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noahfranklinnoahfranklin/gideon/skills/cloud-pentest/SKILL.md

cloud-pentest

Skill2 starsChanged 47 days agoMITView on GitHub

Use when testing cloud environments (AWS, Azure, GCP) for security weaknesses — IAM misconfiguration and privilege escalation, exposed storage/secrets, public/misconfigured services, SSRF-to-metadata credential theft, serverless and container-service risks, logging gaps, and lateral movement across accounts/subscriptions/projects. Maps to MITRE ATT&CK Cloud and provider benchmarks. Authorized engagements only.

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The file

We split this skill into the rules it gives an agent

1 rule. 0 are common, 1 is distinctive, and 0 are very specific to this project.

  • 0

    Common

    Most of the 3 edited versions we read keep these.

  • 1

    Distinctive

    This author's own choices. Worth a look.

  • 0

    Very specific

    Tied to their project's names, files or tools. Probably skip.

  • Common
  • Distinctive
  • Very specific
  1. Distinctive:

    Verify audit logging is on and centralized.

    line 41

“Common” is measured: kept by at least 6 in 10 of the 3 edited versions of this file we could read. “Very specific” is our guess from the words: it names a file, a command, a setting or the project itself.

Keep what fits and drop the rest. Your version, ready for your agents.
Files
SKILL.md

Cloud Penetration Testing (AWS / Azure / GCP)

Assessment of cloud infrastructure and IAM. Cloud compromise is usually an identity/misconfiguration problem, not a memory-corruption one. Mapped to MITRE ATT&CK (Cloud matrices) and provider security benchmarks (CIS).

0. Authorization gate

  • Written authorization from the account/subscription/project owner.
  • Provider testing policy respected (most permit customer-owned testing; some services need notice).
  • Scope: which accounts/subscriptions/projects and services; excluded prod data.

1. Recon & enumeration

  • Enumerate the identity you're given: permissions, roles, attached policies, assumable roles.
  • Inventory resources: compute, storage, databases, functions, networking, key/secret stores.
  • Find public exposure: open storage buckets/blobs, public snapshots/images, exposed databases, public endpoints.

2. IAM misconfiguration & privilege escalation (the core)

  • Over-permissive policies, wildcard permissions, dangerous permission combinations (e.g., pass-role + create-function, policy-version manipulation, privilege-granting APIs).
  • Assume-role chains and cross-account trust that widen access.
  • Fix: least privilege, remove wildcards, guardrails/SCPs, permission-boundary review, no long-lived keys.

3. Secrets & credential exposure

  • Secrets in instance metadata, environment variables, code, storage, or CI; long-lived access keys.
  • SSRF → metadata service to steal instance credentials (coordinate with web-app-pentest/api-security-audit).
  • Fix: enforce IMDSv2/metadata hardening, use short-lived workload identity, secret managers, rotate keys.

4. Service-specific

  • Storage: public/misconfigured buckets, overly broad ACLs, unencrypted data.
  • Serverless: function role over-permission, event-injection, dependency risk.
  • Containers/K8s services: route to container-k8s-pentest.
  • Databases/queues: exposure, weak auth, public access.

5. Lateral movement & persistence (document)

Cross-account role assumption, new credentials/keys, backdoor IAM principals, snapshot/data exfil paths — prove and document, don't persist.

  • Fix: monitor IAM changes, detective controls (CloudTrail/Activity logs/Audit logs), anomaly alerting.

6. Logging & detection review

Verify audit logging is on and centralized; identify blind spots. Cloud attacks are very detectable if logging exists.

7. Tooling

Provider CLIs, ScoutSuite/Prowler (posture), pmapper/cloudsplaining (IAM analysis), pacu (AWS), ROADtools (Azure → also entra-cloud-pentest). Follow RoE + provider policy.

8. Reporting

Present IAM/misconfig attack paths, blast radius per finding, and least-privilege remediation. Checklist: references/cloud-checklist.md.

<sub>© 2026 noahfranklin · Part of the Gideon security suite · MIT License · Original work.</sub>

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