security-scan
Skill808 starsChanged 4 months agoMITView on GitHub
Deep security scanning for .NET applications across 6 layers: vulnerable packages, secrets detection, OWASP code patterns, auth configuration, CORS policy, and data protection. Produces severity-rated findings with specific remediation steps. Load this skill when: "security scan", "security audit", "check for vulnerabilities", "find secrets", "OWASP", "auth review", "CORS check", "security review", "penetration test prep", "CVE check", "vulnerability scan", "hardcoded password", "data protection", "security posture".
89 other projects use a version of this.
Adopted by
Most recently taken up by
- Rojios/everything-claude-codetheir own version, first seen Nov 8, 2026
- bsene/skillstheir own version, first seen Nov 8, 2026
- TheurgicDuke771/DataQtheir own version, first seen Nov 8, 2026
- NemesLaszlo/claude-code-harnesstheir own version, first seen Nov 8, 2026
- pfangueiro/claude-code-agentstheir own version, first seen Nov 8, 2026
- Seeed-Projects/Seeed-Jetson-DevelopTooltheir own version, first seen Nov 8, 2026
Used with
Projects with it also use django-security, deployment-patterns and 10 more.
Other files people use alongside this one.
Files found in the same public projects as a version of this one, more often than they turn up anywhere else. Each project counts once, large collections count for less, and this file's own repository is left out.
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- +2 more from mstuder-slalom
Other versions89 projects use a version of this.
Word for word · 0
None found.
Edited · 0
None found.
Wrote their own version · 89
- openai/codex-security★ 11ksame name
- openai/plugins★ 7.8ksame name
- zereight/gitlab-mcp★ 2.1ksame name
- heartleo/zlib★ 1.5ksame name
- bagofwords1/bagofwords★ 463same name
- loulanyue/awesome-claude-notes★ 272same name
- Resgrid/Core★ 238same name
- GoogleCloudPlatform/cloud-solutions★ 139same name
- Fmarzochi/EGC★ 61same name
- Seeed-Projects/Seeed-Jetson-DevelopTool★ 57same name
79 more not listed
How matches are found. Word for word: the exact same text. Edited: shares passages with this file (“99% same” means 99% of its five-word phrases also appear here; 10% or more counts). Their own version: similar meaning, or, weakest, the same name. We can’t tell which project had it first. Projects are counted among the 200 most-starred candidates, and mentions are links to the repository we found, up to 50 per site, so both counts are a floor.
In this repository57 other files it gives its agents.
- AGENTS.mdAGENTS.md
- .claude/rules/agents.mdAGENTS.md
- .codex/AGENTS.mdAGENTS.md
- .opencode/AGENTS.mdAGENTS.md
- CLAUDE.mdCLAUDE.md
- .cursor/rules/dotnet-rules.mdCursor rule
- api-versioningSkill
- arch-checkSkill
- architecture-advisorSkill
- aspireSkill
- authenticationSkill
- avaloniaSkill
- build-fixSkill
- cachingSkill
- checkpointSkill
- ci-cdSkill
- clean-architectureSkill
- code-reviewSkill
- configurationSkill
- console-cliSkill
- container-publishSkill
- convention-learnerSkill
- dddSkill
- dependency-injectionSkill
- desktop-mvvmSkill
- de-sloppifySkill
- dockerSkill
- dotnet-initSkill
- ef-coreSkill
- error-handlingSkill
- health-checkSkill
- httpclient-factorySkill
- instinct-systemSkill
- loggingSkill
- messagingSkill
- migrateSkill
- minimal-apiSkill
- modern-csharpSkill
- native-aotSkill
- openapiSkill
- opentelemetrySkill
- outdatedSkill
- planSkill
- project-setupSkill
- project-structureSkill
- resilienceSkill
- scaffoldSkill
- scalarSkill
- serilogSkill
- specSkill
- tddSkill
- testingSkill
- token-reportSkill
- verifySkill
- vertical-sliceSkill
- workflow-masterySkill
- wrap-upSkill
The file
We split this skill into the rules it gives an agent
4 rules. 0 are common, 1 is distinctive, and 3 are very specific to this project.
0
Common
Most of the 80 edited versions we read keep these.
1
Distinctive
This author's own choices. Worth a look.
3
Very specific
Tied to their project's names, files or tools. Probably skip.
- Common
- Distinctive
- Very specific
- Distinctive: line 35
After a dependency update (Layer 1), auth changes (Layer 4), config changes (Layer 2), or logging changes (Layer 6)
- Very specific: line 57
Read references/scan-layers.md for the detection patterns per layer.
- Very specific: line 75
Test-fixture "secrets" and appsettings.Development.json values are expected — skip or mark INFO, don't flag as HIGH
- Very specific: line 83
Every finding: [SEVERITY] file:line — title, OWASP category, what's wrong, impact if exploited, and remediation code (before/after).
