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mahumadadmahumadad/quarry/skills/hunt/data-exfiltration-test/SKILL.md

data-exfiltration-test

Skill1 starsChanged 11 days agoMITView on GitHub

Test whether DLP and monitoring controls detect data exfiltration using MITRE ATT&CK TA0010 techniques.

The file

We split this skill into the rules it gives an agent

11 rules. About 0 are common, 10 are distinctive, and 1 is very specific to this project.

  • ≈0

    Common · estimate

    Many files like this have a rule of this kind.

  • ≈10

    Distinctive · estimate

    This author's own choices. Worth a look.

  • 1

    Very specific

    Tied to their project's names, files or tools. Probably skip.

  • Common
  • Distinctive
  • Very specific
  1. Distinctive:

    Use ONLY synthetic test data — NEVER real sensitive data

    line 22
  2. Very specific:

    Use OAST integration (engine/oast.py) for callback collection

    line 32
  3. Distinctive:

    Test: can data leave via DNS queries without detection?

    line 33
  4. Distinctive:

    Test data in HTTP headers (custom headers, cookies, user-agent)

    line 39
  5. Distinctive:

    Test data in request body (POST to external endpoint)

    line 40
  6. Distinctive:

    Test data in URL parameters

    line 41
  7. Distinctive:

    Test data encoded in image/file uploads

    line 42
  8. Distinctive:

    Use OAST endpoint as receiver

    line 43
  9. Distinctive:

    Test sustained low-volume exfiltration (slow drip)

    line 64
  10. Distinctive:

    Test burst exfiltration (large volume, short window)

    line 65
  11. Distinctive:

    ALWAYS use synthetic test data, NEVER real PII/secrets

    line 70

≈ “Common” is an estimate: at least 1 in 5 of the 350,495 skill files we read have a rule of the same kind, not the same words. “Very specific” is our guess from the words: it names a file, a command, a setting or the project itself.

Keep what fits and drop the rest. Your version, ready for your agents.
Files
SKILL.md

Data Exfiltration Control Testing

MITRE ATT&CK: TA0010 (Exfiltration) Gate: EVERY exfiltration test requires explicit operator authorization Purpose: Test whether DLP and monitoring controls detect data leaving

Objective

Assess the effectiveness of data loss prevention (DLP) controls and monitoring by attempting controlled exfiltration of test data through various channels.

Pre-checks

  1. Scope MUST explicitly authorize exfiltration testing
  2. Use ONLY synthetic test data — NEVER real sensitive data
  3. Confirm monitoring/SOC team is aware (or not, depending on test type)
  4. Prepare test data tokens that can be traced back to the test
  5. Operator gate: approve each exfiltration channel before testing

Steps

1. DNS Exfiltration Test

  • Encode test data in subdomain labels (e.g., base32-encoded chunks)
  • Use OAST integration (engine/oast.py) for callback collection
  • Test: can data leave via DNS queries without detection?
  • Channels: direct DNS, DNS-over-HTTPS, DNS tunneling
  • Evidence: callback received = exfiltration possible, not detected

2. HTTP(S) Exfiltration Test

  • Test data in HTTP headers (custom headers, cookies, user-agent)
  • Test data in request body (POST to external endpoint)
  • Test data in URL parameters
  • Test data encoded in image/file uploads
  • Use OAST endpoint as receiver
  • Evidence: request received at OAST = exfiltration channel open

3. Out-of-Band Channel Testing

  • ICMP tunneling feasibility (ping with data payload)
  • WebSocket exfiltration (if WebSocket connections allowed outbound)
  • SMTP exfiltration (email with test data if mail relay available)
  • Evidence: successful OOB data receipt

4. Encoding and Evasion

  • Base64/hex encoding of test data
  • Chunked transfer in small increments
  • Steganographic embedding in allowed file types
  • Compression before exfiltration
  • Purpose: test if DLP inspects encoded/compressed content

5. Volume and Rate Assessment

  • Determine maximum data transfer rate before detection
  • Test sustained low-volume exfiltration (slow drip)
  • Test burst exfiltration (large volume, short window)
  • Evidence: threshold at which monitoring triggers (if ever)

Gotchas

  • ALWAYS use synthetic test data, NEVER real PII/secrets
  • Some DLP solutions only inspect cleartext — encrypted channels may bypass
  • Cloud environments may have different egress controls than on-prem
  • WAF/proxy may block some channels but not log the attempt
  • DNS exfil is often the last channel blocked — test it

Chain Anchors

  • gives: exfiltration-path, dlp-bypass
  • needs: rce, shell, ssrf, or any outbound communication capability

Evidence Requirements

  • Each test: channel used, data sent (hash only), received confirmation
  • Detection assessment: was it logged? was it blocked? was it alerted?
  • Timeline: how long between exfiltration and detection (if detected)
  • Tag: Demonstrated (data exfiltrated undetected) / Inferred (channel open)
  • Include OAST correlation tokens for each test

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