variant-analysis
Skill1 starsChanged 11 days agoMITView on GitHub
Propagate one confirmed vulnerability pattern across the entire codebase or API surface. Use immediately after ANY finding is confirmed with source access: extract the abstract pattern (sink + missing guard + dataflow shape) and search for siblings — same vulnerable call, same missing check, same endpoint template. Turns one finding into complete coverage of its class. Keywords: variant analysis, pattern propagation, codeql variant, semgrep rule from finding, siblings, same-bug-different-location, systematic coverage. Do NOT use before at least one finding is confirmed (that is hunting, not variant analysis) or without source/schema access.
15 other projects use a version of this.
Adopted by
Most recently taken up by
- briiirussell/cybersecurity-skillstheir own version, first seen Nov 1, 2026
- lecluse-net/galaristheir own version, first seen Oct 30, 2026
- mtarcure/claude-vibe-squadtheir own version, first seen Oct 28, 2026
- davidanthonyn/claude-skillstheir own version, first seen Oct 20, 2026
- allanninal/claude-code-skillstheir own version, first seen Oct 17, 2026
- matheus-rib1108/meu-kit-claude-codetheir own version, first seen Oct 17, 2026
Used with
Projects with it also use yara-rule-authoring, second-opinion and 1 more.
Other files people use alongside this one.
Files found in the same public projects as a version of this one, more often than they turn up anywhere else. Each project counts once, large collections count for less, and this file's own repository is left out.
TheWatcher01Skillyara-rule-authoring
Guides authoring of high-quality YARA-X detection rules for malware identification. Use when writing, reviewing, or optimizing YARA rules. Covers naming conventions, string selection, performance optimization, migration from legacy YARA, and false positive reduction. Triggers on: YARA, YARA-X, malware detection, threat hunting, IOC, signature, crx module, dex module.
Also in 3 projects that use this
MicrosoftSkillsecond-opinion
Independent review of current work or a past session. USE WHEN a user wants a second opinion. DO NOT USE WHEN ordinary code review is wanted — use code-review.
Also in 3 projects that use this
SentrySkillsecurity-review
Finds exploitable application security vulnerabilities in code changes. Use for Warden security scans, appsec review, OWASP-style checks, authentication or authorization bugs, injection, XSS, SSRF, path traversal, secrets, unsafe crypto, webhook verification, open redirects, or sensitive data exposure.
Also in 3 projects that use this
Other versions15 projects use a version of this.
Word for word · 0
None found.
Edited · 0
None found.
Wrote their own version · 15
- waybarrios/opencode-power-pack★ 547same name
- briiirussell/cybersecurity-skills★ 489same name
- mtarcure/claude-vibe-squad★ 220same name
- 0x-Shashi/WEB3-AUDIT-SKILLS★ 61same name
- annatchijova/SKILLS★ 9same name
- BrentRector/claude-skills★ 6same name
- allanninal/claude-code-skills★ 1same name
- lecluse-net/galaris★ 1same name
- romaintoso78/claude-skills★ 1same name
- TaiMaBenJi/taima-skills★ 1same name
5 more not listed
How matches are found. Word for word: the exact same text. Edited: shares passages with this file (“99% same” means 99% of its five-word phrases also appear here; 10% or more counts). Their own version: similar meaning, or, weakest, the same name. We can’t tell which project had it first. Projects are counted among the 200 most-starred candidates, and mentions are links to the repository we found, up to 50 per site, so both counts are a floor.
In this repository124 other files it gives its agents.
- CLAUDE.mdCLAUDE.md
- ai-agent-reconSkill
- ai-supply-chainSkill
- exfiltration-via-aiSkill
- indirect-injectionSkill
- llm-fuzzingSkill
- prompt-injectionSkill
- rag-poisoningSkill
- tool-abuseSkill
- chain-analysisSkill
- chain-auth-to-takeoverSkill
- chain-customSkill
- chain-graph-walkSkill
- chain-idor-to-mass-dataSkill
- chain-info-to-exploitSkill
- chain-multi-appSkill
- chain-ssrf-to-cloudSkill
- chain-web-to-rceSkill
- chain-xss-to-account-takeoverSkill
- email-securitySkill
- engagement-flowSkill
- finding-disciplineSkill
- http-headers-securitySkill
- oob-interactionsSkill
- opsec-disciplineSkill
- research-firstSkill
- scope-disciplineSkill
- scope-importSkill
- session-contextSkill
- 2fa-bypassSkill
- api-abuseSkill
- auth-bypassSkill
- broken-access-controlSkill
- business-logicSkill
- cache-poisoningSkill
- clickjackingSkill
- corsSkill
- credential-testingSkill
- crlf-injectionSkill
- cryptographic-oracleSkill
- csrfSkill
- css-injectionSkill
- data-exfiltration-testSkill
- deserializationSkill
- email-injectionSkill
- file-uploadSkill
- fuzzingSkill
- graphqlSkill
- grpcSkill
- host-headerSkill
- http-smugglingSkill
- idorSkill
- info-disclosureSkill
- jwtSkill
- lateral-movementSkill
- lfi-rfiSkill
- mass-assignmentSkill
- oauthSkill
- open-redirectSkill
- parameter-pollutionSkill
- The first 60 shown.
