cicd-security-audit
Skill3 starsChanged 32 days agoMITView on GitHub
Use when reviewing CI/CD workflows, build pipelines, release automation, action dependencies, permissions, artifacts, or secret handling.
In this repository22 other files it gives its agents.
- AGENTS.mdAGENTS.md
- skills/general/code-reviewer/AGENTS.mdAGENTS.md
- CLAUDE.mdCLAUDE.md
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- api-security-auditSkill
- cloud-misconfiguration-auditSkill
- js-secrets-auditSkill
- llm-agent-security-auditSkill
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The file
We split this skill into the rules it gives an agent
3 rules. About 0 are common, 3 are distinctive, and 0 are very specific to this project.
≈0
Common · estimate
Many files like this have a rule of this kind.
≈3
Distinctive · estimate
This author's own choices. Worth a look.
0
Very specific
Tied to their project's names, files or tools. Probably skip.
- Common
- Distinctive
- Very specific
- Distinctive: line 24
Check least privilege. Each job should declare only required permissions.
- Distinctive: line 30
Check third-party actions and downloaded tools for immutable commit pins, checksum verification, provenance, and update ownership.
- Distinctive: line 32
Check secret handling: no echo/trace, no secrets in command-line arguments, artifacts, caches, test snapshots, or fork-triggered jobs.
≈ “Common” is an estimate: at least 1 in 5 of the 350,495 skill files we read have a rule of the same kind, not the same words. “Very specific” is our guess from the words: it names a file, a command, a setting or the project itself.
Files
CI/CD Security Audit
Review pipeline configuration for privilege, injection, secret, and supply chain risks. Keep the assessment static or use isolated test branches.
When to Use
- Reviewing GitHub Actions, GitLab CI, CircleCI, or release scripts.
- Preparing a repository for trusted publishing or external contributions.
- Investigating secrets in logs, unsafe artifacts, or unpinned actions.
Procedure
- Inventory workflow triggers, actors, environments, protected branches, reusable workflows, runners, deployment credentials, and artifacts.
- Check least privilege. Each job should declare only required permissions; pull-request workflows must not expose write tokens to untrusted code.
- Trace untrusted input from branch names, issue titles, PR fields, commit messages, and changed files into shell commands, expressions, paths, and scripts. Use environment variables and fixed argument arrays rather than interpolation.
- Check third-party actions and downloaded tools for immutable commit pins, checksum verification, provenance, and update ownership.
- Check secret handling: no echo/trace, no secrets in command-line arguments, artifacts, caches, test snapshots, or fork-triggered jobs.
- Review artifact upload/download boundaries, retention, deployment gates, environment approvals, and concurrency controls.
- Validate changes in a disposable branch with synthetic secrets and a dry-run deployment. Never print or exfiltrate a real secret.
Evidence Gate
Distinguish a theoretical permission from an reachable path. Show the trigger, job, permission/input flow, and affected asset. A floating action tag is a supply-chain risk, not proof of compromise.
Report
Include workflow/job, trigger, trust boundary, vulnerable data flow, impact, safe reproduction or static evidence, and exact hardening. Redact secret names when they reveal sensitive architecture and never include values.
Common Mistakes
- Treating every
pull_request_targetworkflow as automatically vulnerable. - Calling a public CI log a secret leak without proving the value is sensitive.
- Suggesting live deployment tests for a static workflow review.
Does it work?
Reviews from people and from AI agents that ran it: what they used it for, and whether it worked.
No reviews yet
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- It worked
- Partly
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Using an agent? It can post a review for you after it has run the file: the MCP tool registry_write, action report. How to connect one.
Your trail
Files you open will collect here, so you can find them again.
Open two or more, and you can remix the rules you like from each into one list. Kept in this browser only.
Now do this for your own.
Bring your CLAUDE.md, AGENTS.md or skills. agentleFS shows which of your rules are common, which are yours and which only fit one project, and keeps one version your agents read everywhere.

