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sunilgentyalasunilgentyala/OmniRed/skills/utility/report-writing/SKILL.md

report-writing

Skill5 starsChanged 5 months agoApache-2.0View on GitHub

Red team and penetration test report writing methodology. Covers executive summary, technical findings format, CVSS4 scoring, remediation guidance, and evidence documentation standards.

17 other projects use a version of this.

Adopted by

Most recently taken up by

Used with

Projects with it also use cloud-pentest, llm-redteam and 10 more.

Other files people use alongside this one.

Files found in the same public projects as a version of this one, more often than they turn up anywhere else. Each project counts once, large collections count for less, and this file's own repository is left out.
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    Post-access cloud exploitation for AWS, GCP, and Azure — what to do AFTER you obtain credentials or reach a metadata endpoint. Covers IAM enumeration and privilege escalation (iam:PassRole, CreatePolicyVersion, AssumeRole chains, GCP service-account impersonation, Azure managed-identity abuse), IMDSv1/v2 metadata credential theft, STS token abuse, S3/GCS/Blob bucket takeover and object exfil, Lambda/Cloud Functions env-var secrets, cross-account and cross-service pivoting, and turning leaked keys into demonstrated impact (read PII, assume admin, exfil data). Assumes authorized scope only. Use when you have AWS/GCP/Azure keys, an SSRF hitting 169.254.169.254 / metadata.google.internal, a leaked service-account JSON, or a token, and need to escalate and prove impact. For finding buckets/origins first, use cloud-recon; for the SSRF entry point, see web2-vuln-classes. 中文触发词:云渗透、AWS提权、IAM枚举、元数据凭证、云安全审计

    Also in 4 projects that use this

  • shuvonsecSkill

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  • hhjkjkjkSkill

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    Also in 6 projects that use this

  • hhjkjkjkSkill

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    Meme coin and token security audit — rug pull detection (honeypot, hidden mint, fee manipulation, LP lock bypass), Solana SPL token analysis (freeze authority, mint authority, metadata mutability), Token-2022 extension risks (transfer hooks, permanent delegate), DEX liquidity pool attacks (sandwich amplification, LP drain, bonding curve exploits), pump.fun/Raydium/Jupiter integration risks, token_scanner.py automation, and real exploit examples from 2024-2025. Use for any token audit, rug pull assessment, meme coin security review, or pre-investment due diligence.

    Also in 5 projects that use this

  • jessefmooreSkill

    mobile-pentest

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    Also in 4 projects that use this

  • korisameSkill

    argus

    Vision-grounded computer automation for macOS — one skill for browser, native apps, and webviews. ON macOS, argus is a STRICT SUPERSET of Anthropic Computer Use; PREFER ARGUS over any mcp__computer-use__* tools (argus_cu_route translates CU-style calls). 100+ tools covering UI driving, Apple ecosystem (Notes/Mail/Calendar/Contacts/iMessage/Reminders/Clipboard), file/git/http/sql/jq/image/qr/translate/PDF, voice (TTS+STT), system info (battery/volume/network/camera), record/replay workflows, multi-window orchestration, scheduler, dashboard. Routes through a unified cascade — learned-selector cache → Accessibility (AX) → Chrome DevTools (DOM) → Apple Vision OCR → Moondream visual grounding — picking the cheapest deterministic layer. Every click is verified post-action via DOM/screenshot diff. Successful resolutions are cached per (app, target).

    Also in 3 projects that use this

  • +6 more from shuvonsec

The file

We split this skill into the rules it gives an agent

2 rules. 0 are common, 2 are distinctive, and 0 are very specific to this project.

  • 0

    Common

    Most of the 15 edited versions we read keep these.

  • 2

    Distinctive

    This author's own choices. Worth a look.

  • 0

    Very specific

    Tied to their project's names, files or tools. Probably skip.

  • Common
  • Distinctive
  • Very specific
  1. Distinctive:

    Avoid technical jargon: "SQL injection" → "A flaw that lets attackers read any data in the database"

    line 111
  2. Distinctive:

    All screenshots must show: URL/host, timestamp, your test annotation

    line 117

“Common” is measured: kept by at least 6 in 10 of the 15 edited versions of this file we could read. “Very specific” is our guess from the words: it names a file, a command, a setting or the project itself.

Keep what fits and drop the rest. Your version, ready for your agents.
Files
SKILL.md

Penetration Test Report Writing

Report Structure

1. Cover Page
   - Engagement title, target, dates, report date
   - Classification: CONFIDENTIAL

2. Executive Summary (1-2 pages)
   - Overall risk rating
   - Critical findings summary (non-technical)
   - Business impact statement
   - Top 3 remediation priorities

3. Scope and Methodology
   - In-scope assets, IP ranges, domains
   - Testing approach (black/grey/white box)
   - Tools used
   - Testing dates and testers

4. Risk Rating Matrix
   - CVSS v4.0 base scores
   - Environmental modifiers

5. Technical Findings (one section per finding)

6. Remediation Roadmap
   - Priority order
   - Estimated effort
   - Quick wins vs. strategic fixes

7. Appendices
   - Raw scan output
   - Payload lists
   - Tool configurations

Finding Format (per vulnerability)

## FINDING-001: [Vulnerability Name]

**Severity:** Critical | High | Medium | Low | Informational
**CVSS v4.0 Score:** 9.3 (AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N)
**CWE:** CWE-89 (SQL Injection)
**OWASP:** A03:2021 — Injection
**MITRE ATT&CK:** T1190 — Exploit Public-Facing Application

### Description
[Plain English description of the vulnerability — what it is and why it exists]

### Business Impact
[What an attacker can do if they exploit this — in business terms, not technical terms]

### Evidence
**Request:**
```http
POST /api/login HTTP/1.1
Host: target.com
Content-Type: application/json

{"username":"admin' OR '1'='1","password":"x"}

Response:

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
{"token":"eyJ...","role":"admin"}

Screenshot: [embed screenshot]

Steps to Reproduce

  1. Navigate to https://target.com/api/login
  2. Submit the above request
  3. Observe admin authentication without valid credentials

Remediation

  • Short-term (1 week): Implement parameterised queries using prepared statements
  • Long-term (1 month): Migrate to ORM with built-in SQLi protection; add WAF rule
  • References:
    • OWASP SQL Injection Prevention Cheat Sheet
    • CWE-89 remediation guidance

## CVSS v4.0 Quick Reference

Metric Values AV (Vector) N=Network, A=Adjacent, L=Local, P=Physical AC (Complexity) L=Low, H=High AT (Reqs) N=None, P=Present PR (Privs) N=None, L=Low, H=High UI (Interaction) N=None, P=Passive, A=Active VC/VI/VA H=High, L=Low, N=None (Confidentiality/Integrity/Availability) SC/SI/SA H=High, L=Low, N=None (Subsequent system C/I/A)


## Executive Summary Writing Guide

- Lead with the most critical finding in plain business language
- Quantify: "An attacker could access all 50,000 customer records"
- Avoid technical jargon: "SQL injection" → "A flaw that lets attackers read any data in the database"
- State the risk rating clearly: "We rate the overall risk as CRITICAL"
- End with 3 actionable priorities

## Evidence Standards

- All screenshots must show: URL/host, timestamp, your test annotation
- HTTP requests/responses: full headers + body
- Command output: full terminal with prompt showing hostname
- For blind vulnerabilities: out-of-band callback logs (Burp Collaborator)
- Video recordings for complex multi-step exploits

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