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noahfranklinnoahfranklin/gideon/skills/cicd-supplychain-security/SKILL.md

cicd-supplychain-security

Skill2 starsChanged 47 days agoMITView on GitHub

Use when assessing CI/CD pipelines and the software supply chain — build-system and pipeline attacks (poisoned pipeline execution, unsafe workflow triggers, secret exfiltration from runners), dependency and artifact integrity, registry/package risks, signing and provenance (SLSA, Sigstore), and IaC/config in the pipeline. Maps to OWASP CICD Top 10 and SLSA, with detection and remediation. Authorized assessment of pipelines you own.

The file

We split this skill into the rules it gives an agent

1 rule. About 0 are common, 1 is distinctive, and 0 are very specific to this project.

  • ≈0

    Common · estimate

    Many files like this have a rule of this kind.

  • ≈1

    Distinctive · estimate

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  • Common
  • Distinctive
  • Very specific
  1. Distinctive:

    No secrets exposed to untrusted (fork) builds.

    line 40

≈ “Common” is an estimate: at least 1 in 5 of the 350,495 skill files we read have a rule of the same kind, not the same words. “Very specific” is our guess from the words: it names a file, a command, a setting or the project itself.

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Files
SKILL.md

CI/CD & Software Supply-Chain Security

The pipeline builds and ships everything, so compromising it compromises production — often more quietly than attacking prod directly. Assessment of build systems, dependencies, and artifact integrity. Mapped to the OWASP Top 10 CI/CD Security Risks and SLSA.

0. Authorization gate

  • You own / are authorized to assess these pipelines, repos, and registries.
  • Non-prod runners where possible; no tampering with real releases.
  • Secret-handling rules for anything discovered on runners.

1. Pipeline attack surface (OWASP CI/CD)

  • Insufficient flow control: can an untrusted contributor trigger a privileged pipeline (e.g., workflow runs on fork PRs with secrets)? → Poisoned Pipeline Execution (PPE).
  • Inadequate IAM / over-privileged jobs: tokens with broad scope, long-lived credentials in CI.
  • Dependency chain abuse: typosquatting, dependency confusion (internal name resolvable from public registry), malicious transitive deps.
  • Poisoned artifacts: unsigned/unverified build outputs, mutable tags, cache poisoning.
  • Secret exposure: secrets printed in logs, readable by PR builds, or broad environment scope.
  • Insecure system config: self-hosted runner isolation, misconfigured webhooks, unprotected branches.

For each: test feasibility in scope → detect signal → fix.

2. Dependencies & artifacts

  • Inventory direct + transitive deps; check for known-vuln and malicious packages (SCA).
  • Dependency confusion: are internal package names also resolvable from public registries? Lock registries/scopes.
  • Integrity: are artifacts signed and verified before deploy? Are base images pinned by digest?

3. Provenance & signing (the durable fix)

  • SLSA levels: move toward tamper-resistant, provenance-attested builds.
  • Signing/verification: Sigstore/cosign for artifacts and images; verify in admission (ties to container-k8s-pentest).
  • Enforce that only provenance-verified artifacts reach production.

4. IaC & config in pipeline

  • Scan IaC for misconfig before apply; prevent plan/apply with excessive cloud privileges (ties to cloud-pentest).

5. Remediation themes

  • Least-privilege, short-lived CI credentials (OIDC federation, no long-lived keys).
  • No secrets exposed to untrusted (fork) builds; scoped secrets; log scrubbing.
  • Protected branches, required reviews, pinned actions/images by digest.
  • Signed artifacts + provenance verified at deploy; isolated, ephemeral runners.
  • SCA + secret scanning gating merges.

6. Tooling

SCA (dependency scanners), secret scanners (gitleaks/trufflehog), pipeline auditors, cosign/Sigstore, IaC scanners. Follow RoE.

7. Reporting

Per finding: pipeline/repo/stage, risk (OWASP CI/CD / SLSA gap), blast radius (prod reach), detection, and remediation. Feed cross-domain chains to vuln-chaining. Checklist: references/cicd-checklist.md.

<sub>© 2026 noahfranklin · Part of the Gideon security suite · MIT License · Original work.</sub>

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