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kaandgnshkaandgnsh/Claude-Blue/skills/ai-security/agent-tool-permission-review/SKILL.md

agent-tool-permission-review

Skill0 starsChanged 15 days agoMITView on GitHub

Review AI agent and copilot tool permissions for excessive agency (OWASP LLM06:2025) — tool inventory, identity used for each tool call (user-delegated vs. service), scopes, side effects, human-in-the-loop approvals, sandboxing of code execution, rate limits, and audit logging. Use when deploying an AI agent, coding assistant, or automation that lets an LLM call tools, APIs or shell commands.

The file

We split this skill into the rules it gives an agent

1 rule. About 0 are common, 0 are distinctive, and 1 is very specific to this project.

  • ≈0

    Common · estimate

    Many files like this have a rule of this kind.

  • ≈0

    Distinctive · estimate

    This author's own choices. Worth a look.

  • 1

    Very specific

    Tied to their project's names, files or tools. Probably skip.

  • Common
  • Distinctive
  • Very specific
  1. Very specific:

    Minimal toolset: remove generic tools when specific ones suffice (a send_email(to=fixed-domain) beats http_request(any_url).

    line 21

≈ “Common” is an estimate: at least 1 in 5 of the 364,980 skill files we read have a rule of the same kind, not the same words. “Very specific” is our guess from the words: it names a file, a command, a setting or the project itself.

Keep what fits and drop the rest. Your version, ready for your agents.
Files
SKILL.md

Agent Tool Permission Review

Tool inventory

For every tool/function/MCP server the agent can call:

Tool | Operation(s) | Side effects (read/write/delete/send/pay/execute) | Identity used | Scope/permissions | Data reachable | Approval required? | Rate limit | Logged?

Principles

  1. Minimal toolset: remove generic tools when specific ones suffice (a send_email(to=fixed-domain) beats http_request(any_url); a query_orders(user) beats raw SQL).
  2. User-delegated identity: tool calls execute with the end user's permissions (OAuth on-behalf-of, scoped tokens), not a powerful shared service account — prevents confused-deputy escalation.
  3. Read-only default; write/delete/send actions require explicit human approval with a faithful preview of parameters.
  4. Sandbox code execution: containers/microVMs without network or with egress allow-lists, no host mounts, no credentials, CPU/time limits.
  5. Constrain parameters server-side (validate schemas, allow-lists for recipients/paths/domains); never trust the model to self-limit.
  6. Budget & rate limits per session/user to bound damage and cost (LLM10 unbounded consumption).
  7. Audit: log each tool call (who, which tool, parameters, result status) to the SIEM; alert on anomalous sequences (bulk reads followed by external sends).
  8. Kill switch to disable tools/agent quickly.

Coding agents (e.g., in IDE/CLI)

Restrict shell/file permissions with allow-lists, require approval for network and destructive commands, run in containers/devcontainers for untrusted repos, don't expose production credentials in the environment, review hooks/config files (they can be injection vectors through repository content).

Test

Attempt (authorized) prompt-injection-driven misuse of each write tool (prompt-injection-review), privilege boundaries (can user A's session read user B's data via the agent?), and approval bypass (does a multi-step plan circumvent confirmation?).

Related skills

prompt-injection-review, mcp-server-security-review, trust-boundary-analysis, llm-gateway-controls

References

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