post-exploitation
Skill1 starsChanged 12 days agoMITView on GitHub
Assess post-exploitation risk after initial access: lateral movement, persistence, privilege escalation, and data exfiltration vectors.
- Reads credentials
5 other projects use a version of this.
Adopted by
Most recently taken up by
- AIPentest/CyberStrikeAItheir own version, first seen Nov 3, 2026
- Ed1s0nZ/CyberStrikeAItheir own version, first seen Nov 3, 2026
- noahfranklin/gideontheir own version, first seen Oct 13, 2026
- Kxiandaoyan/CyberStrikeAItheir own version, first seen Sep 7, 2026
- kekurttel/pentest-skillstheir own version, first seen Aug 3, 2026
Used with
Projects with it also use ai-llm-app-attack, attack-surface-recon and 10 more.
Other files people use alongside this one.
Files found in the same public projects as a version of this one, more often than they turn up anywhere else. Each project counts once, large collections count for less, and this file's own repository is left out.
KxiandaoyanSkillai-llm-app-attack
AI/LLM应用攻击:提示注入,Agent工具滥用RCE,RAG投毒,MCP供应链,torch.load pickle RCE。Use when testing LLM apps, agents, RAG, MCP plugins, or AI model file risks.
Also in 3 projects that use this
KxiandaoyanSkillattack-surface-recon
侦察/攻击面测绘:被动whois/amass/crt.sh/FOFA/Shodan,主动subfinder/httpx/naabu/katana/nuclei,DNS地域/CDN/Nginx catch-all/宝塔/UniApp指纹。开局第一动作,认知写入项目黑板。Use when starting recon, asset mapping, fingerprinting, or CDN/DNS bypass discovery.
Also in 3 projects that use this
- +10 more from Kxiandaoyan
Other versions5 projects use a version of this.
Word for word · 0
None found.
Edited · 0
None found.
Wrote their own version · 5
- AIPentest/CyberStrikeAI★ 8.5ksame name
- Ed1s0nZ/CyberStrikeAI★ 8.5ksame name
- Kxiandaoyan/CyberStrikeAI★ 19same name
- kekurttel/pentest-skills★ 4same name
- noahfranklin/gideon★ 2same name
How matches are found. Word for word: the exact same text. Edited: shares passages with this file (“99% same” means 99% of its five-word phrases also appear here; 10% or more counts). Their own version: similar meaning, or, weakest, the same name. We can’t tell which project had it first. Projects are counted among the 200 most-starred candidates, and mentions are links to the repository we found, up to 50 per site, so both counts are a floor.
In this repository124 other files it gives its agents.
- CLAUDE.mdCLAUDE.md
- ai-agent-reconSkill
- ai-supply-chainSkill
- exfiltration-via-aiSkill
- indirect-injectionSkill
- llm-fuzzingSkill
- prompt-injectionSkill
- rag-poisoningSkill
- tool-abuseSkill
- chain-analysisSkill
- chain-auth-to-takeoverSkill
- chain-customSkill
- chain-graph-walkSkill
- chain-idor-to-mass-dataSkill
- chain-info-to-exploitSkill
- chain-multi-appSkill
- chain-ssrf-to-cloudSkill
- chain-web-to-rceSkill
- chain-xss-to-account-takeoverSkill
- email-securitySkill
- engagement-flowSkill
- finding-disciplineSkill
- http-headers-securitySkill
- oob-interactionsSkill
- opsec-disciplineSkill
- research-firstSkill
- scope-disciplineSkill
- scope-importSkill
- session-contextSkill
- 2fa-bypassSkill
- api-abuseSkill
- auth-bypassSkill
- broken-access-controlSkill
- business-logicSkill
- cache-poisoningSkill
- clickjackingSkill
- corsSkill
- credential-testingSkill
- crlf-injectionSkill
- cryptographic-oracleSkill
- csrfSkill
- css-injectionSkill
- data-exfiltration-testSkill
- deserializationSkill
- email-injectionSkill
- file-uploadSkill
- fuzzingSkill
- graphqlSkill
- grpcSkill
- host-headerSkill
- http-smugglingSkill
- idorSkill
- info-disclosureSkill
- jwtSkill
- lateral-movementSkill
- lfi-rfiSkill
- mass-assignmentSkill
- oauthSkill
- open-redirectSkill
- parameter-pollutionSkill
- The first 60 shown.
The file
We split this skill into the rules it gives an agent
6 rules. About 0 are common, 6 are distinctive, and 0 are very specific to this project.
≈0
Common · estimate
Many files like this have a rule of this kind.
≈6
Distinctive · estimate
This author's own choices. Worth a look.
0
Very specific
Tied to their project's names, files or tools. Probably skip.
