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mahumadadmahumadad/quarry/skills/hunt/credential-testing/SKILL.md

credential-testing

Skill1 starsChanged 11 days agoMITView on GitHub

Test authentication strength: hash cracking feasibility, default credentials, password policy compliance, and credential spraying.

The file

Show its rules and text

We split this skill into the rules it gives an agent

18 rules. About 0 are common, 16 are distinctive, and 2 are very specific to this project.

  • ≈0

    Common · estimate

    Many files like this have a rule of this kind.

  • ≈16

    Distinctive · estimate

    This author's own choices. Worth a look.

  • 2

    Very specific

    Tied to their project's names, files or tools. Probably skip.

  • Common
  • Distinctive
  • Very specific
  1. Distinctive:

    If hashes are obtained (from DB dump, config leak, info-disclosure):

    line 22
  2. Very specific:

    Policy check: if hashes use MD5/SHA1/SHA256 without salt → finding (weak hashing algorithm).

    line 32
  3. Distinctive:

    Check defaults for every detected technology:

    line 47
  4. Distinctive:

    Gate: test max 5 attempts per account.

    line 66
  5. Distinctive:

    Verify these controls against the auth implementation:

    line 70
  6. Very specific:

    Check response headers for X-RateLimit-*, Retry-After

    line 91
  7. Distinctive:

    Look for CAPTCHA triggers

    line 92
  8. Distinctive:

    Document: threshold (N attempts), window (M minutes), lockout duration

    line 93
  9. Distinctive:

    Wait full lockout window between rounds

    line 110
  10. Distinctive:

    Human gate required: before each spray round

    line 113
  11. Distinctive:

    After credential access obtained:

    line 130
  12. Distinctive:

    Check for privilege escalation paths (mass-assignment, IDOR with new session)

    line 131
  13. Distinctive:

    Check for MFA bypass (alt auth flows, device trust)

    line 132
  14. Distinctive:

    Check for session management issues (concurrent sessions, no logout)

    line 133
  15. Distinctive:

    Check for horizontal movement (same password on other services)

    line 134
  16. Distinctive:

    Check for data access scope (what does this credential access?)

    line 135
  17. Distinctive:

    All credential test requests/responses in custody log

    line 139
  18. Distinctive:

    Default credential finding if the service is not reachable from the attack surface (internal-only behind VPN)

    line 150

≈ “Common” is an estimate: at least 1 in 5 of the 350,495 skill files we read have a rule of the same kind, not the same words. “Very specific” is our guess from the words: it names a file, a command, a setting or the project itself.

Keep what fits and drop the rest. Your version, ready for your agents.
Files
SKILL.md

Credential Testing

Test authentication strength: hash cracking feasibility, default credentials, password policy compliance, and credential spraying.

Prerequisites

  • Scope confirmed (/quarry:scope) with credential testing authorized
  • AppProfile available (tech stack, auth mechanisms identified)
  • Account lockout policy documented or unknown (assume aggressive)

Steps

1. Hash identification

If hashes are obtained (from DB dump, config leak, info-disclosure):

hashid '{hash_value}'
hashcat --identify '{hash_value}'

Common modes: MD5=0, SHA1=100, SHA256=1400, bcrypt=3200, NTLM=1000, SHA512crypt=1800, PBKDF2-SHA256=10900, Argon2=argon2id.

Policy check: if hashes use MD5/SHA1/SHA256 without salt → finding (weak hashing algorithm). If bcrypt cost < 10 or PBKDF2 iterations < 600k → finding (insufficient work factor per NIST 800-63B §5.1.1.2).

