reentrancy
Skill36 starsChanged 5 months agoMITView on GitHub
Detect reentrancy vulnerabilities — classic, cross-function, and cross-contract (especially read-only reentrancy). Activate whenever Solidity/Vyper code performs external calls, low-level call/transfer/send, ERC-721 safeTransfer with a receiver hook, or any pattern where control flow leaves the contract before state finalization.
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The file
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Reentrancy detection
When this applies
Trigger on any of:
- External calls via
call,delegatecall,staticcall,transfer,send safeTransferFrom/onERC721Received/onERC1155Receivedcallbacks- ERC-777
tokensReceived/tokensToSendhooks - Cross-contract calls preceding state writes
- View functions that read state which is mid-update (read-only reentrancy)
- Custom token callbacks, governance vote-cast hooks, flash-loan callbacks
- Compound/Aave-style accounting that updates user balances after external transfers
Detection patterns
Classic reentrancy (CRITICAL / HIGH)
function withdraw() external {
uint256 amt = balance[msg.sender];
(bool ok,) = msg.sender.call{value: amt}(""); // ← external call
require(ok);
balance[msg.sender] = 0; // ← state update AFTER call
}Signal: state mutation after external call. CEI (Checks-Effects-Interactions) violated.
Cross-function reentrancy (HIGH)
Two functions sharing state where one calls externally and the other reads/mutates the same state. Attacker re-enters via the second function.
Cross-contract reentrancy (HIGH)
Contract A updates state, calls B; B calls back into a different contract C that reads A's stale state.
Read-only reentrancy (HIGH — frequently missed)
Victim contract reads getReserves() / getPrice() from a pool mid-callback, before the pool finalizes its state. Example: Curve pools, Balancer vaults, Uniswap V2 mid-removeLiquidity.
// Pool callback hits this view function before pool state is consistent.
function priceOf(address token) external view returns (uint256) {
return pool.getVirtualPrice(); // ← stale during reentrant call
}ERC-777 / ERC-721 hook reentrancy (HIGH)
_safeTransfer calls onERC721Received on the recipient — if recipient is a contract, it can re-enter.
Severity rubric
| Pattern | Severity | Notes |
| Funds-draining classic reentrancy | Critical | Direct loss of funds, no preconditions |
| Cross-function with shared balance state | High | Requires specific call sequence |
| Read-only reentrancy on price/oracle read | High | Common pattern, often missed |
Reentrancy gated by onlyOwner / trusted role | Medium | Centralization-bounded |
| ERC-777 hook with no state-after-call writes | Low | Defense-in-depth issue |
| Single-actor self-reentrancy with no value flow | Info |
Remediation patterns
- CEI ordering — effects before interactions, always.
nonReentrantmodifier (ReentrancyGuardfrom OpenZeppelin). Add per-function.- For read-only reentrancy — guard the view function too, or use a separate "settled price" cache that only updates outside callbacks. Curve's solution:
withdraw_admin_feeslock, Balancer'sensureNotInVaultContext. - Pull over push payments — let users withdraw rather than pushing transfers.
- Token whitelist — avoid ERC-777 and rebasing tokens in untested paths.
False-positive notes
- A function that uses
nonReentrantfrom a known-good library and only calls trusted contracts is generally safe — note it but don't flag as Critical. transfer(2300 gas) blocks classic reentrancy but is brittle on L2s with higher base gas costs — flag as a separate issue, not as reentrancy resolved.- Reentrancy into a function that only reads (no state writes downstream) and that read isn't used in a check — Info, not High.
Related
- [[oracle-manipulation]] — read-only reentrancy often is an oracle issue
- [[token-compatibility]] — ERC-777 / rebasing tokens widen the attack surface
- [[delegatecall-risks]] — delegatecall through untrusted target = reentrancy + storage corruption combo
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