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noahfranklinnoahfranklin/gideon/skills/iot-embedded-pentest/SKILL.md

iot-embedded-pentest

Skill2 starsChanged 47 days agoMITView on GitHub

Use when assessing IoT / embedded device security — firmware analysis (extraction, hardcoded secrets, outdated components), hardware interfaces (UART/JTAG/SPI debug), device-to-cloud and mobile companion APIs, and wireless protocols (BLE, Zigbee, MQTT/CoAP). Follows the OWASP IoT Top 10 and firmware security testing methodology, with detection and remediation. Authorized testing of devices you own or are cleared to assess.

The file

We split this skill into the rules it gives an agent

2 rules. About 0 are common, 1 is distinctive, and 1 is very specific to this project.

  • ≈0

    Common · estimate

    Many files like this have a rule of this kind.

  • ≈1

    Distinctive · estimate

    This author's own choices. Worth a look.

  • 1

    Very specific

    Tied to their project's names, files or tools. Probably skip.

  • Common
  • Distinctive
  • Very specific
  1. Distinctive:

    Fix: no hardcoded secrets, signed+encrypted firmware updates, patch components, secure boot.

    line 19
  2. Very specific:

    Test the device's cloud API and the companion mobile app (route to api-security-audit and mobile-pentest): auth, device …

    line 26

≈ “Common” is an estimate: at least 1 in 5 of the 350,495 skill files we read have a rule of the same kind, not the same words. “Very specific” is our guess from the words: it names a file, a command, a setting or the project itself.

Keep what fits and drop the rest. Your version, ready for your agents.
Files
SKILL.md

IoT / Embedded Device Testing

Connected devices combine a constrained embedded system, a mobile/cloud backend, and radio protocols — three attack surfaces in one. Assessment mapped to the OWASP IoT Top 10 and firmware testing methodology. Authorized testing of hardware you own or are cleared to assess.

0. Authorization gate

  • You own / are authorized to test the device, its firmware, and its backend.
  • Physical-access and radio-testing rules; spare units for destructive steps.
  • Backend/cloud + companion-app scope (pair with api-security-audit, mobile-pentest).

1. Firmware analysis (highest value, lowest risk)

  • Obtain: vendor download, update capture, or extraction from flash (in scope).
  • Unpack: identify filesystem/components; extract binaries and config.
  • Look for: hardcoded credentials/keys/certs, debug/backdoor accounts, private keys, API endpoints/secrets, outdated components with known CVEs, insecure update mechanism (unsigned/unencrypted firmware).
  • Fix: no hardcoded secrets, signed+encrypted firmware updates, patch components, secure boot.

2. Hardware interfaces

  • Identify debug interfaces (UART console, JTAG/SWD, SPI flash). Assess whether they expose a root shell, memory, or firmware readout.
  • Fix: disable/lock debug interfaces in production, secure boot, flash read protection.

3. Device ↔ cloud / mobile

  • Test the device's cloud API and the companion mobile app (route to api-security-audit and mobile-pentest): auth, device identity/provisioning, tenant isolation (can one device/account reach another's), and update distribution.
  • Fix: strong per-device identity, mutual TLS, authorization on device resources.

4. Wireless / protocols

  • Enumerate radios and protocols: BLE (pairing, GATT authorization), Zigbee/Z-Wave, Wi-Fi (→ wireless-pentest), and app-layer MQTT/CoAP (auth, topic authorization, TLS).
  • Fix: authenticated/encrypted pairing, per-characteristic/topic authorization, TLS, no open brokers.

5. Remediation themes

Secure boot + signed/encrypted updates, no hardcoded secrets, locked debug interfaces, per-device identity + mutual TLS, authorization on device/cloud resources, and patchable components.

6. Tooling

binwalk / firmware extraction, Ghidra (binary analysis), flashrom + hardware adapters (UART/JTAG/SPI), BLE sniffers/tooling, MQTT clients, proxy for device/cloud traffic. Follow RoE; keep spare hardware.

7. Reporting

Per finding: component (firmware/hardware/cloud/radio), weakness (OWASP IoT), impact (device takeover / fleet reach / data), detection, remediation. Fleet-wide chains → vuln-chaining. Checklist: references/iot-checklist.md.

<sub>© 2026 noahfranklin · Part of the Gideon security suite · MIT License · Original work.</sub>

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