2. Wordlist selection

ContextPrimaryFallback
General web approckyou.txtseclists/Passwords/Common-Credentials/10-million-password-list-top-1000000.txt
Admin/service accountsseclists/Passwords/Default-Credentials/default-passwords.txtseclists/Passwords/Leaked-Databases/
Technology-specificseclists/Passwords/Default-Credentials/{product}-default-passwords.txtCustom per engagement
Targeted (client name)Build from OSINT: company name + year + season + symbolshashcat rules: best64.rule, OneRuleToRuleThemAll.rule

3. Default credential testing

Check defaults for every detected technology:

TechnologyDefault credsCheck endpoint
WordPressadmin:admin, admin:password/wp-login.php
Tomcattomcat:tomcat, admin:admin/manager/html
Jenkinsadmin:admin (no auth if setup skipped)/login
Grafanaadmin:admin/login
phpMyAdminroot:(empty)/
Elasticsearch(no auth):9200
MongoDB(no auth):27017
Redis(no auth):6379
RabbitMQguest:guest:15672
PostgreSQLpostgres:postgres:5432
MySQLroot:(empty), root:root:3306
Spring Boot Actuator(no auth)/actuator
Ciscoadmin:admin, cisco:ciscoweb UI / SSH
FortiGateadmin:(empty):443

Gate: test max 5 attempts per account. Stop if lockout detected.

4. NIST 800-63B password policy audit

Verify these controls against the auth implementation:

NIST 800-63B RequirementTest
Min 8 chars (memorized), 6 (random)Register with short passwords
Max ≥ 64 chars allowedRegister with 65+ char password
No composition rules requiredCheck if "Password1!" is rejected but "correct horse battery staple" accepted
Check against breach lists (HIBP)Register with "Password1" — should be rejected
No periodic rotation forcedCheck account settings for forced rotation
Rate limiting on auth attemptsSend 10 rapid login attempts
No SMS-only MFACheck MFA options offered
Secure password storage (bcrypt/Argon2/PBKDF2)From hash analysis in step 1

Each failure is a finding tagged to NIST 800-63B.

5. Credential spray planning

Pre-checks before spraying:

  1. Identify lockout policy:
    • Try 3 wrong passwords → check for lockout message
    • Check response headers for X-RateLimit-*, Retry-After
    • Look for CAPTCHA triggers
  2. Document: threshold (N attempts), window (M minutes), lockout duration

Spray parameters:

# Conservative: 1 password per account per lockout window
# Target list: harvested usernames from recon (email-harvesting, OSINT)
# Password: ONE common password at a time across ALL users

# Example with hydra (if authorized):
hydra -L users.txt -p 'Summer2026!' {target} http-post-form \
  "/login:username=^USER^&password=^PASS^:Invalid" \
  -t 1 -W 30

Spray rules:

  • ONE password per round across all accounts
  • Wait full lockout window between rounds
  • Max 3-5 rounds per engagement unless client authorizes more
  • Top spray passwords: {Season}{Year}!, {Company}2026!, Welcome1!, Password1!, Changeme1!
  • Human gate required before each spray round

6. Document findings

For each credential issue found:

  • Weak hash algorithm: evidence = hash sample (redacted), algorithm identified, NIST reference
  • Default credentials: evidence = successful auth request/response, account accessed, data exposed
  • Policy violation: evidence = what the policy allows vs NIST requirement, test requests proving the gap
  • Spray success: evidence = successful auth request/response (redacted password after confirmation), account type, data accessible

Chain Anchors

After credential access obtained:

  1. Check for privilege escalation paths (mass-assignment, IDOR with new session)
  2. Check for MFA bypass (alt auth flows, device trust)
  3. Check for session management issues (concurrent sessions, no logout)
  4. Check for horizontal movement (same password on other services)
  5. Check for data access scope (what does this credential access?)

Evidence

  • All credential test requests/responses in custody log
  • Hash samples with algorithm identification
  • Lockout policy documentation
  • Spray timing log (attempts per window)
  • NIST 800-63B compliance matrix filled

Never Submit

  • Brute force without authorization
  • Spray results without documenting lockout policy first
  • "Weak password policy" without specific NIST 800-63B reference
  • Default credential finding if the service is not reachable from the attack surface (internal-only behind VPN)

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