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mahumadadmahumadad/quarry/skills/hunt/lateral-movement/SKILL.md

lateral-movement

Skill1 starsChanged 12 days agoMITView on GitHub

Assess lateral movement paths between compromised and adjacent assets using MITRE ATT&CK TA0008 techniques.

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13 rules. About 0 are common, 13 are distinctive, and 0 are very specific to this project.

  • ≈0

    Common · estimate

    Many files like this have a rule of this kind.

  • ≈13

    Distinctive · estimate

    This author's own choices. Worth a look.

  • 0

    Very specific

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  • Common
  • Distinctive
  • Very specific
  1. Distinctive:

    Verify initial access is confirmed (not hypothetical)

    line 21
  2. Distinctive:

    Document the pivot point (host, access level, method)

    line 22
  3. Distinctive:

    Document: which internal hosts respond, which ports are open

    line 31
  4. Distinctive:

    Check for credential reuse across services

    line 37
  5. Distinctive:

    Look for hardcoded credentials in config files, environment variables

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  6. Distinctive:

    Test discovered credentials against other internal services

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  7. Distinctive:

    Check for password patterns (same password, predictable variations)

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  8. Distinctive:

    Test default credentials on internal services

    line 45
  9. Distinctive:

    Check for mutual TLS, API keys, shared secrets

    line 51
  10. Distinctive:

    Test SSH tunneling / port forwarding capability

    line 57
  11. Distinctive:

    Check for jump boxes or bastion hosts

    line 59
  12. Distinctive:

    Document: what additional access each pivot provides

    line 60
  13. Distinctive:

    All credential tests logged with timestamps

    line 78

≈ “Common” is an estimate: at least 1 in 5 of the 350,495 skill files we read have a rule of the same kind, not the same words. “Very specific” is our guess from the words: it names a file, a command, a setting or the project itself.

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SKILL.md

Lateral Movement Assessment

MITRE ATT&CK: TA0008 (Lateral Movement) Prerequisites: Confirmed RCE, shell, or authenticated access on at least one asset Gate: Scope MUST explicitly include internal pivoting/lateral movement

Objective

Assess whether a compromised host can be used to reach additional internal assets, services, or network segments.

Pre-checks

  1. Confirm scope includes lateral movement testing
  2. Verify initial access is confirmed (not hypothetical)
  3. Document the pivot point (host, access level, method)
  4. Confirm network segmentation boundaries with operator

Steps

1. Internal Network Discovery

  • Map internal network from compromised host (arp -a, ip neigh, /etc/hosts)
  • Identify reachable subnets (ping sweep or port scan internal ranges)
  • Document: which internal hosts respond, which ports are open
  • Evidence: network map with reachable hosts

2. Service Account Enumeration

  • Identify service accounts and their privileges
  • Check for credential reuse across services
  • Look for hardcoded credentials in config files, environment variables
  • Evidence: list of discovered service accounts and their access level

3. Credential Reuse Testing

  • Test discovered credentials against other internal services
  • Check for password patterns (same password, predictable variations)
  • Test default credentials on internal services
  • Gate: each credential test against a new host requires operator confirmation

4. Trust Relationship Mapping

  • Identify trust relationships between services (shared DBs, internal APIs)
  • Check for mutual TLS, API keys, shared secrets
  • Map service-to-service authentication
  • Evidence: trust relationship diagram

5. Pivot Feasibility Assessment

  • Test SSH tunneling / port forwarding capability
  • Assess SOCKS proxy feasibility for deeper pivoting
  • Check for jump boxes or bastion hosts
  • Document: what additional access each pivot provides

Gotchas

  • Internal services may have different WAF/IDS rules than external
  • Credential spraying internally can trigger lockouts faster
  • Some services trust internal IPs implicitly — that's a finding
  • Time-based checks: internal services may have different timeouts

Chain Anchors

  • gives: internal-network-access, credential-reuse, pivot-internal
  • needs: rce, authenticated-access, shell

Evidence Requirements

  • Each lateral movement attempt: source host, target host, method, result
  • Network diagrams showing reachable segments
  • All credential tests logged with timestamps
  • Tag: Demonstrated (successful pivot) / Inferred (reachable but untested)

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