api-security-audit
Skill3 starsChanged 32 days agoMITView on GitHub
Use when reviewing an API for authorization gaps, unsafe input binding, token handling, CORS, or HTTP method configuration.
2 other projects use a version of this.
Adopted by
Most recently taken up by
- vishnujchandran/.agentstheir own version, first seen Oct 20, 2026
- noahfranklin/gideontheir own version, first seen Oct 13, 2026
Other versions2 projects use a version of this.
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Wrote their own version · 2
- noahfranklin/gideon★ 2same name
- vishnujchandran/.agents★ 0same name
How matches are found. Word for word: the exact same text. Edited: shares passages with this file (“99% same” means 99% of its five-word phrases also appear here; 10% or more counts). Their own version: similar meaning, or, weakest, the same name. We can’t tell which project had it first. Projects are counted among the 200 most-starred candidates, and mentions are links to the repository we found, up to 50 per site, so both counts are a floor.
In this repository22 other files it gives its agents.
- AGENTS.mdAGENTS.md
- skills/general/code-reviewer/AGENTS.mdAGENTS.md
- CLAUDE.mdCLAUDE.md
- fastify-best-practicesSkill
- agent-toolkit-maintainerSkill
- onboard-repoSkill
- docker-patternsSkill
- accessibilitySkill
- code-reviewerSkill
- thermo-nuclear-code-quality-reviewSkill
- brag-slimSkill
- biome-formattingSkill
- instagram-public-researchSkill
- research-data-collectionSkill
- cicd-security-auditSkill
- cloud-misconfiguration-auditSkill
- js-secrets-auditSkill
- llm-agent-security-auditSkill
- security-auditSkill
- source-leak-auditSkill
- ariadne-prdSkill
- ariadneSkill
The file
Files
API Security Audit
Review an API for configuration and authorization weaknesses without attempting to take over accounts, alter data, or bypass production controls.
When to Use
- Reviewing REST, GraphQL, RPC, or webhook endpoints.
- Investigating mass-assignment, BOLA/IDOR, CORS, JWT, or verb-tampering risk.
- Assessing an API before release or after an authorization change.
Authorization Boundary
Work only against a repository, local fixture, staging environment, or written test scope. Prefer source review and unit tests. Never send admin-changing payloads to a real account, brute-force tokens, or probe unrelated hosts.
Procedure
- Inventory routes, methods, auth middleware, schemas, tenant identifiers, and generated API documentation.
- For every read and write operation, identify the server-side authorization decision. Confirm that object ownership and tenant scope are checked after loading the object, not inferred from client input.
- Inspect request binding. Flag direct persistence of request bodies where
privileged fields such as
role,ownerId,tenantId,verified, orisAdminare not allowlisted. - Review method handling, including
OPTIONS,HEAD,TRACE, method override headers, and routes that accept both GET and mutating verbs. - Review JWT validation: fixed algorithm allowlist, issuer/audience checks, key rotation, expiry, and rejection of unsigned or wrongly signed tokens.
- Review CORS. A wildcard origin alone is not a credential leak; require an unsafe combination of origin reflection, credentials, and a sensitive browser-readable response.
- Reproduce only with harmless fixtures: a second test user, a synthetic
object, and a request that must return
401or403. Do not modify data.
Evidence Gate
Report a finding only when the code path or a controlled fixture demonstrates the trust-boundary failure. A suspicious field name, decoded JWT, or permissive header is a lead, not proof.
Report
Include endpoint or source location, required role, expected decision, observed decision, affected asset, minimal safe reproduction, impact, and remediation. Redact tokens, cookies, API keys, and personal data.
Common Mistakes
- Treating client-side route hiding as authorization.
- Calling
Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *a credentialed CORS finding. - Using a real user's identifier instead of a synthetic fixture.
- Recommending
alg:noneor privilege-changing payloads in production tests.
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