agentleFS
phatnguyen03022001phatnguyen03022001/agent-skills/security-review/SKILL.md

security-review

Skill2 starsChanged 3 months agoApache-2.0View on GitHub

Use when a change affects authentication, authorization, secrets, sensitive data, trust boundaries, untrusted input, external integrations, dependencies, or other security-critical behavior.

192 other projects use a version of this.

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Projects with it also use linkerd-patterns, dependency-cve-sweep and 10 more.

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Files found in the same public projects as a version of this one, more often than they turn up anywhere else. Each project counts once, large collections count for less, and this file's own repository is left out.
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The file

We split this skill into the rules it gives an agent

3 rules. 0 are common, 2 are distinctive, and 1 is very specific to this project.

  • 0

    Common

    Most of the 167 edited versions we read keep these.

  • 2

    Distinctive

    This author's own choices. Worth a look.

  • 1

    Very specific

    Tied to their project's names, files or tools. Probably skip.

  • Common
  • Distinctive
  • Very specific
  1. Distinctive:

    Ask what an attacker or compromised dependency can influence and what authority each component actually needs.

    line 14
  2. Very specific:

    Use adversarial-audit for non-malicious fault pressure and governance bypasses, reuse-first for selecting established security mechanisms, …

    line 44
  3. Distinctive:

    Do not broaden scope into a repository-wide security audit unless authorized, and do not claim a project secure because one change passed …

    line 46

“Common” is measured: kept by at least 6 in 10 of the 167 edited versions of this file we could read. “Very specific” is our guess from the words: it names a file, a command, a setting or the project itself.

Keep what fits and drop the rest. Your version, ready for your agents.
Files
SKILL.md

Security Review

Review security as a design property with concrete threat paths, not as a generic checklist.

Model the system

Identify protected assets, actors, entry points, trust boundaries, data flows, privileges, external dependencies, and security assumptions. Read the target repository’s security policy and existing controls before proposing new ones.

Ask what an attacker or compromised dependency can influence and what authority each component actually needs.

Analyze threats and controls

Focus where relevant on:

  • authentication, session/token lifecycle, and identity binding;
  • authorization at the resource/action boundary, including tenant isolation;
  • validation and canonicalization of untrusted input;
  • injection and unsafe interpretation;
  • secrets, keys, credentials, and logging exposure;
  • sensitive-data collection, storage, transit, retention, and deletion;
  • SSRF/path traversal/file or URL handling;
  • dependency and supply-chain trust;
  • webhook/signature/replay semantics;
  • privilege escalation and confused-deputy paths;
  • secure defaults, least privilege, and failure behavior.

Trace concrete attack paths from controllable source to meaningful sink. Distinguish a plausible vulnerability from a scanner-shaped suspicion. When safe and authorized, validate findings with minimal reproducible evidence rather than inflating severity from theory.

Prioritize

Rank findings by exploitability, impact, exposure, and existing mitigations. Recommend the smallest control that closes the threat without breaking product constraints. Prefer standard, well-maintained security mechanisms over custom cryptography or bespoke identity systems.

Security controls still require verification. Specify negative and boundary tests when they materially prove the control.

Treat security findings skeptically in both directions. Do not dismiss a path because exploitation seems inconvenient, and do not promote a theoretical pattern to critical severity without showing how attacker-controlled data reaches a privileged effect. Record prerequisites and existing mitigations explicitly. For version-sensitive controls or vulnerabilities, verify current upstream guidance rather than relying on remembered best practices.

Boundaries

Use adversarial-audit for non-malicious fault pressure and governance bypasses, reuse-first for selecting established security mechanisms, and reliability for availability/recovery concerns.

Do not broaden scope into a repository-wide security audit unless authorized, and do not claim a project secure because one change passed review.

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