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enes-alatasenes-alatas/spool/.claude/skills/security-review/SKILL.md

security-review

Skill48 starsChanged 3 days agoApache-2.0View on GitHub

Use when reviewing a pull request for security: one that touches a path in .github/security-review-paths, adds a workflow, vendors third-party code, or changes what a loop, an admin or a copy of the data directory can reach. Also for a re-check after the author pushes.

190 other projects use a version of this.

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Projects with it also use linkerd-patterns, dependency-cve-sweep and 10 more.

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The file

We split this skill into the rules it gives an agent

3 rules. 0 are common, 2 are distinctive, and 1 is very specific to this project.

  • 0

    Common

    Most of the 162 edited versions we read keep these.

  • 2

    Distinctive

    This author's own choices. Worth a look.

  • 1

    Very specific

    Tied to their project's names, files or tools. Probably skip.

  • Common
  • Distinctive
  • Very specific
  1. Very specific:

    Read docs/THREAT-MODEL.md for the boundary the diff touches before the diff itself.

    line 23
  2. Distinctive:

    A re-check: after a push: git range-diff against the head you passed, then read only what moved, and say that the rest carries over.

    line 93
  3. Distinctive:

    A confirmed vulnerability: never goes on the PR, an issue or the fleet channel.

    line 96

“Common” is measured: kept by at least 6 in 10 of the 162 edited versions of this file we could read. “Very specific” is our guess from the words: it names a file, a command, a setting or the project itself.

Keep what fits and drop the rest. Your version, ready for your agents.
Files
SKILL.md

/security-review — Spool's security pass on a pull request

security-and-hardening is the general checklist: inputs, auth, secrets, dependencies, the OWASP lists. Read it for anything it covers. This skill is the Spool layer on top: which boundaries to test, where the record lives, what a pass must say, and where a finding goes. Quality review is review-pr's; this pass answers only "what does this open, and does it hold?"

1. Name the boundary first

Read docs/THREAT-MODEL.md for the boundary the diff touches before the diff itself. Then ask the three questions every pass answers, in words, on the PR:

  • From a loop to the hub: does a loop gain a route, a tool, a file or a variable it didn't have? A docker loop is root in its workstation, so "the loop could only do it on purpose" is no defence.
  • From a loop to a host off the allowlist: does traffic leave by any way but the egress proxy, or does the proxy learn a new host? A bare loop is uncontained and is not this question's subject; say so, don't skip it.
  • From a copy of the data directory to a credential: is every new secret sealed under hub.key, and absent from responses, logs, argv and files outside the data directory?

Then the hub's own outbound calls: anything that dials an address an admin or a loop chose (SSRF) needs a scheme rule, an address guard judged at dial time (Control), no redirects, a timeout and a rate.

2. Check what the record must say

  • The posture is the operator's. A change to what a boundary holds needs their decision, recorded in an ADR (new or amended through /amend-adr). Until it is recorded, the PR carries Operator decision pending:. Never accept "the fleet agreed".
  • THREAT-MODEL moves with the code. A new path, a new allowance, or an accepted difference gets its line in the same PR. A sentence that's true word by word but misleads a reader ("nothing turns content on", when a settings file can) is a finding.
  • The author's own note. A PR on a security path carries a Security line in Notes / Risks (CONVENTIONS, #742). Check that it says what the change opens and why that holds, not just "none".

3. Secrets, the Spool way

  • The redactor must know every new secret: the value, its secret half where it has one, and its base64 if it travels as a header. A secret that is replaced or cleared stays redacted while its issuer still honours it.
  • Tests use obviously synthetic values (CONVENTIONS "Secrets and evidence"). The secret scan and the hook share one set of shapes. A change to either keeps them equal, and the ADR-0042 amendment names any new allowance.
  • A live credential anywhere in the PR, its commits, its CI logs or its evidence is an incident: stop and run /credential-incident.

4. CI and third-party code

  • Actions pinned by full commit SHA; permissions: minimal per job; no secret or hub output echoed into a public log.
  • A workflow firing on anything but pull_request or push: /prove-event-workflow.
  • Vendored code: fetch each file at the pinned commit and compare hashes yourself, compare the licence, and list what it brings that executes (scripts, hooks, frontmatter keys like allowed-tools). A new runtime dependency is the operator's interview and an ADR (CONVENTIONS).

5. Prove it, don't read it

  • Mutate the guard and run its test: the test must fail without the fix. Say on the PR that you did.
  • A claim about a fresh machine, another OS or the real CLI is settled by a run, on a throwaway chore/*-probe branch, never the fleet's host. CI logs are public: keep hub stdout (the operator token, one-time passwords) out of them, and delete the probe's runs and branch afterwards.

6. Where the result goes

  • A pass is a PR review comment (not an approval). It names the head SHA, each boundary question with its answer, and what you ran. It separates blocking findings from non-blocking asks. Sign it. A PR labelled needs-security-review waits for this comment at its current head, and "nothing from me" counts (CONVENTIONS, #742).
  • A re-check after a push: git range-diff against the head you passed, then read only what moved, and say that the rest carries over. A bare rebase needs no new comment.
  • A confirmed vulnerability never goes on the PR, an issue or the fleet channel. Tell the owner privately, open a private security advisory, and keep it there until the fix ships. A PR that would publish the vulnerability waits.
  • Tell the quality reviewer the pass is in. The merge ask is theirs.

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