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raniellimontagnaraniellimontagna/agent-toolkit/skills/security/cicd-security-audit/SKILL.md

cicd-security-audit

Skill3 starsChanged 32 days agoMITView on GitHub

Use when reviewing CI/CD workflows, build pipelines, release automation, action dependencies, permissions, artifacts, or secret handling.

The file

We split this skill into the rules it gives an agent

3 rules. About 0 are common, 3 are distinctive, and 0 are very specific to this project.

  • ≈0

    Common · estimate

    Many files like this have a rule of this kind.

  • ≈3

    Distinctive · estimate

    This author's own choices. Worth a look.

  • 0

    Very specific

    Tied to their project's names, files or tools. Probably skip.

  • Common
  • Distinctive
  • Very specific
  1. Distinctive:

    Check least privilege. Each job should declare only required permissions.

    line 24
  2. Distinctive:

    Check third-party actions and downloaded tools for immutable commit pins, checksum verification, provenance, and update ownership.

    line 30
  3. Distinctive:

    Check secret handling: no echo/trace, no secrets in command-line arguments, artifacts, caches, test snapshots, or fork-triggered jobs.

    line 32

≈ “Common” is an estimate: at least 1 in 5 of the 350,495 skill files we read have a rule of the same kind, not the same words. “Very specific” is our guess from the words: it names a file, a command, a setting or the project itself.

Keep what fits and drop the rest. Your version, ready for your agents.
Files
SKILL.md

CI/CD Security Audit

Review pipeline configuration for privilege, injection, secret, and supply chain risks. Keep the assessment static or use isolated test branches.

When to Use

  • Reviewing GitHub Actions, GitLab CI, CircleCI, or release scripts.
  • Preparing a repository for trusted publishing or external contributions.
  • Investigating secrets in logs, unsafe artifacts, or unpinned actions.

Procedure

  1. Inventory workflow triggers, actors, environments, protected branches, reusable workflows, runners, deployment credentials, and artifacts.
  2. Check least privilege. Each job should declare only required permissions; pull-request workflows must not expose write tokens to untrusted code.
  3. Trace untrusted input from branch names, issue titles, PR fields, commit messages, and changed files into shell commands, expressions, paths, and scripts. Use environment variables and fixed argument arrays rather than interpolation.
  4. Check third-party actions and downloaded tools for immutable commit pins, checksum verification, provenance, and update ownership.
  5. Check secret handling: no echo/trace, no secrets in command-line arguments, artifacts, caches, test snapshots, or fork-triggered jobs.
  6. Review artifact upload/download boundaries, retention, deployment gates, environment approvals, and concurrency controls.
  7. Validate changes in a disposable branch with synthetic secrets and a dry-run deployment. Never print or exfiltrate a real secret.

Evidence Gate

Distinguish a theoretical permission from an reachable path. Show the trigger, job, permission/input flow, and affected asset. A floating action tag is a supply-chain risk, not proof of compromise.

Report

Include workflow/job, trigger, trust boundary, vulnerable data flow, impact, safe reproduction or static evidence, and exact hardening. Redact secret names when they reveal sensitive architecture and never include values.

Common Mistakes

  • Treating every pull_request_target workflow as automatically vulnerable.
  • Calling a public CI log a secret leak without proving the value is sensitive.
  • Suggesting live deployment tests for a static workflow review.

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