C31-review-security
Skill1 starsChanged 3 months agoMITView on GitHub
Output language: Respond automatically in the user's conversation language. Return exactly one JSON object: Rules: - autofix_class: safe_auto only for adding input sanitization or escaping. Auth/logic fixes are gated_auto or manual. - confidence: 100 = I can write a curl to exploit this; 75 = clear vulnerable pattern; 50 = plausible with specific input; 25 = suspicious but unlikely. - No findings = empty arrays. Do not cry wolf.
In this repository56 other files it gives its agents.
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- C31-multi-reviewSkill
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The file
We split this skill into the rules it gives an agent
7 rules. About 0 are common, 7 are distinctive, and 0 are very specific to this project.
≈0
Common · estimate
Many files like this have a rule of this kind.
≈7
Distinctive · estimate
This author's own choices. Worth a look.
0
Very specific
Tied to their project's names, files or tools. Probably skip.
- Common
- Distinctive
- Very specific
- Distinctive: line 7
Read-only — does not edit files.
- Distinctive: line 44
Read the intent summary and diff.
- Distinctive: line 47
Check if input reaches a query builder, shell, template, or eval.
- Distinctive: line 48
Check auth guards: is ownership verified?
- Distinctive: line 49
Check output construction: is user input reflected in HTML/JSON without escaping?
- Distinctive: line 50
Check for secrets in strings, config, or logs.
- Distinctive: line 82
No findings = empty arrays.
≈ “Common” is an estimate: at least 1 in 5 of the 350,495 skill files we read have a rule of the same kind, not the same words. “Very specific” is our guess from the words: it names a file, a command, a setting or the project itself.
Files
Multilingual Triggers
| Language | Trigger phrases |
| EN | C31-review-security |
| ZH | 安全审查, 安全检查 |
| JA | セキュリティレビュー, 脆弱性チェック |
Output language: Respond automatically in the user's conversation language.
C31 Review — Security
Focus
- Injection (SQL, NoSQL, command, template, LDAP)
- XSS / CSP bypasses / unsafe HTML construction
- Auth bypass / privilege escalation / missing ownership checks
- Secrets in code or logs (tokens, passwords, keys)
- Insecure deserialization / unsafe eval
- Missing rate limiting / brute-force exposure
- CORS misconfiguration / unsafe headers
- Data exposure (PII leak, over-fetching, missing field-level auth)
Severity Calibration
| Level | Meaning | Examples |
| P0 | Direct exploit, data breach, auth bypass | SQL injection in public endpoint |
| P1 | Elevated privilege or significant data leak | Missing ownership check on delete |
| P2 | Defense-in-depth gap, narrow exploit window | No rate limit on login |
| P3 | Logging of sensitive data, minor header issue | Password logged in error message |
Workflow
- Read the intent summary and diff.
- For each endpoint, handler, or input boundary touched:
- Identify all user-supplied input (query params, body, headers, path segments).
- Check if input reaches a query builder, shell, template, or eval.
- Check auth guards: is ownership verified? Is the check on the right layer?
- Check output construction: is user input reflected in HTML/JSON without escaping?
- Check for secrets in strings, config, or logs.
- Flag any exploitable path or defense gap.
JSON Output Contract
Return exactly one JSON object:
{
"reviewer": "security",
"findings": [
{
"title": "One-line description",
"severity": "P0|P1|P2|P3",
"file": "relative/path",
"line": 42,
"confidence": 0|25|50|75|100,
"autofix_class": "safe_auto|gated_auto|manual|advisory",
"owner": "review-fixer|downstream-resolver|human",
"requires_verification": true|false,
"pre_existing": true|false,
"suggested_fix": "If known, brief fix description"
}
],
"residual_risks": ["Architecture-level risk 1"],
"testing_gaps": ["Missing security test for auth bypass"]
}Rules:
autofix_class:safe_autoonly for adding input sanitization or escaping. Auth/logic fixes aregated_autoormanual.confidence: 100 = I can write a curl to exploit this; 75 = clear vulnerable pattern; 50 = plausible with specific input; 25 = suspicious but unlikely.- No findings = empty arrays. Do not cry wolf.
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