cloud-misconfiguration-audit
Skill3 starsChanged 32 days agoMITView on GitHub
Use when reviewing cloud storage, IAM, metadata access, network exposure, or deployment configuration for unauthorized access risk.
In this repository22 other files it gives its agents.
- AGENTS.mdAGENTS.md
- skills/general/code-reviewer/AGENTS.mdAGENTS.md
- CLAUDE.mdCLAUDE.md
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The file
We split this skill into the rules it gives an agent
2 rules. About 0 are common, 2 are distinctive, and 0 are very specific to this project.
≈0
Common · estimate
Many files like this have a rule of this kind.
≈2
Distinctive · estimate
This author's own choices. Worth a look.
0
Very specific
Tied to their project's names, files or tools. Probably skip.
- Common
- Distinctive
- Very specific
- Distinctive: line 49
Keep account IDs, tokens, object names, and personal data to the minimum needed.
- Distinctive: line 53
Stop on customer data, cross-account access, write permission, or unexpected production impact.
≈ “Common” is an estimate: at least 1 in 5 of the 350,495 skill files we read have a rule of the same kind, not the same words. “Very specific” is our guess from the words: it names a file, a command, a setting or the project itself.
Files
Cloud Misconfiguration Audit
Assess cloud exposure from configuration, policy, logs, and synthetic fixtures. The goal is to reduce unintended access, not to enumerate or exploit another tenant's infrastructure.
When to Use
- Reviewing AWS, GCP, Azure, Supabase, Firebase, object storage, or IAM policy.
- Checking deployment templates, public endpoints, metadata protections, or container/cloud role boundaries.
Procedure
- Define account/project/subscription, region, environment, and read-only credentials in scope. Confirm the audit identity and expected permissions.
- Inventory internet-facing services, buckets, databases, load balancers, serverless functions, service accounts, workload identities, and secrets.
- Review IAM for wildcard principals/actions/resources, cross-account trust, unused roles, privilege escalation paths, and production identities in CI.
- Review storage for public listing/read/write, predictable object paths, insecure CORS, version history, logs, and sensitive metadata.
- Review metadata-service protections and container/task role boundaries in source and infrastructure-as-code. Do not query a live metadata endpoint unless the account owner explicitly provides an isolated fixture.
- Confirm findings with policy simulation, provider analyzer output, or a synthetic object. Never download unrelated customer data or alter policy.
- Recheck after remediation with the same read-only identity and record the before/after decision.
Evidence Gate
Public policy syntax is not automatically exploitable. Prove the effective permission, resource scope, and data class. A provider-owned public identifier is not a credential.
Report
Record provider/account alias, resource type and masked identifier, effective principal/action, data class, impact, remediation, and verification result. Keep account IDs, tokens, object names, and personal data to the minimum needed.
Stop Conditions
Stop on customer data, cross-account access, write permission, or unexpected production impact. Preserve only metadata and notify the authorized owner.
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Your trail
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