule maintenance windows with live kernel patching where needed.
- Edit
/etc/sudoersdirectly withoutvisudo— syntax errors lock you out. - Use
NOPASSWD: ALLin sudoers — the whole point of sudo is the audit trail. - Give every admin the same SSH key — per-person keys enable revocation and accountability.
- Treat AIDE / rkhunter as checkboxes — they must alert off-host, or they are paperweights.
- Disable auditd because "logs fill the disk" — rotate, ship, don't disable.
- Leave AppArmor profiles in
complainmode forever — tune and enforce. - Leave
umask 0022in/etc/login.defs— use027so others can't read new files by default. - Forget
/boot— it often ends up 755 and world-readable. - Leave
kernel.dmesg_restrict=0— kernel messages leak addresses useful for exploitation. - Skip the post-upgrade AIDE re-baseline — every legit update generates false positives until rebased.
- Run Lynis once, fix nothing, forget. Track hardening score as a metric over time.
References Index
Domain references:
references/users-groups-sudo.md— account model, sudo hardening, password agingreferences/file-permissions-acls.md— DAC, setuid audit, ACLs, mount optionsreferences/pam-authentication.md— PAM stack, pwquality, faillock, MFAreferences/selinux-apparmor.md— MAC, AppArmor profiles, systemd sandboxingreferences/auditd-logging.md— rules, ausearch, off-host shippingreferences/kernel-sysctl-hardening.md— sysctls, modprobe blacklist, lockdownreferences/file-integrity.md— AIDE baseline, alerting, re-baseliningreferences/rootkit-detection.md— rkhunter, chkrootkit, incident runbookreferences/patch-management.md— unattended-upgrades, debsecan, CVE SLAsreferences/boot-security.md— GRUB password, Secure Boot, LUKS, TPM
Compliance:
references/cis-benchmark-checklist.md— ~60-item CIS-aligned audit checklist
Related skills:
network-security— firewall, WAF, TLS, VPN, IDS (network layer)cicd-devsecops— secrets, dependency scanning, pipeline hardeningcicd-jenkins-debian— Debian server provisioning for CI/CDdatabase-reliability— DB-specific hardening, backup, failoverweb-app-security-audit— application-layer vulnerabilities
Degraded mode
Fallback without privileged execution: produce a read-only findings report and exact commands for an authorised operator. Never claim a control was applied without post-change evidence.
Decision rules
| Change | Execution mode | Failure avoided |
| Read-only inventory or configuration review | inspect directly | Unnecessary host mutation |
| Reversible hardening with tested access path | stage and verify | Administrator lockout |
| Firewall, PAM, SSH, boot, or encryption change | require console/rollback plan | Loss of remote access or boot failure |
Inputs
| Artefact | Required? | Purpose |
| Host role, distribution/version, exposed services, access method, and change window | yes | Select controls without locking out administrators or breaking the workload |
| Current configuration and approved baseline | conditional | Compare observed state with the intended CIS or organisation-specific profile |
Quality Standards
Hardening must preserve emergency access and workload availability, produce before-and-after evidence, validate each affected service, and retain a tested rollback for lockout-sensitive changes.
Outputs
| Artefact | Consumer | Acceptance condition |
| Hardening plan, applied-change record, and rollback evidence | System owner and operations team | Each change has pre-check, command or configuration evidence, service validation, lockout-safe rollback, and residual exception owner |
Does it work?
Reviews from people and from AI agents that ran it: what they used it for, and whether it worked.
No reviews yet
People and AI agents can review whether this works in practice. Say what you used it for, and whether it worked.
- It worked
- Partly
- It didn't
Using an agent? It can post a review for you after it has run the file: the MCP tool registry_write, action report. How to connect one.
Your trail
Files you open will collect here, so you can find them again.
Open two or more, and you can remix the rules you like from each into one list. Kept in this browser only.
Now do this for your own.
Bring your CLAUDE.md, AGENTS.md or skills. agentleFS shows which of your rules are common, which are yours and which only fit one project, and keeps one version your agents read everywhere.

