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iktok90-designiktok90-design/ai-smart-contract-auditor/skills/signature-replay/SKILL.md

signature-replay

Skill36 starsChanged 5 months agoMITView on GitHub

Detect signature-replay, EIP-712 / EIP-2612 mistakes, malleable signatures, cross-chain replay, missing nonces. Activate on `ecrecover`, `permit`, meta-transactions, signed orders, signed approvals, EIP-712 domain construction, gasless transaction relayers.

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2 rules. About 0 are common, 0 are distinctive, and 2 are very specific to this project.

  • ≈0

    Common · estimate

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  • ≈0

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    This author's own choices. Worth a look.

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  • Distinctive
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  1. Very specific:

    Always require(signer != address(0)) after ecrecover, or use OZ ECDSA.

    line 45
  2. Very specific:

    Use OZ EIP712 base + ECDSA.recover — handles s-bound, malleability, zero-address.

    line 75

≈ “Common” is an estimate: at least 1 in 5 of the 372,429 skill files we read have a rule of the same kind, not the same words. “Very specific” is our guess from the words: it names a file, a command, a setting or the project itself.

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Files
SKILL.md

Signature replay & EIP-712 detection

When this applies

  • ecrecover and any signature verification path
  • permit (EIP-2612, ERC-4494) implementations
  • Meta-tx / gasless flows (ERC-2771, EIP-3074 / EIP-7702 wrapping)
  • Signed off-chain orders (0x, Seaport, custom)
  • Signed governance votes
  • Validator-set / bridge signature aggregation (see [[bridge-specialist]])

Detection patterns

Missing nonce (CRITICAL)

bytes32 digest = keccak256(abi.encode(sender, amount));   // ← no nonce, infinitely replayable
require(ecrecover(digest, v, r, s) == sender);

Missing chainId in domain (CRITICAL — cross-chain replay)

EIP-712 domain MUST include chainId. Without it, signing on Ethereum replays on Optimism/Arbitrum/etc.

bytes32 domain = keccak256(abi.encode(EIP712_DOMAIN, name, version, /* no chainId */ , verifyingContract));

Hardcoded chainId / _DOMAIN_SEPARATOR cached without fork-detect (HIGH)

DOMAIN_SEPARATOR = _hashDomain(block.chainid);   // ← cached in constructor, breaks after fork

Re-compute when block.chainid differs.

Signature malleability (HIGH)

ECDSA accepts both (r, s) and (r, n-s) for valid signatures. If you use the digest as a uniqueness key, attacker can flip s and replay. Enforce s ≤ secp256k1n/2 and v ∈ {27, 28}. Or use OpenZeppelin's ECDSA.tryRecover which already does this.

ecrecover returns address(0) on invalid sig — not reverted (HIGH)

address signer = ecrecover(digest, v, r, s);   // returns 0 on bad sig
require(roles[signer]);   // ← if roles[address(0)] is ever true (default mapping behavior), it bypasses

Always require(signer != address(0)) after ecrecover, or use OZ ECDSA.

Replay across contracts (HIGH)

Missing address(this) / verifyingContract in the signed payload. Same admin sig usable on multiple deployments.

Front-running of permit (MEDIUM)

See [[mev-frontrunning]] §permit.

Approval-front-run via signed message (HIGH)

Off-chain signed orders where the maker can replay across fills if the order doesn't include salt + nonce + cancellation mechanism.

Permit2 confusion (HIGH)

Mixing Permit2's SignatureTransfer (one-shot) vs AllowanceTransfer (persistent). Read the contract's docs carefully.

Severity rubric

PatternSeverity
Missing nonce in signed payloadCritical
Missing chainId — cross-chain replay possibleCritical
ecrecover without signer != address(0) checkHigh
Malleable signature accepted (no s-bound check)High
Cached DOMAIN_SEPARATOR without fork-aware re-computeHigh
Signed payload omits verifyingContractHigh
Order salt missing, no cancellation mechanismHigh
Off-by-one chainId for L2 chains (e.g. Polygon = 137 not 1)High
Permit gas-grief on revert reverts in batchMedium

Remediation patterns

  • Use OZ EIP712 base + ECDSA.recover — handles s-bound, malleability, zero-address.
  • Include in every signed payload: chainId, verifyingContract, nonce, deadline, plus any operation-specific fields.
  • Re-derive DOMAIN_SEPARATOR lazily when block.chainid != cached_chainid.
  • Nonces: per-signer monotonic OR per-order salt + on-chain seen-bitmap.
  • For ERC-1271 (contract signers), validate via isValidSignature(bytes32, bytes) returning the magic value.

False-positive notes

  • Single-use bound to a specific consumed-event flag isn't strictly replayable — but still flag if the bound is fragile.
  • Pure off-chain signatures never submitted on-chain don't have replay risk on chain, but watch for accidental reuse.

Related

  • [[access-control]]
  • [[bridge-specialist]] — validator set signatures
  • [[mev-frontrunning]]

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