confidence-scoring
Skill36 starsChanged 5 months agoMITView on GitHub
Always-on meta-skill — for every finding produced, attach a confidence level (HIGH/MEDIUM/LOW) and a reasoning trace. Activate on every /audit, /audit-deep, /audit-changes, /audit-live, /quick-scan invocation.
1 other project uses a version of this.
Adopted by
Most recently taken up by
- yogsoth-ai/knowledge-structuringtheir own version, first seen May 18, 2026
Other versions1 project uses a version of this.
Word for word · 0
None found.
Edited · 0
None found.
Wrote their own version · 1
- yogsoth-ai/knowledge-structuring★ 2same name
How matches are found. Word for word: the exact same text. Edited: shares passages with this file (“99% same” means 99% of its five-word phrases also appear here; 10% or more counts). Their own version: similar meaning, or, weakest, the same name. We can’t tell which project had it first. Projects are counted among the 200 most-starred candidates, and mentions are links to the repository we found, up to 50 per site, so both counts are a floor.
In this repository44 other files it gives its agents.
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- false-positive-feedback-loopSkill
- fee-on-transferSkill
- flash-loan-attacksSkill
- initializationSkill
- inline-assemblySkill
- integer-issuesSkill
- intents-erc7683Skill
- known-good-comparisonSkill
- liquidation-cascadeSkill
- mev-frontrunningSkill
- mev-pbsSkill
- multi-pass-self-critiqueSkill
- oracle-manipulationSkill
- oracle-redundancySkill
- permit2-patternsSkill
- pragma-and-addressesSkill
- progress-and-streamingSkill
- reentrancySkill
- restaking-eigenlayerSkill
- selfdestruct-eip6780Skill
- signature-malleabilitySkill
- signature-replaySkill
- solana-anchorSkill
- storage-layoutSkill
- stylus-rustSkill
- token-compatibilitySkill
- tx-context-misuseSkill
- unchecked-callsSkill
- ve-lock-governanceSkill
- vyper-specificSkill
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The file
We split this skill into the rules it gives an agent
4 rules. About 0 are common, 4 are distinctive, and 0 are very specific to this project.
≈0
Common · estimate
Many files like this have a rule of this kind.
≈4
Distinctive · estimate
This author's own choices. Worth a look.
0
Very specific
Tied to their project's names, files or tools. Probably skip.
- Common
- Distinctive
- Very specific
- Distinctive: line 35
Every finding includes a "How I reached this conclusion" snippet:
- Distinctive: line 75
Don't mark every finding HIGH to look thorough.
- Distinctive: line 76
Don't mark a real, well-evidenced finding LOW to be cautious — that defeats the purpose.
- Distinctive: line 77
Don't downgrade Critical severity to compensate for low confidence — they're orthogonal axes.
≈ “Common” is an estimate: at least 1 in 5 of the 350,495 skill files we read have a rule of the same kind, not the same words. “Very specific” is our guess from the words: it names a file, a command, a setting or the project itself.
Files
Confidence scoring (meta-skill)
Per-finding confidence is what separates a noisy linter from a usable auditor. Always attach confidence.
Confidence levels
HIGH
- Pattern matches exactly with no ambiguous preconditions.
- Working exploit possible (or already drafted via [[exploit-poc-writer]]).
- Affected line is reachable from a public/external function with no role gating.
- Cross-verified by attacker subagent or
/verify-finding. - Historical incident matches the same pattern at this severity.
MEDIUM
- Pattern matches but exploit requires non-trivial preconditions:
- Specific token type (rebasing / fee-on-transfer)
- Specific chain configuration (sequencer down on L2, oracle behavior)
- Multi-actor coordination
- Reachability through trusted-only call paths.
- One specialist subagent confirms, another offers a benign explanation.
LOW
- Pattern theoretically present but practical exploitability uncertain.
- Heavy reliance on assumptions about external integrations not auditable.
- Defense-in-depth gaps with no clear attack.
- Conflicting evidence between passes (in
/audit-strict).
Reasoning trace requirement
Every finding includes a "How I reached this conclusion" snippet:
Reasoning:
1. Function withdraw() at Vault.sol:140 sends ether via low-level call.
2. State update (balance[msg.sender] = 0) happens after the call (CEI violated).
3. Receiver address is user-controlled (msg.sender).
4. No nonReentrant modifier on the function.
5. No external mitigation in surrounding code.
Conclusion: classic reentrancy, exploitable in a single tx.
Cross-check: attacker subagent independently constructed a PoC (passing).
→ Confidence: HIGHWhen to downgrade
Always downgrade if:
- The "exploit" requires the attacker to compromise an admin key.
- The pattern is present but mitigated by an immutable, audited library call.
- The vuln class is present but the capability requires unrealistic state.
When to escalate to HIGH
Upgrade to HIGH only if:
- You can articulate the exploit in concrete terms.
- You can identify the specific value at risk.
- You can write a PoC that compiles (or you cite a historical incident).
Output integration
In the standard finding format:
[<ID> | <Severity>] <Title>
Confidence: HIGH | MEDIUM | LOW
Reasoning: <trace>
...Don't
- Don't mark every finding HIGH to look thorough.
- Don't mark a real, well-evidenced finding LOW to be cautious — that defeats the purpose.
- Don't downgrade Critical severity to compensate for low confidence — they're orthogonal axes.
Related
- [[multi-pass-self-critique]] — uses confidence to filter
- [[false-positive-feedback-loop]] — low-confidence findings are dismissal candidates
- [[known-good-comparison]] — known-good match → upgrade confidence
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Your trail
Files you open will collect here, so you can find them again.
Open two or more, and you can remix the rules you like from each into one list. Kept in this browser only.
Now do this for your own.
Bring your CLAUDE.md, AGENTS.md or skills. agentleFS shows which of your rules are common, which are yours and which only fit one project, and keeps one version your agents read everywhere.