- Common
- Distinctive
- Very specific
- Distinctive: line 22
After gaining access, gather context before acting:
- Distinctive: line 34
Every command output captured in custody log.
- Distinctive: line 59
Document — do NOT install — persistence mechanisms available:
- Distinctive: line 73
Document the path (how an attacker would install it)
- Distinctive: line 80
Check for escalation vectors from current access level:
- Distinctive: line 115
NEVER actually exfiltrate data.
≈ “Common” is an estimate: at least 1 in 5 of the 350,495 skill files we read have a rule of the same kind, not the same words. “Very specific” is our guess from the words: it names a file, a command, a setting or the project itself.
Files
Post-Exploitation Assessment
Skill for assessing post-exploitation risk once initial access is confirmed. Covers lateral movement, persistence, privilege escalation, and data exfiltration vectors — all within authorized scope.
Prerequisites
- At least one finding with status
exploitedorconfirmedthat grants code execution or authenticated access - Explicit operator approval via seven-question gate
- Scope must explicitly authorize post-exploitation activities
Phase 1: Situational Awareness
After gaining access, gather context before acting:
1. Identify current user/role and privileges
2. Enumerate local system info (OS, hostname, network interfaces)
3. List running services and listening ports
4. Check for credential stores (env vars, config files, keyrings)
5. Map network topology visible from this positionEvidence Requirements
Every command output captured in custody log. No destructive actions without separate operator gate.
Phase 2: Lateral Movement Assessment
Assess — do NOT execute without gate — potential lateral paths:
| Vector | Check | Tool |
| SSH keys | find / -name authorized_keys -o -name id_rsa 2>/dev/null | Manual |
| Network shares | showmount -e {host}, SMB enumeration | nmap scripts |
| Internal services | Port scan from compromised host | nmap/rustscan |
| Cloud metadata | curl -s http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/ | curl |
| Container escape | Check /proc/1/cgroup, Docker socket | Manual |
| Database credentials | Grep config files for connection strings | grep/find |
| Token reuse | Session tokens, API keys in environment | env, config |
Chain Anchors
rce→ enablespivot-internalssrf+cloud-metadata→credential-theftcredential-file-read→lateral-movement
Phase 3: Persistence Assessment
Document — do NOT install — persistence mechanisms available:
| Mechanism | Risk Level | Detection Difficulty |
| Cron jobs | Medium | Low — visible in crontab |
| SSH authorized_keys | Medium | Low — visible in file |
| Web shell | High | Medium — file on disk |
| Service/systemd unit | High | Medium — visible in systemctl |
| Container image modification | High | High — survives restarts |
| Database triggers/stored procs | Medium | High — often unmonitored |
Reporting
For each mechanism found available:
- Document the path (how an attacker would install it)
- Assess detection difficulty for the target's monitoring
- Recommend specific detection rules (feeds into detection-pairing skill)
- Classify as Demonstrated (if tested read-only) or Inferred
Phase 4: Privilege Escalation
Check for escalation vectors from current access level:
1. SUID/SGID binaries: find / -perm -4000 -type f 2>/dev/null
2. Sudo misconfigurations: sudo -l
3. Kernel version vs known local privesc CVEs
4. Writable paths in cron jobs or services
5. Docker group membership (docker run --privileged)
6. Cloud IAM role permissions (overly permissive)
7. Database GRANT privilegesCross-reference with ENABLES_MAP: auth-bypass → privilege-escalation.
Phase 5: Data Exfiltration Assessment
Map sensitive data accessible from current position:
| Data Type | Where to Look | Impact |
| PII/PHI | Database tables, file stores | Regulatory (GDPR/HIPAA) |
| Credentials | Config files, env vars, vaults | Lateral movement |
| Business data | Application databases, S3 buckets | Financial/competitive |
| Source code | Git repos, deployment artifacts | IP theft |
| Logs | Application/system logs | Reconnaissance |
Volume Assessment
Estimate extractable data volume and rate:
- Network egress bandwidth from compromised host
- Available exfil channels (DNS, HTTP, ICMP)
- Detection likelihood per channel
Gotchas
- NEVER actually exfiltrate data. Demonstrate access, measure volume, document the path. The PoC is "I can read row 1 of table X", not "here are 10k rows".
- Container breakouts: verify scope covers the host, not just the container.
- Cloud metadata: some providers have IMDSv2 requiring token — check both.
- Persistence assessment is documentation only — installing persistence mechanisms is out of scope unless explicitly authorized.
- Network pivoting from a compromised host changes the attack surface — re-confirm scope before scanning internal networks.
Output
For each post-exploitation vector assessed:
- Finding with evidence_tag (Demonstrated if verified read-only, Inferred if theoretical)
- Chain reference linking initial access to post-exploitation capability
- Detection recommendation for blue team
- Remediation priority based on combined chain severity
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