credential-testing
Skill1 starsChanged 11 days agoMITView on GitHub
Test authentication strength: hash cracking feasibility, default credentials, password policy compliance, and credential spraying.
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The file
Show its rules and text
We split this skill into the rules it gives an agent
18 rules. About 0 are common, 16 are distinctive, and 2 are very specific to this project.
≈0
Common · estimate
Many files like this have a rule of this kind.
≈16
Distinctive · estimate
This author's own choices. Worth a look.
2
Very specific
Tied to their project's names, files or tools. Probably skip.
- Common
- Distinctive
- Very specific
- Distinctive: line 22
If hashes are obtained (from DB dump, config leak, info-disclosure):
- Very specific: line 32
Policy check: if hashes use MD5/SHA1/SHA256 without salt → finding (weak hashing algorithm).
- Distinctive: line 47
Check defaults for every detected technology:
- Distinctive: line 66
Gate: test max 5 attempts per account.
- Distinctive: line 70
Verify these controls against the auth implementation:
- Very specific: line 91
Check response headers for X-RateLimit-*, Retry-After
- Distinctive: line 92
Look for CAPTCHA triggers
- Distinctive: line 93
Document: threshold (N attempts), window (M minutes), lockout duration
- Distinctive: line 110
Wait full lockout window between rounds
- Distinctive: line 113
Human gate required: before each spray round
- Distinctive: line 130
After credential access obtained:
- Distinctive: line 131
Check for privilege escalation paths (mass-assignment, IDOR with new session)
- Distinctive: line 132
Check for MFA bypass (alt auth flows, device trust)
- Distinctive: line 133
Check for session management issues (concurrent sessions, no logout)
- Distinctive: line 134
Check for horizontal movement (same password on other services)
- Distinctive: line 135
Check for data access scope (what does this credential access?)
- Distinctive: line 139
All credential test requests/responses in custody log
- Distinctive: line 150
Default credential finding if the service is not reachable from the attack surface (internal-only behind VPN)
≈ “Common” is an estimate: at least 1 in 5 of the 350,495 skill files we read have a rule of the same kind, not the same words. “Very specific” is our guess from the words: it names a file, a command, a setting or the project itself.
Files
Credential Testing
Test authentication strength: hash cracking feasibility, default credentials, password policy compliance, and credential spraying.
Prerequisites
- Scope confirmed (
/quarry:scope) with credential testing authorized - AppProfile available (tech stack, auth mechanisms identified)
- Account lockout policy documented or unknown (assume aggressive)
Steps
1. Hash identification
If hashes are obtained (from DB dump, config leak, info-disclosure):
hashid '{hash_value}'
hashcat --identify '{hash_value}'Common modes: MD5=0, SHA1=100, SHA256=1400, bcrypt=3200, NTLM=1000, SHA512crypt=1800, PBKDF2-SHA256=10900, Argon2=argon2id.
Policy check: if hashes use MD5/SHA1/SHA256 without salt → finding (weak hashing algorithm). If bcrypt cost < 10 or PBKDF2 iterations < 600k → finding (insufficient work factor per NIST 800-63B §5.1.1.2).
2. Wordlist selection
| Context | Primary | Fallback |
| General web app | rockyou.txt | seclists/Passwords/Common-Credentials/10-million-password-list-top-1000000.txt |
| Admin/service accounts | seclists/Passwords/Default-Credentials/default-passwords.txt | seclists/Passwords/Leaked-Databases/ |
| Technology-specific | seclists/Passwords/Default-Credentials/{product}-default-passwords.txt | Custom per engagement |
| Targeted (client name) | Build from OSINT: company name + year + season + symbols | hashcat rules: best64.rule, OneRuleToRuleThemAll.rule |
3. Default credential testing
Check defaults for every detected technology:
| Technology | Default creds | Check endpoint |
| WordPress | admin:admin, admin:password | /wp-login.php |
| Tomcat | tomcat:tomcat, admin:admin | /manager/html |
| Jenkins | admin:admin (no auth if setup skipped) | /login |
| Grafana | admin:admin | /login |
| phpMyAdmin | root:(empty) | / |
| Elasticsearch | (no auth) | :9200 |
| MongoDB | (no auth) | :27017 |
| Redis | (no auth) | :6379 |
| RabbitMQ | guest:guest | :15672 |
| PostgreSQL | postgres:postgres | :5432 |
| MySQL | root:(empty), root:root | :3306 |
| Spring Boot Actuator | (no auth) | /actuator |
| Cisco | admin:admin, cisco:cisco | web UI / SSH |
| FortiGate | admin:(empty) | :443 |
Gate: test max 5 attempts per account. Stop if lockout detected.
4. NIST 800-63B password policy audit
Verify these controls against the auth implementation:
| NIST 800-63B Requirement | Test |
| Min 8 chars (memorized), 6 (random) | Register with short passwords |
| Max ≥ 64 chars allowed | Register with 65+ char password |
| No composition rules required | Check if "Password1!" is rejected but "correct horse battery staple" accepted |
| Check against breach lists (HIBP) | Register with "Password1" — should be rejected |
| No periodic rotation forced | Check account settings for forced rotation |
| Rate limiting on auth attempts | Send 10 rapid login attempts |
| No SMS-only MFA | Check MFA options offered |
| Secure password storage (bcrypt/Argon2/PBKDF2) | From hash analysis in step 1 |
Each failure is a finding tagged to NIST 800-63B.
5. Credential spray planning
Pre-checks before spraying:
- Identify lockout policy:
- Try 3 wrong passwords → check for lockout message
- Check response headers for
X-RateLimit-*,Retry-After - Look for CAPTCHA triggers
- Document: threshold (N attempts), window (M minutes), lockout duration
Spray parameters:
# Conservative: 1 password per account per lockout window
# Target list: harvested usernames from recon (email-harvesting, OSINT)
# Password: ONE common password at a time across ALL users
# Example with hydra (if authorized):
hydra -L users.txt -p 'Summer2026!' {target} http-post-form \
"/login:username=^USER^&password=^PASS^:Invalid" \
-t 1 -W 30Spray rules:
- ONE password per round across all accounts
- Wait full lockout window between rounds
- Max 3-5 rounds per engagement unless client authorizes more
- Top spray passwords:
{Season}{Year}!,{Company}2026!,Welcome1!,Password1!,Changeme1! - Human gate required before each spray round
6. Document findings
For each credential issue found:
- Weak hash algorithm: evidence = hash sample (redacted), algorithm identified, NIST reference
- Default credentials: evidence = successful auth request/response, account accessed, data exposed
- Policy violation: evidence = what the policy allows vs NIST requirement, test requests proving the gap
- Spray success: evidence = successful auth request/response (redacted password after confirmation), account type, data accessible
Chain Anchors
After credential access obtained:
- Check for privilege escalation paths (mass-assignment, IDOR with new session)
- Check for MFA bypass (alt auth flows, device trust)
- Check for session management issues (concurrent sessions, no logout)
- Check for horizontal movement (same password on other services)
- Check for data access scope (what does this credential access?)
Evidence
- All credential test requests/responses in custody log
- Hash samples with algorithm identification
- Lockout policy documentation
- Spray timing log (attempts per window)
- NIST 800-63B compliance matrix filled
Never Submit
- Brute force without authorization
- Spray results without documenting lockout policy first
- "Weak password policy" without specific NIST 800-63B reference
- Default credential finding if the service is not reachable from the attack surface (internal-only behind VPN)
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