security-policy-parser
Skill1 starsChanged 2 days agoMITView on GitHub
Parse and extract actionable constraints from a target's bug bounty or vulnerability disclosure policy before planning any testing phase. Identifies: test account policy (provided vs. researcher-owned), explicit exclusions, SLA/payment terms, safe harbor language, and scope boundaries that affect engagement planning. Use after scope is defined and before recon begins. Keywords: bug bounty policy, VDP, vulnerability disclosure, scope rules, test accounts, safe harbor, responsible disclosure, program rules.
In this repository134 other files it gives its agents.
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The file
We split this skill into the rules it gives an agent
3 rules. About 0 are common, 2 are distinctive, and 1 is very specific to this project.
≈0
Common · estimate
Many files like this have a rule of this kind.
≈2
Distinctive · estimate
This author's own choices. Worth a look.
1
Very specific
Tied to their project's names, files or tools. Probably skip.
- Common
- Distinctive
- Very specific
- Distinctive: line 71
If test accounts = "researcher-owned" AND no self-service signup exists → flag that authenticated testing requires commercial onboarding or …
- Very specific: line 74
If exclusions mention specific techniques (e.g., "no automated scanning") → annotate in scope.json rules.
- Distinctive: line 76
If rewards are $0 (VDP only) → adjust ROI expectations.
≈ “Common” is an estimate: at least 1 in 5 of the 364,980 skill files we read have a rule of the same kind, not the same words. “Very specific” is our guess from the words: it names a file, a command, a setting or the project itself.
Files
Signals
- Engagement targeting a bug bounty or VDP program.
- Need to determine whether authenticated testing is feasible before starting recon (credential availability affects phase planning).
- Need to confirm safe harbor, exclusions, and reporting requirements.
Prerequisites
- URL of the target's security/bug-bounty policy (from
scope-disciplineor the engagement brief).
Methodology
- Fetch the policy page:
curl -s "https://target.example.com/security-policy" > policy-raw.html # strip HTML for readable text lynx -dump -nolist policy-raw.html > policy-text.txt # or cat policy-raw.html | sed 's/<[^>]*>//g' | tr -s ' \n' > policy-text.txt Extract key fields — search for these patterns:
Field Search terms Impact on engagement Test accounts "own account", "test account", "we provide", "sandbox" Determines if auth testing needs coordination Exclusions "out of scope", "excluded", "do not", "prohibited" Hard limits on techniques Safe harbor "legal action", "law enforcement", "good faith" Engagement risk assessment Rewards "$", "bounty", "reward", "payment" ROI estimation SLA "business days", "response time", "triage" Reporting timeline Reporting format "encrypt", "PGP", "format", "steps to reproduce" Report template requirements Domains "in scope", "*.domain", "assets" Cross-check against scope.txt - Produce a policy summary — structured output for the engagement
state:
## Policy Summary: [Target] - **URL:** [policy URL] - **Last updated:** [date if stated] - **Safe harbor:** [yes/no + quote] - **Test accounts:** [provided / researcher-owned / unclear] - **Account creation path:** [self-service / sales / invitation / unclear] - **Exclusions:** [list] - **Reward tiers:** [table] - **SLA:** [triage days / payment days] - **Report requirements:** [encryption, format, etc.] - **Domains in scope:** [list, cross-checked with scope.txt] - Flag blockers for phase planning:
- If test accounts = "researcher-owned" AND no self-service signup exists → flag that authenticated testing requires commercial onboarding or vendor coordination BEFORE planning auth phases.
- If exclusions mention specific techniques (e.g., "no automated scanning") → annotate in scope.json rules.
- If rewards are $0 (VDP only) → adjust ROI expectations.
- Store in engagement state:
Save the summary as
report/policy-summary.mdand update.pentest-state/scope.jsonwith any rules extracted.
Validation Gate
- Policy URL fetched and readable text extracted.
- Test account availability determined (provided / own / unclear).
- All exclusions captured and reflected in scope rules.
- Safe harbor language confirmed present (or its absence noted as engagement risk).
- Account creation path documented — if no self-service, the blocker is flagged before recon completes.
Gotchas
- Policies change. Always fetch fresh at engagement start — don't rely on cached or remembered versions.
- "Use your own account" does NOT mean "create an account for free" — if there's no self-service signup, the researcher must subscribe or coordinate with the vendor. This distinction blocked authenticated testing in the Healthatom engagement for 8+ phases.
- Some policies list assets in a machine-readable format (JSON, YAML in
.well-known/security.txtor HackerOne scope API). Prefer structured sources over scraping HTML. - "Web/API vulnerabilities" in scope usually covers AI/ML endpoints too, but confirm if there's ambiguity.
- VDPs (no reward) still provide safe harbor — the legal protection has value even without payment.
Chain Anchors
Policy analysis feeds into:
- Engagement planning — credential strategy, phase ordering
- Report formatting — match the program's expected format
- ROI estimation — reward tiers × finding severity × competition
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Your trail
Files you open will collect here, so you can find them again.
Open two or more, and you can remix the rules you like from each into one list. Kept in this browser only.
Now do this for your own.
Bring your CLAUDE.md, AGENTS.md or skills. agentleFS shows which of your rules are common, which are yours and which only fit one project, and keeps one version your agents read everywhere.

