cloud-posture-assessment
Skill0 starsChanged 11 days agoMITView on GitHub
Assess multi-cloud security posture (AWS, Azure, GCP) with Prowler, ScoutSuite, Steampipe or native CSPM (Security Hub, Defender for Cloud, Security Command Center) against CIS benchmarks — prioritize findings by exploitability and blast radius rather than count. Use for cloud security assessments, onboarding a new account/subscription/project, or reviewing CSPM output.
In this repository273 other files it gives its agents.
- ad-attack-path-analysisSkill
- adcs-security-reviewSkill
- ad-privileged-access-reviewSkill
- dcsync-detectionSkill
- gpo-security-reviewSkill
- kerberos-attack-detectionSkill
- agent-tool-permission-reviewSkill
- ai-incident-responseSkill
- llm-gateway-controlsSkill
- llm-security-evaluationSkill
- mcp-server-security-reviewSkill
- model-artifact-securitySkill
- prompt-injection-reviewSkill
- rag-security-reviewSkill
- api-abuse-detectionSkill
- api-authorization-testingSkill
- api-inventorySkill
- api-schema-securitySkill
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- sast-triageSkill
- sca-dependency-riskSkill
- secure-code-reviewSkill
- security-requirementsSkill
- threat-modelingSkill
- asset-criticality-tieringSkill
- asset-inventory-reconciliationSkill
- external-attack-surface-reviewSkill
- shadow-it-discoverySkill
- aws-credential-compromiseSkill
- aws-iam-reviewSkill
- aws-org-guardrailsSkill
- cloudtrail-investigationSkill
- guardduty-triageSkill
- s3-exposure-reviewSkill
- azure-activity-investigationSkill
- azure-rbac-reviewSkill
- conditional-access-reviewSkill
- entra-audit-investigationSkill
- entra-signin-investigationSkill
- backup-assuranceSkill
- critical-service-mappingSkill
- ransomware-recoverySkill
- recovery-exerciseSkill
- cloud-exposure-reviewSkill
- cloud-incident-responseSkill
- cloud-logging-baselineSkill
- audit-evidence-packageSkill
- continuous-control-monitoringSkill
- control-mappingSkill
- control-testing-samplingSkill
- container-incidentSkill
- dockerfile-hardeningSkill
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- runtime-detection-falcoSkill
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- The first 60 shown.
The file
We split this skill into the rules it gives an agent
1 rule. About 0 are common, 1 is distinctive, and 0 are very specific to this project.
≈0
Common · estimate
Many files like this have a rule of this kind.
≈1
Distinctive · estimate
This author's own choices. Worth a look.
0
Very specific
Tied to their project's names, files or tools. Probably skip.
- Common
- Distinctive
- Very specific
- Distinctive: line 37
Run tools; export JSON/OCSF.
≈ “Common” is an estimate: at least 1 in 5 of the 350,495 skill files we read have a rule of the same kind, not the same words. “Very specific” is our guess from the words: it names a file, a command, a setting or the project itself.
Files
Cloud Posture Assessment
Run assessments (read-only credentials)
prowler aws --compliance cis_4.0_aws -M html json-ocsf # framework names: prowler aws --list-compliance
prowler azure --az-cli-auth --compliance cis_3.0_azure
prowler gcp --project-ids my-project
scout aws --report-dir scout-report # ScoutSuite
steampipe check benchmark.cis_v300 # Steampipe/Powerpipe mods (version-specific)Native: AWS Security Hub (CIS/FSBP standards), Microsoft Defender for Cloud (secure score, MCSB), GCP Security Command Center (Security Health Analytics). Use a dedicated audit role: AWS SecurityAudit + ViewOnlyAccess; Azure Reader + Security Reader; GCP roles/iam.securityReviewer + roles/viewer.
Prioritize (not by count)
| Priority | Finding class |
| P1 | Public exposure of data stores (buckets, databases, snapshots), admin services open to internet, root/global admin without MFA, logging disabled, long-lived keys for admins |
| P2 | Over-privileged identities (wildcards, PassRole), cross-account/tenant trusts to unknown parties, unencrypted sensitive stores, IMDSv1 on internet-facing instances |
| P3 | Hardening gaps: rotation, tagging, minor configuration |
Combine with attack-path context: an IMDSv1 instance that is internet-facing and has an admin role is far worse than either alone (CNAPP attack paths, or manual graph review).
Workflow
- Scope accounts/subscriptions/projects (all of them — shadow accounts are common).
- Run tools; export JSON/OCSF; deduplicate across tools.
- Validate top findings manually (false positives from intentional public assets).
- Assign owners via tags/account ownership; set SLAs; track in tickets.
- Prevent recurrence with guardrails (SCPs/Azure Policy/Org Policy) and IaC scanning.
Output
Cloud/account | Control (CIS ID) | Resource | Severity | Exploitability context | Owner | Fix | Guardrail to prevent
Related skills
cloud-exposure-review, aws-org-guardrails, azure-rbac-review, gcp-iam-review, iac-scanning
References
- Prowler: https://docs.prowler.com/
- ScoutSuite: https://github.com/nccgroup/ScoutSuite
- CIS cloud benchmarks: https://www.cisecurity.org/cis-benchmarks
- CSA Cloud Controls Matrix: https://cloudsecurityalliance.org/research/cloud-controls-matrix
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