“Common” is measured: kept by at least 6 in 10 of the 80 edited versions of this file we could read. “Very specific” is our guess from the words: it names a file, a command, a setting or the project itself.
Files
/security-scan — 6-Layer Security Pipeline
What
Runs a defense-in-depth static scan across 6 layers. A project with zero CVEs can still have hardcoded secrets, SQL injection, and missing auth — each layer catches a different vulnerability class. Findings map to the OWASP Top 10:2025 taxonomy and are rated Critical/High/Medium/Low by exploitability, impact, and exposure — a Critical SQL injection on a public endpoint outranks a Low info-disclosure on an admin page.
Detection patterns, OWASP mappings, remediation code, and the report template
live in references/scan-layers.md — read it before executing.
Honesty rule: this is static analysis, not a penetration test. It catches known patterns but misses business-logic flaws, complex authorization bypasses, and runtime-only vulnerabilities. Every report states this.
When
- Pre-release security gate — full scan, non-negotiable before production
- "Security scan", "security audit", "find secrets", "CVE check", "OWASP"
- After a dependency update (Layer 1), auth changes (Layer 4), config changes (Layer 2), or logging changes (Layer 6)
- Pre-pentest preparation — fix static issues before paying for a pentest
- Incident response and quarterly reviews
How
Step 1: Choose Layers
| Scenario | Layers |
| Pre-release gate / pentest prep / incident / quarterly | All 6 |
| After dependency update | 1 |
| New endpoint added | 3, 4, 5 |
| Auth system changes | 4 |
| Config file changes | 2 |
| Logging changes | 6 |
| Public API exposure | 3, 4, 5 |
| Internal-only service | 1, 2, 3 |
Step 2: Execute the Layers
Read references/scan-layers.md for the detection patterns per layer.
Delegate deep auth and secrets review to the security-auditor agent, pairing
the authentication and configuration skills.
| # | Layer | OWASP 2025 | Method |
| 1 | Package vulnerabilities | A03 Supply Chain | dotnet list package --vulnerable --include-transitive |
| 2 | Secrets detection | — | Pattern scan over .cs/.json/.yml/.xml/.config |
| 3 | OWASP code patterns | A05 Injection, A08 Integrity, A04 Crypto, A01 Access Control | Source scan: raw SQL, Html.Raw, BinaryFormatter, MD5/SHA1, IDOR |
| 4 | Auth configuration | A07 Authentication, A01 Access Control | get_endpoint_map — every route's auth posture in one call; flag unmarked endpoints; then JWT validation settings |
| 5 | CORS policy | A02 Misconfiguration | Wildcard origins, credentials combos, method/header breadth |
| 6 | Data protection | A04 Crypto, A09 Logging & Alerting | PII in logs, over-broad responses, plaintext sensitive storage |
Step 3: Rate with Context
Severity must match actual risk — over-classification causes alert fatigue and buries the real Critical:
- Test-fixture "secrets" and appsettings.Development.json values are expected — skip or mark INFO, don't flag as HIGH
- A missing XML comment is never a security finding
- Reserve Critical for exploitable-now issues: injection on public endpoints, exposed production secrets, auth bypass
Step 4: Report
Every finding: [SEVERITY] file:line — title, OWASP category, what's wrong,
impact if exploited, and remediation code (before/after). Produce the summary
table + per-layer status table from the reference template, prefixed with the
static-analysis disclaimer.
Example
User: /security-scan before we ship
Claude: Running all 6 layers...
| Layer | Status | Findings |
|-------|--------|----------|
| 1. Packages | PASS | 0 CVEs (142 packages incl. transitive) |
| 2. Secrets | PASS | 0 real secrets (2 dev-only values skipped) |
| 3. OWASP Patterns | FAIL | 1 SQL injection |
| 4. Auth Config | WARN | 2 endpoints missing explicit auth attributes |
| 5. CORS | PASS | Explicit origins from configuration |
| 6. Data Protection | WARN | Customer email logged at Information level |
[HIGH] SearchOrders.cs:34 — SQL Injection (A05:2025)
FromSqlRaw($"...LIKE '%{search}%'") → attacker controls the query.
Fix: db.Orders.Where(o => EF.Functions.Like(o.Name, $"%{search}%"))
[MEDIUM] OrderEndpoints.cs:18,31 — no [Authorize]/[AllowAnonymous]; behavior
depends on ambient global policy. Make intent explicit per endpoint.
[LOW] OrderPlacedHandler.cs:22 — PII in logs (A09:2025). Log CustomerId, not email.
Note: static analysis only — this does not replace a penetration test.Related
references/scan-layers.md— detection patterns, OWASP 2025 mappings, report template/verify— Phase 5 runs a lightweight version of this scan per change set/health-check— Dimension 7 (Security Posture) is the spot-check versionauthentication/configuration— remediation patterns for Layers 4 and 2
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