threat-modeling
Skill0 starsChanged 12 days agoMITView on GitHub
Threat model a system, feature or architecture change — data-flow diagram with trust boundaries, STRIDE (or LINDDUN for privacy, PASTA for risk-centric) threat enumeration, abuse cases, mitigations mapped to owners, and residual risk. Use at design time, before a major release, for security design reviews, or when asked "what could go wrong with this design?".
45 other projects use a version of this.
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- kinhluan/skillstheir own version, first seen Nov 8, 2026
- AxlZero21/Skillstheir own version, first seen Nov 8, 2026
- bepaldes/heimdall-agenttheir own version, first seen Nov 8, 2026
- reddygopalkrishna/developer-agent-skillstheir own version, first seen Nov 8, 2026
- SWEStash/swe-workflow-skillstheir own version, first seen Nov 8, 2026
- nledford/engineering-review-boardtheir own version, first seen Nov 3, 2026
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Other versions45 projects use a version of this.
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- briiirussell/cybersecurity-skills★ 489same name
- fr33d3m0n/skill-threat-modeling★ 347same name
- proflead/codex-skills-library★ 153same name
- hardw00t/ai-security-arsenal★ 101same name
- nahid-sparktales/agent-dispatcher★ 59same name
- mn-youssef/security-skills★ 47same name
- kumaran-is/claude-code-onboarding★ 35same name
- nimadorostkar/Claude-Skills-collection★ 33same name
- ulises-jeremias/agent-toolkit★ 19same name
- Indium-AI-Labs/indium-agentkit★ 18same name
35 more not listed
How matches are found. Word for word: the exact same text. Edited: shares passages with this file (“99% same” means 99% of its five-word phrases also appear here; 10% or more counts). Their own version: similar meaning, or, weakest, the same name. We can’t tell which project had it first. Projects are counted among the 200 most-starred candidates, and mentions are links to the repository we found, up to 50 per site, so both counts are a floor.
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The file
Files
Threat Modeling
The Threat Modeling Manifesto's four questions: What are we working on? What can go wrong? What are we going to do about it? Did we do a good enough job?
Workflow
- Model the system: DFD with external entities, processes, data stores, data flows; mark trust boundaries (internet ↔ edge, service ↔ service, tenant ↔ tenant, user ↔ admin, CI ↔ production). Note data classification on each flow. Tools: OWASP Threat Dragon, draw.io, Microsoft Threat Modeling Tool, threat-model-as-code (pytm, Threagile).
- Enumerate threats per element crossing a boundary using STRIDE:
| STRIDE | Property | Typical questions |
| Spoofing | Authentication | Can a caller impersonate a user/service? Token validation, mTLS, webhook signatures |
| Tampering | Integrity | Can data be modified in transit/storage? Input validation, signing, immutable logs |
| Repudiation | Non-repudiation | Are security-relevant actions logged with actor identity? |
| Information disclosure | Confidentiality | Over-broad APIs, error messages, logs with secrets, IDOR, cross-tenant leakage |
| Denial of service | Availability | Unbounded queries, expensive operations, rate limits, queue floods |
| Elevation of privilege | Authorization | Missing object-level checks, role escalation, SSRF to metadata, deserialization |
- Add abuse cases specific to the business (fraud, scraping, account takeover, prompt injection for LLM features — see
prompt-injection-review). - Rate (likelihood × impact or simple High/Med/Low) and decide: mitigate, transfer, accept, eliminate.
- Track mitigations as tickets/requirements with owners; link to ASVS requirements (
security-requirements). - Validate: tests (unit/integration security tests, DAST, pen test) proving mitigations; revisit model on architecture change.
Output template
Threat model <system/feature> v<> <date> Participants: <>
Scope & assumptions: <>
DFD: <link> Trust boundaries: <list>
# | Element/flow | STRIDE | Threat | Existing control | Risk | Mitigation | Owner | Ticket | Status
Accepted risks: <with approver>Related skills
secure-code-review, security-requirements, trust-boundary-analysis, architecture-review, pipeline-threat-model
References
- Threat Modeling Manifesto: https://www.threatmodelingmanifesto.org/
- OWASP Threat Modeling Cheat Sheet: https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/Threat_Modeling_Cheat_Sheet.html
- OWASP Threat Dragon: https://owasp.org/www-project-threat-dragon/
- LINDDUN privacy threat modeling: https://linddun.org/
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