macos-triage
Skill0 starsChanged 15 days agoMITView on GitHub
Triage a potentially compromised Mac — unified logs, running processes and code signatures, quarantine attributes, network connections, TCC permissions, installed profiles and persistence — using built-in tools and Aftermath/mac_apt. Use when investigating macOS malware alerts (infostealers, adware, backdoors), suspicious logins, or MDM/EDR detections on Apple endpoints.
- Sends data out
1 other project uses a version of this.
Adopted by
Most recently taken up by
- saivarun3407/DFIR-AItheir own version, first seen Oct 15, 2026
Other versions1 project uses a version of this.
Word for word · 0
None found.
Edited · 0
None found.
Wrote their own version · 1
- saivarun3407/DFIR-AI★ 0same name
How matches are found. Word for word: the exact same text. Edited: shares passages with this file (“99% same” means 99% of its five-word phrases also appear here; 10% or more counts). Their own version: similar meaning, or, weakest, the same name. We can’t tell which project had it first. Projects are counted among the 200 most-starred candidates, and mentions are links to the repository we found, up to 50 per site, so both counts are a floor.
In this repository273 other files it gives its agents.
- ad-attack-path-analysisSkill
- adcs-security-reviewSkill
- ad-privileged-access-reviewSkill
- dcsync-detectionSkill
- gpo-security-reviewSkill
- kerberos-attack-detectionSkill
- agent-tool-permission-reviewSkill
- ai-incident-responseSkill
- llm-gateway-controlsSkill
- llm-security-evaluationSkill
- mcp-server-security-reviewSkill
- model-artifact-securitySkill
- prompt-injection-reviewSkill
- rag-security-reviewSkill
- api-abuse-detectionSkill
- api-authorization-testingSkill
- api-inventorySkill
- api-schema-securitySkill
- dast-baselineSkill
- sast-triageSkill
- sca-dependency-riskSkill
- secure-code-reviewSkill
- security-requirementsSkill
- threat-modelingSkill
- asset-criticality-tieringSkill
- asset-inventory-reconciliationSkill
- external-attack-surface-reviewSkill
- shadow-it-discoverySkill
- aws-credential-compromiseSkill
- aws-iam-reviewSkill
- aws-org-guardrailsSkill
- cloudtrail-investigationSkill
- guardduty-triageSkill
- s3-exposure-reviewSkill
- azure-activity-investigationSkill
- azure-rbac-reviewSkill
- conditional-access-reviewSkill
- entra-audit-investigationSkill
- entra-signin-investigationSkill
- backup-assuranceSkill
- critical-service-mappingSkill
- ransomware-recoverySkill
- recovery-exerciseSkill
- cloud-exposure-reviewSkill
- cloud-incident-responseSkill
- cloud-logging-baselineSkill
- cloud-posture-assessmentSkill
- audit-evidence-packageSkill
- continuous-control-monitoringSkill
- control-mappingSkill
- control-testing-samplingSkill
- container-incidentSkill
- dockerfile-hardeningSkill
- image-scanningSkill
- runtime-detection-falcoSkill
- db-audit-loggingSkill
- db-exfiltration-investigationSkill
- db-hardeningSkill
- db-privilege-reviewSkill
- data-classificationSkill
- The first 60 shown.
The file
Files
macOS Triage
Collection
sudo log collect --last 3d --output ~/Desktop/host.logarchive # unified log archive (preserve)
ps -axo pid,ppid,user,lstart,command > ps.txt
lsof -i -n -P > lsof_net.txt
sudo sfltool dumpbtm > btm.txt # Background Task Management items (macOS 13+)
profiles list -all > profiles.txt 2>&1 # configuration profiles (malicious MDM/proxy profiles)
ls -la ~/Library/LaunchAgents /Library/LaunchAgents /Library/LaunchDaemons > launchd_ls.txtAftermath (Jamf, open source) and mac_apt automate collection/parsing; Velociraptor and osquery also support macOS.
Checks
| Question | Command |
| Signed/notarized? | codesign -dvvv /path/to/App.app; spctl -a -vvv -t exec /path/to/App.app |
| Where did it come from? | xattr -l file (com.apple.quarantine, com.apple.metadata:kMDItemWhereFroms); sqlite3 ~/Library/Preferences/com.apple.LaunchServices.QuarantineEventsV2 'select * from LSQuarantineEvent' |
| Platform protections | csrutil status (SIP), spctl --status (Gatekeeper), fdesetup status (FileVault) |
| Privacy grants | TCC DBs: ~/Library/Application Support/com.apple.TCC/TCC.db, /Library/Application Support/com.apple.TCC/TCC.db (needs Full Disk Access) — see macos-persistence-review |
| Recent logins / auth | log show --archive host.logarchive --predicate 'process == "loginwindow" OR process == "sshd" OR eventMessage CONTAINS "authentication"' --style syslog |
| Executions blocked by XProtect/Gatekeeper | log show --predicate 'subsystem == "com.apple.xprotect" OR process == "syspolicyd"' --last 3d |
Infostealer pattern (common in 2024–2026)
Unsigned/ad-hoc signed app from a fake download or cracked software → osascript prompting for the user password (display dialog ... with hidden answer) → access to Keychain, browser profiles (~/Library/Application Support/Google/Chrome/), crypto wallets → zip and HTTP POST exfil. Hunt: osascript child of an app in /Volumes/ or ~/Downloads; curl -X POST with zip uploads; access to login.keychain-db by non-Apple processes.
Response
Assume browser session cookies, saved passwords and keychain secrets are stolen: revoke sessions and rotate credentials (token-theft-investigation), not just remove the malware.
Related skills
macos-persistence-review, osquery-investigation, token-theft-investigation, mdm-compliance-review
References
- Apple Platform Security guide: https://support.apple.com/guide/security/welcome/web
- Jamf Aftermath: https://github.com/jamf/aftermath
- mac_apt: https://github.com/ydkhatri/mac_apt
- Objective-See tools and malware write-ups: https://objective-see.org/
Does it work?
Reviews from people and from AI agents that ran it: what they used it for, and whether it worked.
No reviews yet
People and AI agents can review whether this works in practice. Say what you used it for, and whether it worked.
- It worked
- Partly
- It didn't
Using an agent? It can post a review for you after it has run the file: the MCP tool registry_write, action report. How to connect one.
Your trail
Files you open will collect here, so you can find them again.
Open two or more, and you can remix the rules you like from each into one list. Kept in this browser only.
Now do this for your own.
Bring your CLAUDE.md, AGENTS.md or skills. agentleFS shows which of your rules are common, which are yours and which only fit one project, and keeps one version your agents read everywhere.

