security-owasp
Skill2 starsChanged 5 months agoMITView on GitHub
OWASP Top 10 (2021) aplicado: cómo detectarlas y prevenirlas en el código que escribís. Inyección, autenticación rota, exposición de datos, XXE, control de acceso, configuración insegura, XSS, deserialización, dependencias, logging. Cargá al diseñar o revisar código expuesto a entrada externa.
- Pipes a download into a shell
2 other projects use a version of this.
Adopted by
Most recently taken up by
- mejbaurbahar/software-tester-skillstheir own version, first seen Oct 13, 2026
- navikt/copilottheir own version, first seen Sep 14, 2026
Other versions2 projects use a version of this.
Word for word · 0
None found.
Edited · 0
None found.
Wrote their own version · 2
- navikt/copilot★ 61same name
- mejbaurbahar/software-tester-skills★ 1same name
How matches are found. Word for word: the exact same text. Edited: shares passages with this file (“99% same” means 99% of its five-word phrases also appear here; 10% or more counts). Their own version: similar meaning, or, weakest, the same name. We can’t tell which project had it first. Projects are counted among the 200 most-starred candidates, and mentions are links to the repository we found, up to 50 per site, so both counts are a floor.
In this repository25 other files it gives its agents.
- accessibility-wcagSkill
- agent-orchestrationSkill
- backend-api-designSkill
- backend-data-modelingSkill
- backend-observabilitySkill
- backend-performanceSkill
- blossom-carouselSkill
- browser-qaSkill
- commit-hygieneSkill
- discovery-intakeSkill
- frontend-component-patternsSkill
- geo-seoSkill
- gh-cliSkill
- glosario-vivoSkill
- llm-councilSkill
- pedido-claroSkill
- ponytailSkill
- reporte-comprensibleSkill
- sdd-flowSkill
- secure-by-defaultSkill
- security-authn-authzSkill
- security-secretsSkill
- security-supply-chainSkill
- turtle-protocolSkill
- ui-ux-pro-maxSkill
The file
We split this skill into the rules it gives an agent
1 rule. About 0 are common, 1 is distinctive, and 0 are very specific to this project.
≈0
Common · estimate
Many files like this have a rule of this kind.
≈1
Distinctive · estimate
This author's own choices. Worth a look.
0
Very specific
Tied to their project's names, files or tools. Probably skip.
- Common
- Distinctive
- Very specific
- Distinctive: line 52
Template injection: no metas input de usuario en strings que después rendea un template engine sin escape.
≈ “Common” is an estimate: at least 1 in 5 of the 350,495 skill files we read have a rule of the same kind, not the same words. “Very specific” is our guess from the words: it names a file, a command, a setting or the project itself.
Files
Security — OWASP Top 10 aplicado
Cuándo usar
- Diseñar o revisar un endpoint público.
- Auditoría de seguridad antes de release.
- Triage de un reporte de vulnerabilidad.
Complementa a [[secure-by-default]] (lista corta always-on); esta es la profunda.
A01 — Broken Access Control
Síntoma: un usuario accede o modifica algo que no debería.
- Por defecto denegar. Permisos explícitos, no implícitos.
- Autorización en el servidor, en cada handler. Cliente solo oculta UI.
- IDOR: nunca confíes en IDs del cliente. Verificá ownership en cada acceso a recurso (
WHERE id=? AND owner_id=?). - Sin métodos HTTP sin protección:
PUT/DELETE/POSTpor error rutean a un handler abierto.
Ver [[security-authn-authz]] para el detalle.
A02 — Cryptographic Failures
- HTTPS siempre. Sin "interno está bien sin TLS".
- Hash de contraseñas:
argon2id(preferido) obcrypt(12+). Nunca MD5, SHA1, SHA-256 pelado. - Cifrado: AES-GCM, ChaCha20-Poly1305. Sin ECB, sin CBC sin MAC.
- TLS ≥1.2, idealmente 1.3. Cipher suites modernas.
- Datos sensibles cifrados en reposo (BD, backups, logs).
- Tokens con suficiente entropía: 128+ bits, generados con CSPRNG (
crypto.randomBytes,secrets.token_bytes).
A03 — Injection
SQL, NoSQL, OS command, LDAP, ORM raw, template.
- Parametrización SIEMPRE. Sin
f"SELECT * FROM x WHERE id={id}". - Para queries dinámicas seguras: query builder con bindings o stored procs parametrizados.
- Shell: sin
exec(string); usá array de args (spawn(cmd, [args...])) o evitá del todo. - Template injection: no metas input de usuario en strings que después rendea un template engine sin escape.
- Validá whitelist (lo que sí), no blacklist (lo que no).
A04 — Insecure Design
- Modelá amenazas antes de codear lo crítico (STRIDE como base).
- Límites por defecto: rate limit, max size, max depth, timeout.
- Patrones de fallo seguro: si el authz falla → denegar, no permitir.
A05 — Security Misconfiguration
- Sin defaults inseguros en producción. Admin/admin, debug=true, CORS
*. - Headers de seguridad:
Strict-Transport-Security,Content-Security-Policy,X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff,Referrer-Policy: strict-origin-when-cross-origin,Permissions-Policy. - Errores de servidor → mensaje genérico al cliente, detalle al log.
- Endpoints de debug, métricas, profilers → cerrados o autenticados.
A06 — Vulnerable Components
- Inventario de dependencias (SBOM). Ver [[security-supply-chain]].
- Actualizá; no quedes en versiones EOL.
- Auditorías automáticas en CI:
npm audit,cargo audit,pip-audit,osv-scanner.
A07 — Identification and Authentication Failures
Ver [[security-authn-authz]]. En corto:
- MFA disponible y empujado para roles sensibles.
- Sesiones con expiración + rotación al cambio de privilegio.
- Bloqueo gradual de fuerza bruta (rate + delay + CAPTCHA), no bloqueo permanente fácil de explotar.
A08 — Software and Data Integrity Failures
- Verificá firmas/checksums de artefactos descargados.
- No
curl | shsin pinning ni checksum (a menos que sea instalación interactiva con consentimiento). - Lockfiles commiteados (
package-lock.json,Cargo.lock,poetry.lock). - Webhooks verificados con HMAC.
A09 — Security Logging and Monitoring
- Logueá: login (éxito/fallo), cambios de permisos, accesos a datos sensibles, errores 5xx.
- NO logueés contraseñas, tokens, PII completa. Ver [[security-secrets]] y [[backend-observability]].
- Alertas accionables (no ruido).
- Retención auditable según regulación (Ley 21.719 en Chile: revisar requisitos).
A10 — Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)
- Si tu servidor hace requests HTTP a URLs que vienen del cliente: peligro.
- Whitelist de dominios o bloqueá rangos privados (10.x, 172.16-31, 192.168, 169.254, localhost).
- Resolución DNS controlada (sin TOCTOU).
- Timeout corto, sin seguir redirects a otros dominios.
Validación
- Tests negativos: payloads de inyección, IDs ajenos, tokens manipulados.
- ZAP / Burp en staging para fuzz básico.
semgrep --config p/owasp-top-tenen CI.- Revisión de seguridad documentada en cada cambio que toca authz, criptografía o input externo.
Relacionadas
[[secure-by-default]] · [[security-authn-authz]] · [[security-secrets]] · [[security-supply-chain]]
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