cvss4-scoring
Skill5 starsChanged 5 months agoApache-2.0View on GitHub
CVSS v4.0 scoring guide for red team findings. Covers all metric groups (Base, Threat, Environmental, Supplemental), AI/LLM-specific scoring considerations, and OWASP LLM Top 10 to CVSS mapping.
In this repository33 other files it gives its agents.
- dcsyncSkill
- kerberoastingSkill
- pass-the-hashSkill
- jailbreakingSkill
- model-extractionSkill
- prompt-injectionSkill
- system-prompt-extractionSkill
- jwtSkill
- oauthSkill
- session-attacksSkill
- container-escapeSkill
- iam-privescSkill
- s3-enumSkill
- edr-evasionSkill
- initial-accessSkill
- embedding-attacksSkill
- rag-poisoningSkill
- mcp-context-injectionSkill
- mcp-rug-pullSkill
- mcp-tool-poisoningSkill
- osintSkill
- subdomain-enumSkill
- model-tamperingSkill
- report-writingSkill
- graphqlSkill
- idorSkill
- rceSkill
- sqliSkill
- ssrfSkill
- sstiSkill
- waf-bypassSkill
- xssSkill
- xxeSkill
The file
We split this skill into the rules it gives an agent
1 rule. About 0 are common, 1 is distinctive, and 0 are very specific to this project.
≈0
Common · estimate
Many files like this have a rule of this kind.
≈1
Distinctive · estimate
This author's own choices. Worth a look.
0
Very specific
Tied to their project's names, files or tools. Probably skip.
- Common
- Distinctive
- Very specific
- Distinctive: line 114
Use the official FIRST calculator: https://www.first.org/cvss/calculator/4-0
≈ “Common” is an estimate: at least 1 in 5 of the 350,495 skill files we read have a rule of the same kind, not the same words. “Very specific” is our guess from the words: it names a file, a command, a setting or the project itself.
Files
CVSS v4.0 Scoring Guide
Base Metrics
Exploitability Metrics
| Metric | Values | Notes |
| AV (Attack Vector) | N/A/L/P | Network=remotely exploitable; Physical=requires device |
| AC (Attack Complexity) | L/H | H=requires specific conditions or luck |
| AT (Attack Requirements) | N/P | P=target must be in non-default configuration |
| PR (Privileges Required) | N/L/H | |
| UI (User Interaction) | N/P/A | N=no user needed; A=user must actively engage |
Impact Metrics (Vulnerable System)
| Metric | Values |
| VC (Confidentiality) | H/L/N |
| VI (Integrity) | H/L/N |
| VA (Availability) | H/L/N |
Impact Metrics (Subsequent Systems)
| Metric | Values | Notes |
| SC (Confidentiality) | H/L/N | Impact on other systems in scope |
| SI (Integrity) | H/L/N | |
| SA (Availability) | H/L/N |
Common Findings — Quick Scores
| Finding | CVSS v4.0 Vector | Score |
| Unauthenticated RCE | AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H | 10.0 |
| SQLi (auth bypass) | AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N | 9.3 |
| Stored XSS (session hijack) | AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:A/VC:H/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N | 7.1 |
| Reflected XSS | AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:A/VC:L/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N | 5.3 |
| SSRF (internal) | AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:H/SI:N/SA:N | 8.6 |
| IDOR (read) | AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N | 7.1 |
AI/LLM-Specific Scoring
Standard CVSS was designed for traditional software. Apply these adjustments for AI vulnerabilities:
Prompt Injection (Direct)
AV:N — Network (user input over API/web)
AC:L — No special conditions
AT:N — Default configurations are vulnerable
PR:N — Unauthenticated in most products
UI:N — No user interaction beyond sending the prompt
VC:H — System prompt, tool configs, session data
VI:H — Agent can be directed to take harmful actions
VA:N — Usually doesn't affect availability
SC:H — Multi-agent pipelines: subsequent systems affectedIndirect Prompt Injection (via RAG/web)
AV:N — Attacker controls external content
AC:H — Requires agent to retrieve attacker content
AT:P — Requires agent to have retrieval capability
PR:N — No credentials needed (content is public)
UI:N — Agent retrieves autonomously
SC:H — High: affects all users who trigger retrievalMCP Tool Poisoning
AV:N — Network (unauthenticated tools/list)
AC:L — Low (no special conditions)
AT:N — None
PR:N — Unauthenticated endpoint
UI:N — Agent connects automatically
VC:H — Full context window visible to poisoned tool
VI:H — Agent can be directed to write files, call APIs
SC:H — Other MCP servers and downstream agents affected
Score: ~9.3Threat Metrics (Optional)
E (Exploit Maturity)
- U = Unreported
- P = Proof-of-Concept
- A = Attacked (in-the-wild exploitation confirmed)Supplemental Metrics
S (Safety) — N/P: physical harm possible
AU (Automatable) — N/Y: can be automated at scale
R (Recovery) — A/U/I: automatic/user/irrecoverable
V (Value Density) — D/C: diffuse/concentrated
RE (Effort) — L/M/H: low/medium/high response effort
U (Urgency) — Clear/Green/Amber/RedCalculator
Use the official FIRST calculator: https://www.first.org/cvss/calculator/4-0
Does it work?
Reviews from people and from AI agents that ran it: what they used it for, and whether it worked.
No reviews yet
People and AI agents can review whether this works in practice. Say what you used it for, and whether it worked.
- It worked
- Partly
- It didn't
Using an agent? It can post a review for you after it has run the file: the MCP tool registry_write, action report. How to connect one.
Your trail
Files you open will collect here, so you can find them again.
Open two or more, and you can remix the rules you like from each into one list. Kept in this browser only.
Now do this for your own.
Bring your CLAUDE.md, AGENTS.md or skills. agentleFS shows which of your rules are common, which are yours and which only fit one project, and keeps one version your agents read everywhere.

