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kaandgnshkaandgnsh/Claude-Blue/skills/aws-security/aws-org-guardrails/SKILL.md

aws-org-guardrails

Skill0 starsChanged 13 days agoMITView on GitHub

Design and review AWS Organizations guardrails — SCPs and RCPs (resource control policies), delegated administrators, organization CloudTrail, security tooling accounts, region restrictions, root access management — to prevent dangerous actions across all accounts. Use when building a multi-account landing zone, reviewing Control Tower/SCP coverage, or adding preventive controls after an incident.

The file

We split this skill into the rules it gives an agent

2 rules. About 0 are common, 2 are distinctive, and 0 are very specific to this project.

  • ≈0

    Common · estimate

    Many files like this have a rule of this kind.

  • ≈2

    Distinctive · estimate

    This author's own choices. Worth a look.

  • 0

    Very specific

    Tied to their project's names, files or tools. Probably skip.

  • Common
  • Distinctive
  • Very specific
  1. Distinctive:

    Test policies with the IAM policy simulator / in a sandbox OU before attaching broadly.

    line 45
  2. Distinctive:

    Check exemptions (break-glass roles) are narrow and monitored.

    line 46

≈ “Common” is an estimate: at least 1 in 5 of the 350,495 skill files we read have a rule of the same kind, not the same words. “Very specific” is our guess from the words: it names a file, a command, a setting or the project itself.

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Files
SKILL.md

AWS Organization Guardrails

Account structure

Management account (no workloads), security tooling account (delegated admin for GuardDuty, Security Hub, Access Analyzer, Macie, Detective, Inspector), log archive account (organization trail, immutable buckets), workload OUs (prod/non-prod), sandbox OU, suspended OU.

High-value SCPs (preventive)

{
  "Version": "2012-10-17",
  "Statement": [
    {"Sid": "ProtectSecurityServices", "Effect": "Deny",
     "Action": ["cloudtrail:StopLogging", "cloudtrail:DeleteTrail", "cloudtrail:UpdateTrail", "cloudtrail:PutEventSelectors",
                "guardduty:DeleteDetector", "guardduty:DisassociateFromMasterAccount", "guardduty:UpdateDetector",
                "securityhub:DisableSecurityHub", "config:StopConfigurationRecorder", "config:DeleteConfigurationRecorder",
                "access-analyzer:DeleteAnalyzer"],
     "Resource": "*",
     "Condition": {"ArnNotLike": {"aws:PrincipalArn": "arn:aws:iam::*:role/SecurityBreakGlass"}}},
    {"Sid": "DenyLeaveOrg", "Effect": "Deny", "Action": "organizations:LeaveOrganization", "Resource": "*"},
    {"Sid": "DenyRootUser", "Effect": "Deny", "Action": "*", "Resource": "*",
     "Condition": {"StringLike": {"aws:PrincipalArn": "arn:aws:iam::*:root"}}},
    {"Sid": "RegionRestriction", "Effect": "Deny", "NotAction": ["iam:*", "organizations:*", "sts:*", "support:*", "cloudfront:*", "route53:*", "budgets:*"],
     "Resource": "*", "Condition": {"StringNotEquals": {"aws:RequestedRegion": ["eu-west-1", "eu-central-1"]}}}
  ]
}

Other common SCPs: deny disabling S3 BPA, require IMDSv2 (ec2:MetadataHttpTokens), deny creating IAM users/access keys (force SSO), deny ram: sharing outside org. RCPs (resource control policies) enforce data perimeters on resources (e.g., deny S3/KMS/Secrets access from principals outside the org: aws:PrincipalOrgID).

Centralized root access management lets you remove root credentials from member accounts.

Review

  1. aws organizations list-policies --filter SERVICE_CONTROL_POLICY and list-targets-for-policy — which OUs/accounts are covered.
  2. Test policies with the IAM policy simulator / in a sandbox OU before attaching broadly; SCPs never grant, they only limit; they don't apply to the management account.
  3. Check exemptions (break-glass roles) are narrow and monitored.
  4. Confirm org trail covers all accounts and regions, log archive bucket has Object Lock / restricted access.

Related skills

aws-iam-review, cloud-logging-baseline, cloud-posture-assessment

References

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