The file
We split this skill into the rules it gives an agent
3 rules. 0 are common, 3 are distinctive, and 0 are very specific to this project.
0
Common
Most of the 15 edited versions we read keep these.
3
Distinctive
This author's own choices. Worth a look.
0
Very specific
Tied to their project's names, files or tools. Probably skip.
- Common
- Distinctive
- Very specific
- Distinctive: line 40
Write it as a one-line predicate: "calls to X where argument contains request-derived data and no call to Y in the same handler".
- Distinctive: line 50
Sweep the whole repo / service map: Every hit is a VARIANT CANDIDATE — not a finding.
- Distinctive: line 66
NOT 12 near-duplicate findings.
“Common” is measured: kept by at least 6 in 10 of the 15 edited versions of this file we could read. “Very specific” is our guess from the words: it names a file, a command, a setting or the project itself.
Files
Purpose
Finding one SQLi is luck; finding ALL SQLi built the same way is analysis. Clients fix the instance you report and leave the 11 siblings. Variant analysis is the discipline that converts a confirmed finding into class-wide coverage — and it's also how you verify a fix ("the patch closed endpoint A; the same pattern in B, C, D remains").
Methodology
- Abstract the confirmed finding into a pattern. From the PoC, extract:
- the SINK (exact function/API:
db.execute(,render_template_string(,exec(, an HTTP client call...), - the missing GUARD (no parameterization, no authorization decorator, no allowlist check),
- the SOURCE shape (request param → sink distance, any wrappers). Write it as a one-line predicate: "calls to X where argument contains request-derived data and no call to Y in the same handler".
- the SINK (exact function/API:
- Encode the pattern as a query:
- Semgrep rule (fastest; one YAML per pattern, run in seconds),
- CodeQL query when a database already exists (static-analysis-toolkit),
- fallback: structured grep / ast-grep for simple shapes. Iterate until the rule fires on the ORIGINAL finding location — if it can't find the bug you know, it won't find its siblings.
- Sweep the whole repo / service map. Every hit is a VARIANT CANDIDATE — not a finding. Triage each: same source reachability? same guard really absent? sanitization happening in a wrapper the pattern can't see?
- Confirm candidates per class rules. Variants get the same evidence
bar as the original: live trigger where in scope, or
Inferredwith the code-path evidence (source → sink trace + absent guard) clearly attached. Mass-reporting unverified variants violates the anti-fabrication rules. - No-source variant analysis (black-box): pattern = endpoint shape. If
/api/v1/users/{id}/exporthad IDOR, enumerate sibling routes from api-discovery and replay the identity-swap (session-context) across all handlers sharing the route template. Route-naming symmetry is the pattern. - Report as a family. One finding per distinct root cause, with a variant table (location, status: demonstrated/inferred/not-reachable) — NOT 12 near-duplicate findings. Report-writing skill has the family format.
Tooling
semgrep --config pattern.yml .— primary pattern engine.codeql database analyze— deep dataflow variants on an existing DB.ast-grep/sg— fast syntactic sweeps.- Router/framework route dumps (Rails routes, Flask url_map, OpenAPI paths) for black-box sibling enumeration.
Validation Gate (minimum proof)
- The pattern rule demonstrably matches the original confirmed finding.
- Each reported variant carries: location, source→sink trace (or live
evidence), guard-absence note, and status tag. Unverifiable variants go in
the finding's variant table as
Inferred, never as separate Demonstrated findings.
Gotchas
- Wrapper blindness: sanitization/authorization in middleware or decorators makes naive patterns over-fire — extend the pattern with the wrapper's signature once discovered, and re-sweep.
- Copy-paste drift: siblings often have subtle differences (one HAS the check). Verify each hit individually; the pattern finds candidates, humans (validators) confirm.
- Generated code and vendored dirs: exclude
vendor/,node_modules/, generated protobuf — or you'll drown in out-of-scope hits (supply-chain findings are the other skill's job). - Record sweep coverage: files/routes searched, exclusions — the variant table's completeness claim depends on it.
Chain Anchors
- Variant family mapped → which variant sits on the highest-value asset (admin panel, payment service)? Retest that one first for Demonstrated.
- Guard missing systematically (e.g., no authorization decorator anywhere in a service) → that is a structural finding: report root cause once, cite all affected routes.
- Fix-verification mode: after client remediation, re-run the same pattern — unfixed siblings become the retest report's core content.
Does it work?
Reviews from people and from AI agents that ran it: what they used it for, and whether it worked.
No reviews yet
People and AI agents can review whether this works in practice. Say what you used it for, and whether it worked.
- It worked
- Partly
- It didn't
Using an agent? It can post a review for you after it has run the file: the MCP tool registry_write, action report. How to connect one.
Your trail
Files you open will collect here, so you can find them again.
Open two or more, and you can remix the rules you like from each into one list. Kept in this browser only.
Now do this for your own.
Bring your CLAUDE.md, AGENTS.md or skills. agentleFS shows which of your rules are common, which are yours and which only fit one project, and keeps one version your agents read everywhere.

