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iktok90-designiktok90-design/ai-smart-contract-auditor/skills/signature-malleability/SKILL.md

signature-malleability

Skill36 starsChanged 5 months agoMITView on GitHub

Detect ECDSA signature malleability and ecrecover pitfalls — missing low-s (EIP-2) enforcement, unconstrained v, unchecked address(0) from ecrecover, replay across chainId/contract from a missing EIP-712 domain separator, EIP-2098 compact-signature confusion, and signature reuse. Activate whenever code calls ecrecover directly, parses (r,s,v) from bytes, or verifies signed messages without OpenZeppelin ECDSA.

The file

We split this skill into the rules it gives an agent

2 rules. About 0 are common, 0 are distinctive, and 2 are very specific to this project.

  • ≈0

    Common · estimate

    Many files like this have a rule of this kind.

  • ≈0

    Distinctive · estimate

    This author's own choices. Worth a look.

  • 2

    Very specific

    Tied to their project's names, files or tools. Probably skip.

  • Common
  • Distinctive
  • Very specific
  1. Very specific:

    Signal: no EIP-712 domain separator binding chainId and verifyingContract.

    line 42
  2. Very specific:

    Prefer SignatureChecker when signers may be ERC-1271 contract wallets.

    line 64

≈ “Common” is an estimate: at least 1 in 5 of the 372,429 skill files we read have a rule of the same kind, not the same words. “Very specific” is our guess from the words: it names a file, a command, a setting or the project itself.

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Files
SKILL.md

Signature malleability detection

When this applies

Trigger on any of:

  • Direct ecrecover(hash, v, r, s) calls (not via OpenZeppelin ECDSA.recover)
  • Manual (r, s, v) decoding from a bytes signature with assembly
  • Permit / meta-tx / order-book / claim flows that verify a signed digest
  • Signatures used as nonces or dedup keys (e.g. usedSig[sig] = true)
  • EIP-712 typed-data verification, or its absence where one is needed

Detection patterns

Missing low-s enforcement / malleable sig (HIGH if sig is a key)

address signer = ecrecover(hash, v, r, s);   // no s-range check
require(signer == expected);
usedSignature[keccak256(abi.encode(r,s,v))] = true;  // ← dedup keyed on sig bytes

Signal: for any valid (r,s,v) the "flipped" signature (r, n - s, v ^ 1) recovers the same signer (the classic Bitcoin/Ethereum transaction-malleability class). If the signature itself is the replay key, an attacker submits the twin and bypasses dedup. Enforce s <= secp256k1n/2 (EIP-2).

Unchecked ecrecover returning address(0) (HIGH)

address signer = ecrecover(hash, v, r, s);
require(signer == owner);  // if owner could ever be address(0)... or no check at all

Signal: malformed inputs make ecrecover return address(0). Any code path where the compared-against value can be address(0) (uninitialized mapping slot, default) authenticates an attacker with garbage. Always require(signer != address(0)).

Unconstrained v (MEDIUM)

Accepting arbitrary v (not 27/28) or trusting a caller-supplied v for EIP-2098 compact sigs, mixing the 64-byte and 65-byte formats. EIP-2098 packs yParity into the high bit of s; decoding it as a raw 65-byte sig corrupts recovery.

Cross-domain / cross-chain replay (HIGH)

bytes32 digest = keccak256(abi.encode(ORDER_TYPEHASH, maker, amount, nonce));

Signal: no EIP-712 domain separator binding chainId and verifyingContract. A signature is replayable on another chain (post-fork) or a sibling deployment. Build the digest with _hashTypedDataV4 (\x19\x01 + domainSeparator + structHash) and recompute the domain separator if block.chainid changes.

Signature reuse / no nonce (HIGH)

Same digest accepted twice because there's no per-signer nonce or no marking of consumed digests — meta-tx and claim flows drain repeatedly.

Severity rubric

PatternSeverityNotes
Malleable sig used as replay/dedup keyHighTwin sig bypasses guard
ecrecover==address(0) authenticates attackerHighAuth bypass
Missing EIP-712 domain → cross-chain replayHighSignature reuse across deployments
No nonce → straight replayHighRepeated execution
Unconstrained v / EIP-2098 confusionMediumFormat-dependent
Low-s missing but sig never used as a keyLowDefense-in-depth

Remediation patterns

  1. Use OpenZeppelin ECDSA.recover — it enforces s <= secp256k1n/2, rejects bad v, and reverts on address(0) (it also handles EIP-2098).
  2. Bind digests with EIP-712 (EIP712 base + _hashTypedDataV4), including chainId and verifyingContract; recompute the domain separator on chainid change.
  3. Use per-signer nonces (incrementing) rather than signature-bytes dedup; consume by (signer, nonce) not (r,s,v).
  4. Explicit require(signer != address(0)) even when using libraries, for any hand-rolled path.
  5. Prefer SignatureChecker when signers may be ERC-1271 contract wallets.

False-positive notes

  • Code already routing through OpenZeppelin ECDSA/SignatureChecker with EIP-712 and nonces is safe — don't re-flag the underlying ecrecover.
  • A sig verified against a non-zero, always-set signer where the digest is never reused is malleability-tolerant; note, don't escalate.

Related

  • [[signature-replay]] — nonce/chainId replay is the sibling concern
  • [[erc1271-contract-signatures]] — smart-wallet signers need isValidSignature
  • [[permit2-patterns]] — Permit2 / EIP-2612 digests and nonces

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